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ABSTRACT
Yonghwi, Kwon PhD, Purdue University, August 2018. Combatting Advanced Persistent
Threat via Causality Inference and Program Analysis. Major Professors: Xiangyu Zhang
and Dongyan Xu.
Cyber attackers are becoming more and more sophisticated. In particular, Advanced
Persistent Threat (APT) is a new class of attack that targets a specifc organization and
compromises systems over a long time without being detected. Over the years, we have
seen notorious examples of APTs including Stuxnet which disrupted Iranian nuclear centrifuges and data breaches affecting millions of users. Investigating APT is challenging as
it occurs over an extended period of time and the attack process is highly sophisticated and
stealthy. Also, preventing APTs is diffcult due to ever-expanding attack vectors.
In this dissertation, we present proposals for dealing with challenges in attack investigation. Specifcally, we present L DX which conducts precise counter-factual causality
inference to determine dependencies between system calls (e.g., between input and output
system calls) and allows investigators to determine the origin of an attack (e.g., receiving
a spam email) and the propagation path of the attack, and assess the consequences of the
attack. L DX is four times more accurate and two orders of magnitude faster than stateof-the-art taint analysis techniques. Moreover, we then present a practical model-based
causality inference system, M CI, which achieves precise and accurate causality inference
without requiring any modifcation or instrumentation in end-user systems.
Second, we show a general protection system against a wide spectrum of attack vectors and methods. Specifcally, we present A2C that prevents a wide range of attacks by
randomizing inputs such that any malicious payloads contained in the inputs are corrupted.
The protection provided by A2C is both general (e.g., against various attack vectors) and
practical (7% runtime overhead).

1

1

INTRODUCTION

Cyber attackers are becoming more and more sophisticated. In particular, Advanced Persistent Threat or APT is a special kind of attacks that leverages most stealthy and advanced
attack methods. They lurk in victim systems for a long time (e.g., from weeks to months)
without being detected while exfltrating secrets and/or disrupting systems. We have seen
many high-profle APT attacks including S TUXNET which targets the most dangerous infrastructure, nuclear plants, and compromised more than hundreds of thousands of systems through multiple steps. It lurked in the systems for years while silently updating,
installing backdoors, and exfltrating information. It was commented that the attack could
have caused a nuclear disaster more catastrophic than Chernobyl. Unfortunately, combatting APT attacks is particularly diffcult because (1) the attacks happen for a long time
hence even tracking and understanding what attackers did is challenging and (2) they leverage zero-day vulnerabilities which are not disclosed hence proactive prevention of APT is
challenging.
This dissertation presents fundamental approaches that systematically prevent and analyze APT attacks. Specifcally, we analyze state-of-the-art attack prevention and analysis
techniques and identifes advantages and disadvantages. To this end, we realize the original concept of counter-factual causality which was frst introduced by David Hume in the
18th century can be effective in APT attack investigation and existing techniques are approximations of the counter-factual causality. In addition, we identify that existing attack
prevention approaches are mostly attack-vector specifc hence they are often ineffective in
preventing zero-day exploits. As a result, we develop a novel causality inference technique
that can precisely identify causal relationships between processes, fles, and network addresses. Also, we develop a novel attack vector agnostic exploit injection attack prevention
technique to thwarts zero-day exploits. By leveraging those fundamental techniques, we
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can achieve the complete protection and analysis of APT attacks which happen over a long
time and leverage stealthy techniques.
In particular, this dissertation includes (1) L DX [1], a novel counter-factual causality
inference, which strictly follows the original defnition of counter-factual causality frst introduced by David Hume in 18th century, (2) M CI [2], a novel model-based causality inference technique built on top of L DX, that infers causality for enterprise systems without any
instrumentation and modifcation of underlying systems such as kernel, and (3) A2C [3],
a novel exploit injection attack prevention technique, that can prevent zero-day exploits
which is not known hence existing attack vector specifc techniques cannot prevent.

1.1

Dissertation Statement
Accurate attack investigation and general protection against advanced and sophisticated

attacks can be achieved by leveraging causality inference and fundamental weaknesses of
the attacks.

1.2

Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
• We develop a practical causality inference system, L DX [1] that can conduct a faithful
counterfactual causality inference to determine dependencies between system calls
(e.g., between input and output system calls) and allow investigators to determine the
origin of an attack (e.g., receiving a spam email) and assess the consequences of the
attack. L DX is 4 times more accurate and 2 orders of magnitude faster (6% runtime
overhead) than state-of-the-art taint analysis techniques.
• Expanding beyond L DX, we have proposed a model-based causality inference system, M CI [2]. M CI is practical as it does not require any modifcation or instrumentation to end-user systems, and it is more accurate and precise (0.1% FP/FN) than
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the previous state-of-the-art technique BEEP [4] which does require instrumentation
(12.8% FP/0.3% FN).
• We have designed a novel software protection system, A2C [3], that prevents a wide
range of attacks by randomizing inputs such that any malicious payloads contained
in the inputs are corrupted. The protection provided by A2C is both general (e.g.,
against various attack vectors including buffer-overfow, integer-overfow, use-afterfree, type-confusion, and ROP) and practical (7% runtime overhead).

1.3

Dissertation Organization
This dissertation includes three fundamental primitives for the investigation and preven-

tion of advanced cyber-attacks: L DX which proposes a novel causality inference technique
(Chapter 2), M CI which develops a novel model-based causality inference technique for
enterprise environment (Chapter 3), and A2C which is an attack vector agnostic exploit
injection attack prevention technique (Chapter 4).

1.4

Dissertation Overview
Prior to my work, the two most widely used state-of-the-art techniques for attack inves-

tigation were taint analysis and audit-logging. Taint analysis tracks program dependencies
by monitoring the data propagation of individual instructions. Audit-logging focuses on dependencies between syscalls exposed through explicit syscall arguments (e.g., fle handles).
For example, they consider syscalls on the same fle or within the same process causally
related. Unfortunately, taint analysis suffers from signifcant performance overhead as it
needs to monitor every instruction. Moreover, both taint analysis and audit-logging are
inaccurate as taint analysis has diffculty handling control dependencies and the assumptions made in audit-logging (e.g., all output syscalls are causally related to all input syscalls
within a process) are too coarse-grained, leading to a large number of bogus dependencies.
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Counter-factual causality, frst introduced in the 18th century by David Hume [5], can
be used to describe the desired causal analysis in an attack investigation. Specifcally, given
two events, a latter event is causally dependent on a preceding event if changes at the
preceding event lead to state differences in the latter event. To this end, we realized that the
limitations of taint analysis and audit-logging stem from their imprecise approximations
of counter-factual causality. My research pioneered building techniques that implement
precise counter-factual causality for cyber attack investigation.
In addition, to build general protection against ever-evolving cyber attacks, my research
breaks a common critical step of most attacks: malicious payload injection and execution.
In particular, we exploit a fundamental characteristic of malicious payloads: they are designed with strict semantic assumptions about the execution environment (e.g., platform or
architecture), hence they are particularly brittle to any mutation.

1.4.1

Conducting Faithful Counter-factual Causality

We take a fundamental approach: adapting the original counter-factual causality concept in the context of program and program execution. L DX [1] conducts faithful counterfactual causality inference on computer systems via dual execution. Specifcally, it runs
two executions in parallel — the original execution and its mutated version with mutations
on input syscalls. Then, it observes differences at output syscalls. Any difference indicates
causality between the mutated input syscalls and the output syscalls. Due to the mutation
L DX introduces, the mutated execution may take a different path, leading to a different
sequence of executed syscalls, when compared with the original execution. Hence, a fundamental challenge of L DX is to align the two executions so that they can be compared
at the same execution point, because comparing executions at misaligned points leads to
incorrect causality (i.e., FP/FN). To this end, we designed a novel runtime counter derived
from program structure. The counter is not a simple logic timestamp, but rather denotes
execution points by ensuring an important key property: The counter value indicates the
relative progress of executions, meaning that an execution with a larger counter value must

5
be ahead of another execution with a smaller counter value with respect to program structure. The counter facilitates alignment of two executions, enabling precise and effcient
causality inference. Evaluation on a large set of real-world applications, including Apache
web server, shows that L DX is 4 times more accurate and 2 orders of magnitude faster than
state-of-the-art taint analysis techniques.

1.4.2

Model-based Causality Inference for Practical Attack Provenance

The primary hindrance of existing techniques, including L DX, for attack provenance is
their requirement of changing end-user systems such as program instrumentation and kernel
modifcation. In contrast, existing automata-based techniques do not require instrumentation. They work by identifying program behaviors (e.g., fle downloading) from a concrete
log (e.g., a syscall log). They construct automata that represent the behaviors. Then, they
parse a log generated from an execution with the automata to determine whether the behaviors are exhibited in the log. However, they do not take dependencies into account; for
instance, they may detect two behaviors that are “download a fle” and “send a message,”
while the causal relationship between these two behaviors is not exposed.
M CI [2] is a model-based causality inference technique for attack provenance that directly works on syscall logs without requiring any end-user program instrumentation or
kernel modifcation. For each program, it uses L DX to acquire precise causal models for a
set of primitive operations (e.g., opening a fle). A causal model is a sequence of syscalls
annotated with inter-dependencies (causality) between the syscalls within the model, where
some of the inter-dependencies are caused by memory operations and hence implicit at the
syscall level. During deployment, M CI parses the existing audit-logs into concrete model
instances to derive causality. To this end, parsing syscall logs with causal models with
implicit dependency information leads to two prominent challenges: language complexity
and ambiguity. First, to express complex inter-dependencies annotated in causal models,
expressive grammar is required while more expressive grammar describes more complex
language (e.g., context-free or context-sensitive) and hence leads to higher cost in pars-
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ing. Second, some syscalls can be parsed by multiple models that share common parts
(e.g., common prefxes). In such cases, it is diffcult to decide which model is the right
one. As different causalities are derived from different models, the ambiguity problem may
lead to incorrect causality (i.e., FP/FN). To solve these challenges, we designed a novel
model parsing algorithm called segmented parsing that can handle multiple model complexity levels (e.g., regular, context-free, and context-sensitive) and substantially mitigate
the ambiguity problem by leveraging explicit dependencies that can be directly derived
from the log (e.g., dependencies caused by fle handles). Specifcally, M CI frst obtains a
model skeleton of each causal model. A model skeleton consists of syscalls with explicit
dependencies. The skeleton partitions a model into model segments that can be described
and parsed by automata. Without requiring any changes to end-user systems, M CI recovers
causality with close to 0% FP/FN for most applications (the worst case: 8.3% FP and 5.2%
FN). More importantly, causal models have composability such that models for primitive
operations can be composed together to describe complex system-wide attack behaviors.
For example, primitive models for “Edit”, “Copy”, “Paste”, and “Save” can compose a new
model that represents a complex user behavior “Edit→Copy→Edit→Paste→Edit→Save”
(e.g., potential information exfltration). Evaluation on attack cases created by security
professionals in the DARPA TC program shows that attack causal graphs generated by M CI
are more precise than those generated by the previous state-of-the-art system BEEP [4] that
requires instrumentation.

1.4.3

Corrupting Malicious Payloads via Input Perturbation

A2C [3] exploits the brittleness of malicious payloads to provide general protection.
It corrupts malicious payloads by encoding all inputs from untrusted sources at runtime.
However, the encoding may break program execution on benign inputs as well. To assure
that the program continues to function correctly when benign inputs are provided, We developed a static analysis technique that identifes all the places that read and process inputs
and selectively inserts decoding logic at some of those places. Specifcally, decoding only
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occurs when the use of the inputs cannot be exploited. For instance, when inputs in a byte
array are copied to an integer array, each byte of the inputs is padded with 3 zero bytes (as
an integer is 4 bytes on 32-bit machines) before it is stored into the integer array. Constructing a meaningful payload with 3 zero bytes in every four bytes is extremely diffcult, if not
impossible. To this end, we proposed a novel constraint solving algorithm which identifes
operations that make inputs no longer exploitable, such as the copy operation from a byte
array to an integer array. The operations essentially divide the state space of a program into
exploitable and post-exploitable sub-spaces because the program state before the operation
is exploitable, but no longer so after the operations. Therefore, A2C decodes the mutated
values only when they are transmitted from the exploitable space to the post-exploitable
space. Notably, the exploitable space is much smaller than the post-exploitable space —
making A2C highly effcient. A2C successfully achieves general protection for a large
set of real-world programs, including Apache web server against a variety of attacks (e.g.,
heap spraying, use-after-free, buffer-overfow, integer-overfow, and type-confusion) with
low overhead (6.94%).
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2

L DX : CAUSALITY INFERENCE BY LIGHTWEIGHT DUAL EXECUTION

Causality inference, such as dynamic taint anslysis, has many applications (e.g., information leak detection). It determines whether an event e is causally dependent on a preceding
event c during execution. We develop a new causality inference engine L DX. Given an
execution, it spawns a slave execution, in which it mutates c and observes whether any
change is induced at e. To preclude non-determinism, L DX couples the executions by sharing syscall outcomes. To handle path differences induced by the perturbation, we develop a
novel on-the-fy execution alignment scheme that maintains a counter to refect the progress
of execution. The scheme relies on program analysis and compiler transformation. L DX
can effectively detect information leak and security attacks with an average overhead of
6.08% while running the master and the slave concurrently on seperate CPUs, much lower
than existing systems that require instruction level monitoring. Furthermore, it has much
better accuracy in causality inference.

2.1

Introduction
Causality inference during program execution determines whether an event is causally

dependent on a preceding event. Such events could be system level events (e.g., input/output
syscalls) or individual instruction executions. A version of causality inference, dynamic
tainting, is widely used to detect information leak, namely, sensitive information is undesirably disclosed to untrusted entities, and runtime attacks, in which exploit inputs subvert
critical execution state such as stack and heap [6–10].
Most existing causality inference techniques are based on program dependences, especially data dependences. There is data dependence between two events if the former event
defnes a variable and the later event uses it. These techniques have a few limitations. First,
they have diffculty in handling control dependence. There is control dependence between
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a predicate and an instruction if the predicate directly determines whether the instruction
executes. The challenge lies in that control dependences sometimes lead to strong causality,
but some other times lead to very weak causality that cannot be exploited by attackers and
hence should not be considered. Most existing solutions [11–13] rely on detecting syntactic
patterns of control dependences and hence are incomplete. Second, existing techniques are
expensive (e.g., a few times slow-down [8]), as memory accesses need to be instrumented
to detect data dependences. Third, the complexity in implementation is high. Dependence
tracking logic needs to be defned for each instruction, which is error-prone for complex
instruction sets. Instrumenting third party libraries, various languages and their runtimes,
is very challenging.
We observe that these limitations root at tracking causality by monitoring program dependencies. We propose to directly infer causality based on its defntion. In [14], counterfactual causality was defned as follows. An event e is causally dependent on an earlier
event c if and only if the absence of c also leads to the absence of e. Program dependence
tracking in some sense just approximates counterfactural causality. Our technique works
as follows. It perturbs the program state at c (the source) and then observes whether there
is any change at e (the sink). There are a number of challenges. (1) We need at least
two executions to infer causality. Thus, we must prune the differences caused by nondeterminism such as different external event orders. (2) Meaningful comparison of states
across executions requires execution alignment. Due to perturbation, the event e may occur
at different locations. Naive approaches such as using program counters hardly work due
to path differences [15]. (3) The second execution is not a simple replay of the frst one, as
the perturbation may cause path differences and then input/output syscall differences. (4)
Ideally, the two executions should proceed in parallel. Otherwise, the execution time is at
least doubled.
The core of our technique is a novel runtime engine L DX, which stands for Lightweight
Dual eXecution. Its execution model is similar to Dual Execution (DualEx) [16]. Given
an original execution (the master), a new execution (the slave) is derived by mutating the
source(s). Later, by comparing the output buffer contents of the two executions at the
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sink(s), we can determine if the sink(s) are causally dependent on the source(s). The master and the slave are coupled and run concurrently. The slave tries to reuse syscall and
nondeterministic instruction outcomes (e.g., rdtsc) from the master to avoid nondeterminism. To avoid side effects, the slave often ignores output syscalls. Since perturbation
may cause path differences and hence syscall differences, an on-the-fy execution alignment
scheme is necessary. DualEx has a very expensive alignment scheme based on Execution
Indexing [15]. The slow-down reported in [16] is three orders of magnitude. In contrast,
L DX features a novel lightweight on-the-fy alignment scheme that maintains a counter that
refects the progress of execution. The counter is computed in such a sophisticated way
that an execution with a larger counter value must be ahead of another with a smaller one.
The slave blocks if it reaches a syscall earlier than the master. If different paths are taken
in the executions, the scheme can detect them and instructs the executions to perform their
syscalls independently. It also allows the executions to realign by ensuring that they have
the same counter value at the join point of the different paths. Without such fne-grained
alignment, when the slave encounters a syscall different from that in the master, it cannot
decide if the master is running behind (so that it can simply wait) or the two are taking
different paths so that the syscall will never happen in the master.
Our contributions are summarized in the following.
• We study the limitations of program dependence based causality and propose counterfactual causality instead.
• We develop a lightweight dual execution engine that enables practical counterfactual
causality inference.
• We develop a novel scheme that computes a counter cost-effectively at runtime using
simple arithmetic operations. The counter values from multiple executions indicate
their relative progress, facilitating runtime alignment. The scheme handles language
features such as loops, recursion, and indirect calls.
• Our evaluation shows that L DX outperforms existing program dependence based
dynamic tainting systems L IBDFT [8] and TAINTGRIND [17]. In the effectiveness
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aspect, L IBDFT and TAINTGRIND can only detect 31.47% and 20% of the true information leak cases and attacks detected by L DX. Also, L DX does not report any
false warnings. In the effciency aspect, the overhead of L DX is 6.08% to the original execution while it requires running the master and the slave concurrently on two
separate CPUs. In contrast, the other two cause a few times slowdown although they
do not require the additional CPU and memory. Note that the counter scheme allows
aligning and continuing executions in the presence of path differences, which makes
L DX superior to T IGHTLIP [18], which often terminates when it detects misaligned
syscalls.

Limitations. L DX requires access to source code. Specifcally, the target application
should be compiled with LLVM because our analysis and instrumentation techniques are
implemented in a LLVM pass. L DX occupies more resources than a single execution. In
the worst case scenario, it may double the resource consumption on memory, processor,
and external resources such as fles on disk. Our performance evaluations assume that the
machine has enough capacity to accomodate such resource duplication. In practice, if the
slave and the master executions are coupled most of the time, only the processor and memory consumptions are doubled because the slave can shares most external I/Os with the
master. L DX may have false positives. For example, low level data races that are not protected by any locks may induce non-deterministic state differences and eventually lead to
undesirable output differences. However, for shared memory accesses protected by locks,
L DX ensures the same synchronization order across the master and the slave. Furthermore,
heap addresses are non-deterministic across the two runs, if heap pointer values are emitted
as part of the output, L DX reports causality even though the two pointers may be semantically equivalent. However, In our experience, pointer values are rarely printed as part of
the outputs at sink points.
L DX may also have false negatives. The current implementation may not capture
causality through covert channels. For example, information can be disclosed through execution time and fle metadata (e.g. last accessed time). We will leave it to our future work.

12
Furthermore, program execution may run into extremal conditions (e.g., running out of
disk/memory space), the current implementation of L DX does not handle such conditions.

2.2

Counterfactual Causality
Counterfactual causality (CC) [14, 19] is the earliest and the most widely used defni-

tion of causality: an event e is causally dependent on an event c if and only if, if c were not
to occur, e would not occur. Later, researchers also introduce the notion of causal strength:
c is a strong cause if and only if it is the necessary and suffcient condition of e [20–22].
Otherwise, c is a weak cause.
We adapt the defnition in the context of program and program execution as follows.
Given an execution, we say a variable y at an execution point j is causally dependent on
a variable x at an earlier point i, if and only if mutating x at i will cause change of y at j.
The causality is strong if and only if any change to x must lead to some change of y. We
call this causality a one-to-one mapping. The causality is weak if multiple x values lead
to the same y value. We call it a many-to-one mapping. The strength of the causality is
determined by how many x values map to the same y.

Figure 2.1.: Examples to illustrate the comparison of counterfactual causality and program
dependences. Arrows denote strong causalities between x at the sink and s at the source.

Most existing causality inference techniques including dynamic tainting are based on
tracking program dependences, especially data dependencies. Two events are causally related if there is a dependence path between them during execution. As we discussed in
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Section 3.1, these techniques have inherent limitations because program dependences are
merely approximation of CC. Next, we discuss the relation between CC and dynamic program dependences to motivate our design.
(1) Most Data Dependences Are Essentially Strong CCs. Consider Fig. 2.1 (a). There is a
strong CC between s at the source (line 1) and x at the sink (line 4) as any change to s leads
to some change at the sink, and there is a data dependence path 4 → 3 → 1 between the
two. Other data dependences have similar characteristics, which implies that conventional
dynamic tainting (based on data dependence) tracks strong CCs. On the other hand, if there
is a technique that infers all strong CCs, it must subsume dynamic tainting.
(2) Control Dependences Induce Both Strong and Weak CCs. In Fig. 2.1 (b), assume the
true branch is taken and x = 1. We can infer that s must be 10; there is strong causality
between x and s. This strong CC is induced by the control dependence 14→13, together
with data dependences 15 → 14 and 13 → 11. If control dependence is not tracked (like
in most existing dynamic tainting techniques), the CC is missed. However in many cases,
control dependences only lead to weak CC. In case (c), assume s = 50 and hence x = 1.
There is a dependence path 25 → 24 → 23 → 21 if control dependence 24 → 23 is tracked.
However, the casuality between x at 25 and s at 21 is weak as many values of s lead to
the same x = 1. Such weak causality is very diffcult for the attacker to exploit. For
example with x = 1, the adversary can hardly infer s’s value, even with the knowledge
of the program. Moreover in code injection attacks, the attacker can hardly manipulate the
sink (e.g. function return address) by changing the source. According to [23], if control
dependences are not tracked, 80% strong CCs are missed; if all control dependences are
tracked, strong CCs are never missed but 45% of the detected causalities are weak. In
some large programs, an output event is causally dependent on almost all inputs with 90%
of them being weak causalities that cannot be exploited. In summary, control dependences
are a poor approximation of strong CCs.
(3) Tracking both Data and Control Dependences May Still Miss Strong CCs. Fig. 2.1 (d)
presents such a case. Assume s = 10 and hence the else branch is executed. As such, x is
not updated. However, the fact that x is not updated (and hence has the value of 0) allows
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main ( ) {
1. read(stdin, &name, &title,
&salary, &age);
2. fout=open(✁);
3. if (title==STAFF)
4.
raise=SRaise( staff.std✂,salary);
5. else if (title==MANAGER){
6. raise=MRaise(name,salary,age);
7. read(stdin, &dept);
8. raise+=BONUS[dept];
9. } else ...
10. sprintf (buf, ✁✂, &name, &raise);
11. send(socket, buf);
}
SRaise(standard, salary) {
12. FILE fin=open(standard,...);
13. read (fin, &rate);
14. return salary*rate;
}
MRaise(name,salary,age) {
15. raise=SRaise( mngr.std✂,salary);
16. if (salary>C1 && age==JUNIOR)
17.
write(fout,&name);
18. return raise;
}

main( )

0

SRaise( )

Entry
cnt++

Entry
cnt++

1

1. read( ✁ );
cnt++

1

12. fin=open( ✁ );
cnt++

2

2. fout=open(✁)

13. read(✁)
2

3. if (title==S..)

14. return

2
2

2
0

5. if (title==M )

MRaise( )

4. raise=SRaise(✁);
4#
5##
6
cnt+=2
6

6. MRaise( ✁ );

2
9. ...

10. sprint(buf, ✁ );

cnt++
3

cnt++
7

11. send (✁)

(a) Program

2 16. if (salary...)

cnt+=4

8. raise=...;

6

15. raise= SRaise();

2#

cnt++
7. read( ✁ );

Entry

17. write(✁)

3

cnt++

18. return...

(b) Control Flow Graphs and Instrumentation

Figure 2.2.: Illustrative example. The code along control fow edges represents instrumentation.
# cnt+=2

inside SRaise(); ## cnt+=3 in MRaise().

the adversary to infer s = 10. It is a strong CC: any change to s makes x have a different
value. Unfortunately, such strong CC cannot be detected by tracking program dependences
as line 37 is only data dependent on line 32 as the true branch is not executed. More cases
are omitted due to the space limitations. They can be found in our technical report [24].
The above discussion suggests that program dependences are a poor approximation of
strong CCs. Hence, we propose L DX, a cost-effective technique that allows us to directly
infer strong CCs, strictly following the defnition.

2.3

Overview and Illustrative Example
We use an example to illustrate L DX. Here we are interested in information leak detec-

tion. We mutate the secret inputs. If output differences are observed at the sinks, there are
strong CCs between the sinks and the secret inputs, and hence leaks.
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Specifcally, given the master execution, L DX creates a slave and runs the two concurrently in a closely coupled fashion. The master interacts with the environment and records
its syscall outcomes. In most cases, the slave does not interact with the environment, but
reuses the master’s syscall outcomes, to eliminate state differences caused by nondeterministic factors such as external event orders. The slave mutates the sources, which potentially
leads to path differences and hence syscall differences. A novel feature of L DX is to tolerate syscall differences in a cost-effective manner. It maintains a counter for each execution
that indicates the progress. Execution points (across runs) with the same counter value and
the same PC are guaranteed to align (in terms of control fow). An execution with a larger
counter value is ahead of another with a smaller value. Aligned syscalls can share their
outcomes; if the slave encounters a syscall with a counter larger than that in the master,
the slave blocks until the master catches up; if the slave encounters an input syscall that
does not have an alignment in the master, it will execute the syscall independently. The
counter is computed as follows. It is incremented by 1 at each syscall. When two executions take different branches of a predicate –since the branches may have different numbers
of syscalls– the values added to the counter may be different. The technique compensates
the counter in the branch that has a smaller increment so that the counter must have the
same value when the join point of the branches is reached. As such, the executions are
re-synchronized.

Figure 2.3.: Syscall traces and the synchronization action sequence by L DX for the example in
Fig. 2.2 with title the secret. The shaded entries are aligned.
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Example. Consider the program in Fig. 2.2 (a). It reads information of an employee,
computes his/her raise and sends it to a remote site. If the employee is a regular staff,
function SRaise() is called to compute the raise (line 4). If he/she is a manager, function
MRaise() is called (line 6). Moreover, the program reads the department information to
compute the bonus for the manager. Finally (lines 10 and 11), the name and the raise are
reported to a remote site. SRaise() opens and reads a contract fle that describes the rate
of raise. MRaise() calls SRaise() to compute the basic raise, using a different contract
fle. Furthermore, it saves all the junior managers with a salary higher than C1 to a local
fle.
The control fow graphs (CFGs) and their instrumentation for counter computation (i.e.
code along CFG edges) are shown in Fig. 2.2 (b). The number beside a node denotes the
counter value at the node, computed by the instrumentation starting from the function entry.
It can be intuitively considered as the maximum number of syscalls encountered along a
path from the entry to the node. In SRaise(), the counter is incremented twice along edges
Entry → 12 and 12 → 13 before the two syscalls. The total increment is hence 2, as shown
beside the exit node. In MRaise(), the counter value of line 15 is 2, although the edge
is not instrumented. This is because of the increments inside SRaise(). The true branch
of line 16 has an increment of 1 due to the write syscall. To ensure identical counter
values at the join point, the false branch (i.e., edge 16 → 18) is compensated with +1. As a
result, the total increment of MRaise() is 3 along any path. Similarly in main(), the path
3 → 5 → 6 → 7 → 8 → 10 has an increment of 4, due to the three syscalls inside MRaise()
and the syscall at line 7. As such, we compensate the edges 4 → 10 and 9 → 10 by +2 and
+4, respectively.
Assume title=STAFF is the secret. In the slave, it is mutated to MANAGER. Also assume age=JUNIOR. Fig. 2.3 shows the syscall sequences of the two executions and the
corresponding counter values. The frst two entries are the syscalls at lines 1 and 2 in both
executions, and they align due to the same counter value. Hence, the slave copies the syscall
results from the master. The two executions diverge at line 3 and different syscalls are encountered. In particular, the master executes two syscalls inside SRaise() and the slave
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executes the two syscalls inside SRaise() in a different context, followed by the write at
line 17 and the read at 7. Since these syscalls do not align, both the master and the slave
execute them separately. Assume the master fnishes its (true) branch frst and continues
to the send syscall at line 11. At this time, the counter is 7 in the master and larger than
the slave’s. The master blocks until the slave’s counter also reaches 7, at which the two
syscalls (at line 11) align again. Since the syscall is a sink, L DX compares the outputs and
identifes differences. It hence reports a leak. Note that even though there is no direct data
fow from title to raise, the value of raise still leaks the secret title through control
dependences. Many existing techniques cannot detect such causality. 
One may notice in Fig. 2.3 that the third and the fourth syscalls in both executions
have the same counter. In fact, both are syscalls in SRaise(). To recognize syscalls
that are different but have the same counter value and the same PC, L DX compares their
parameters.
Fixed versus Dynamically Computed Counter values. One may also be curious that
why L DX does not assign a fxed counter value to each syscall. This is because a function
may be invoked under different contexts such that the counter value computed for a syscall
inside the function may vary.
Use of L DX. L DX is fully automated during production runs. It has a predefned confguration of sources (e.g., socket receives) and sinks (e.g., fle writes). The user can also
choose to annotate the sources and sinks in the code during instrumentation. At runtime,
all the specifed sources are mutated. If output differences are observed at any sink, L DX
considers that there is strong causality between the sink and some source(s) and reports an
exception. It does not require running multiple times for individual sources.

2.4

Basic Design
The basic design consists of two components. The frst is for counter computation and

the second is for synchronizing the executions and sharing syscall results. For now, we
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assume programs do not have loops, recursion, or indirect calls. They are discussed in later
sections (loops/recursion in Section 2.5 and indirect calls in Section 2.6).

2.4.1

Counter Computation

In L DX, each execution maintains a counter to allow progress comparison across runs.
The basic idea of counter computation is to ensure that the current counter value represents
the maximum number of syscalls along a path from the beginning of the program to the
current execution point. If the program does not have any loops, recursion, or indirect
calls, such a number can be uniquely computed. Hence, our instrumentation compensates
the paths other than the one that has the maximum number of syscalls, by incrementing the
counter, to make sure the counter must have the same value (i.e. the maximum number of
syscalls) along any path. Intuitively, when the two executions take different branches of a
predicate, the counter computation ensures that they align when the branches join again,
because the counter will have the same value regardless of the branch taken.
The instrumentation procedure is presented in Algorithm 1. It consists of two functions: I NSTRUMENT P ROG () that instruments the program and I NSTRUMENT F UNC () that
instruments a function. I NSTRUMENT P ROG () instruments functions in the reverse topological order. As such, when a function is instrumented, all its callees must have been
instrumented. In I NSTRUMENT F UNC (), cnt[n] contains the number of maximum syscalls
along a path from the function entry to n. In lines 6-7, cnt[] is initialized to 0. Then in
the loop from lines 8-16, the algorithm traverses the CFG nodes in the topological order
and computes cnt[]. In particular, cnt[n] is frst set to the maximum of cnt[p] for all its
predecessors p (line 9). It is further incremented by one if n is a syscall (lines 10-11).
Then for any incoming edge p → n, the algorithm instruments it with a counter increment
of cnt[n] − cnt[p], ensuring the counter value must be cnt[n] along all edges (lines 12-14).
After that, if n denotes a function call to Fx , cnt[n] is incremented by the counter of the function FCNT [Fx ], which denotes the maximum number of syscalls that can happen inside Fx
along any path (line 15-16). Note that this increment does not cause any instrumentation on
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Algorithm 1 Basic counter instrumentation algorithm
Input: The CFGs of the m functions of a program P, denoted as hN1 , E1 i, ..., hNm , Em i
Output: Instrumented CFGs
1: function I NSTRUMENT P ROG
2:
for hNi , Ei i in reverse topological order of the call graph do
3:
I NSTRUMENT F UNC (hNi , Ei i)
4:
end for
5: end function
Input: The CFG of a function F, denoted as hN, Ei
Output: The instrumented CFG
6: function I NSTRUMENT F UNC
7:
for each node n ∈ N do
8:
cnt[n] ← 0
9:
end for
10:
for node n ∈ N in topological order do
11:
cnt[n] ← max p→n∈E (cnt[p])
12:
if n is a syscall then
13:
cnt[n] ← cnt[n] + 1
14:
end if
15:
for each edge p → n ∈ E do
16:
if cnt[p] =
6 cnt[n] then
17:
instrument p → n with “cnt+ =”·cnt[n] − cnt[p]
18:
end if
19:
end for
20:
if n is a call to user function Fx then
21:
cnt[n] ← cnt[n] + FCNT [Fx ]
22:
end if
23:
end for
24:
FCNT [F] ← cnt[exit node of F]
25: end function
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n because the increment denoted by FCNT [Fx ] is realized inside Fx . At the end, FCNT [F]
is set to the computed counter value for the exit node. It will be used in counter computation
in the callers of F.
Example. In Fig. 2.2, the algorithm frst instruments SRaise(). The cnt[] values are
showed beside the nodes. Observe that cnt[12] = 1 and cnt[13] = 2, which lead to the
instrumentation on entry → 12 and 12 → 13. FCNT [SRaise] = cnt[14] = 2. MRaise()
is instrumented next. Due to FCNT [SRaise], cnt[15] = 2. Note that node 15 is not
instrumented. Node 18 has two predecessors and thus cnt[18] = max(cnt[17], cnt[16]) = 3,
which entails the instrumentation on 16 → 18. At last, function main() is instrumented.
cnt[10] = max (cnt[8], cnt[4], cnt[9]) = cnt[8] = 6, causing the instrumentation on 4 → 10
and 9 → 10. 
Algorithm 2 Syscall wrapper for master
Input: Syscall id sys id and parameters args.
Output: Syscall return value.
Defnition: Qm the syscall outcome queue maintained by the master; Os the latest sink syscall by the slave;
cntm and cnts the local counters in master and slave, respectively; readym the counter value in master
exposed to the slave; similarly, readys the counter value in the slave exposed to the master.
1: function S YSCALLW RAPPER(sys id, args)
2:
if sys id denotes a sink syscall then
3:
while cntm > readys do
4:
{}
5:
end while
6 sys id ∨ Os .args =
6 args then
6:
if cntm < readys ∨ Os .sys id =
7:
report causality
8:
end if
9:
end if
10:
r ← S YSCALL (sys id, args)
11:
Qm .enq(hcntm , sys id, args, ri)
12:
readym ← cntm
13:
return r
14: end function

2.4.2

Dual Execution Facilitated by Counter Numbers

To support dual execution, L DX intercepts syscalls to perform synchronization and
syscall outcome sharing. In the master, when a syscall is encountered, if it is not a sink,
L DX executes the syscall and saves the outcome for potential reuse by the slave. Otherwise,
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it waits for the slave to reach the same sink so that their parameters can be compared. In
the slave, upon a syscall, it frst checks whether it is ahead of the master. If so, it waits until
the master fnishes the corresponding syscall so that it can copy the master’s result. If the
corresponding syscall does not appear in the master (due to path differences), which can be
detected by the counter scheme, the slave executes the syscall.
Execution Control in the Master. Algorithm 2 shows the controller of the master. It is implemented as a syscall wrapper. Each syscall in the master must go through the controller.
Inside the controller, cntm and cnts denote the current counter values in the master and the
slave, respectively. They are local to their execution and invisible to the other execution.
It also uses two shared variables readym and readys to facilitate synchronization. They are
assigned the values of cntm and cnts when the master and the slave are ready to disclose the
effects of the current syscall to the other party.
Lines 2-6 handle a sink syscall. At line 3, the master spins until the slave catches up.
Note that the value of readys is the same as cnts when the state of the slave’s syscall denoted
by cnts becomes visible. There are four possible cases after the master gets out of the spin
loop.
(1) cntm < readys . This happens when there is not a syscall denoted by the value of cntm
in the slave. For example in Fig. 2.2, assume the master takes the false branch at line 3 and
is now at line 7 with cntm = 6 while the slave takes the true branch and now it just returns
from the call to SRaise() at line 4 with cnts = readys = 4. Assume we make line 7 a sink.
Then the master will wait at line 7. However, the next time readys is updated (in the slave)
is at line 11, at which readys = 7, larger than cntm = 6.
(2) cntm ≡ readys but the syscall in the slave represented by readys is different from the
sink syscall in the master. This is due to path differences.
(3) cntm ≡ readys and both the master and the slave align at the same sink syscall. However,
their arguments are different.
(4) The counters, syscalls, and arguments are all identical.
The frst three cases denote causality between the source and the sink, suggesting leak
or exploit. The last case is benign. In the frst two cases, there is causality because the sink
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(in the master) disappears in the slave with the input perturbation. The three comparisons
at line 5 correspond to the frst three cases, respectively.
If the current syscall is not a sink, lines 7-8 in the algorithm perform the real syscall
and enqueue the syscall and its outcome, which may be reused by the slave. At last (line
9), readym is set up-to-date, indicating the syscall outcome for cntm is ready (for the slave).
Execution control in the slave is similar. Details can be found in our technical report [24].
Syscall Handling. L DX’s policy of handling syscalls is similar to that in dual execution
(DualEx) [16]. For most input/output syscalls, the slave simply reuses the master’s syscall
outcome if their alignments in the master can be found. Otherwise, it executes the syscall.
To avoid undesirable interference, the slave may need to construct its own copy of the
system state before executing the syscall. For example, before the slave executes a fle
read, the fle needs to be cloned, opened, and then seeked to the right position. Some
special syscalls are always executed independently such as process creation. Since the
policy is not our contribution, we refer the interested reader to [16].
Dual Execution Model Comparison between L DX and DualEx [16]. Similar to L DX,
DualEx also has the master and the slave. However, its synchronization and alignment
control is through a third process called the monitor. Both the master and the slave simply
send their executed instructions to the monitor, which builds a tree-like execution structure
representation called index and aligns the executions based on their indices. The monitor
also determines if a process needs to be blocked, achieving lockstep synchronization. As
such, its overhead is very high (i.e., 3 orders of magnitude). In contrast, L DX is much more
lightweight. It is based on counter values and uses spinning to achieve synchronization.

2.5

Handling Loops
The basic design assumes programs without loops. Handling loops is challenging be-

cause the number of iterations for a loop is unknown at compile time. The master and the
slave may iterate different numbers of times due to the perturbation at sources, leading to
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Figure 2.4.: Loop example

different increments to the counters and hence diffculty in alignment. Our solution is to
synchronize two corresponding loops at the iteration level. In particular, it aligns the ith
iteration of the master with the ith iteration of the slave by synchronizing at the backedges,
i.e. the edge from the end of the loop body back to the loop head. It is analogous to having
a barrier at the end of each iteration. Along the backedge, L DX also resets the counter to
the value before it entered the loop. Doing so, the value of the counter is bounded and does
not grow with the number of iterations. If an execution gets out of the loop, its counter is
incremented by the maximum number of syscalls along any path inside the loop. As such,
a counter value beyond the loop is larger than any counter values within the loop, correctly
indicating that the execution beyond the loop is ahead of the one in the loop.
Algorithm 3 presents the instrumentation algorithm for a function with loops. It transforms the CFG to an acyclic graph by removing loop edges. As such, the cnt[] values in
the acyclic graph are statically computable. The computed cnt[] values are then leveraged
to construct the instrumentation, including that for the original loop edges. Particularly,
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Algorithm 3 Counter instrumentation with loops
Input: The CFG of a function F, denoted as hN, Ei
Output: The instrumented CFG
1: function I NSTRUMENT F UNC W ITH L OOP
2:
for each back edge t → h ∈ E do
3:
Let h → n be the exit edge of the loop
4:
E ← E − {t → h, h → n}
5:
E ← E ∪ {t → n}
6:
end for
7:
I NSTRUMENT F UNC(hN, Ei)
8:
remove all dummy edges and their instrumentation
9:
restore all the removed edges in the original CFG
10:
for each original back edge e : t → h do
11:
instrument e with “sync(); cnt− =”·cnt[t] − cnt[h]
12:
end for
13:
for each original loop exit edge e : h → n do
14:
instrument e with “cnt+ =”·cnt[n] − cnt[h]
15:
end for
16: end function

. Remove loop exit and back edges
. Add dummy edge
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the algorithm frst removes all the backedges and the loop exit edges (line 2-5). A loop
exit edge is from the loop head h to the next statement n beyond the loop. A dummy edge
is inserted from the end of the loop body t to the next statement n beyond the loop. Our
discussion focuses on for and while loops, do-while loops can be similarly handled.
At line 6, the acyclic graph is instrumented through I NSTRUMENT F UNC (). After that,
the dummy edges and their instrumentation are removed as they do not denote real control
fow (line 7). The backedges and loop exit edges are then restored. Lines 9-10 instrument
the backedges. For a backedge t → h, the instrumentation frst calls a barrier function
sync(), which is similar to lines 3-4 in Algorithm 2, to synchronize with the backedge of
the same iteration in the other execution. It then resets the counter to the value at h such
that the counter increment of the next iteration has a fresh start. Lines 11-12 instrument the
loop exit edges. For a loop exit h → n, the instrumentation increments the counter by the
difference between cnt[n] and cnt[h]. Intuitively, it raises the counter to the value of cnt[n].
Example. Fig. 2.4 (a) shows a loop example. There are two loops: the i loop and the j
loop. Their iteration numbers are determined by the inputs from line 2. Figure (b) shows
the transformed CFG and part of the instrumentation generated by I NSTRUMENT F UNC () in
the basic design. Observe that the backedges 8 → 5 and 12 → 3, the loop exit edges 3 → 13
and 5 → 9 are removed. Dummy edges 8 → 9 and 12 → 13 are added. They do not represent
real control fow, but allow cnt[9] to be computed as cnt[8] + 1 and cnt[13] = cnt[12] + 1.
Figure (c) shows the instrumentation for backedges and loop exit edges. Note that the CFG
in (c) is the original CFG. The backedge 8 → 5 is instrumented with the call to the barrier
function and the decrement of the counter by cnt[8] − cnt[5] = 1. The loop exit edge 5 → 9
is instrumented with the counter increment of cnt[9] − cnt[5] = 2, which makes the counter
value of node 9 always larger than those within loop j. The instrumentation for loop i is
similar.
Fig. 2.5 shows the dual execution when the loop bounds n and m are the sources. Assume the master executes with n = 1 and m = 2 and the slave executes with n = 2 and m = 1.
Along the syscall sequences, we also show the loop iterations to facilitate understanding.
The frst three syscalls (up to inside the frst iteration of j) align in the two executions.
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Figure 2.5.: Syscalls and the sequence of synchronizations by L DX for the example in Fig. 2.4
with n and m the sources. The shaded entries are aligned. The indentation shows the loop nesting.

At A , the two executions are synchronized and counters are reset to 2. However at B ,
the slave exits loop j while the master continues to the second iteration of j. As such,
the slave’s counter becomes 4, which blocks its execution. At C , the master fnishes the
second iteration of j and its counter is reset to 2. At D , the master also exits loop j and
its counter is incremented to 4, which aligns the two syscalls at line 9. At E , the two
runs are synchronized at the backedge of loop i and their counters are reset to 2 due to
the instrumentation on 12 → 3. At F , the master exits the i loop; its counter becomes 5
due to the instrumentation on 3 → 13, which blocks its execution as the master needs the
parameters of the send() from the slave to infer causality. In contrast, the slave executes
the remaining i iteration before it reaches the aligned sink (line 13). 
Recursive functions are handled similarly. Also note that we only need to instrument
loops that include syscalls. Hot loops are usually computation intensive and should not
have syscalls. Therefore, they are unlikely to be instrumented.
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2.6

Handling Indirect Function Calls
The challenge for handling indirect calls is that the call targets are usually unknown at

compile time. As a result, we cannot use the counter values in the callee(s) to compute
those in the caller. To handle indirect calls, L DX saves a copy of the current counter to the
stack when an indirect call is encountered, and resets the counter to 0 such that the two
executions start a fresh alignment from the indirect call site. When the executions return
from the indirect call, the counter value is restored. As such, we do not need to know the
precise counter increment inside the indirect call to support alignment in the caller. L DX
supports components that cannot be instrumented such as third party libraries and dynamic
loaded libraries by synchronizing at their interface. Longjmp and setjmp are ignored
during the CFG analysis. They are supported at runtime by saving a copy of the counter
stack at the setjmp which will be restored upon the longjmp. Moreover, an artifcial sink
is inserted before the longjmp so that if one process longjmps but the other does not, L DX
reports exception. More details can be found in [24].

2.7

Handling Concurrency and Library Calls
L DX supports real concurrency, which is completely different from DualExec [16].

Threads have their own counters. Threads in the master and the slave are paired up. L DX
treats pthread library calls as syscalls. The two executions hence synchronize on those calls
and share the outcomes of lock acquisitions and releases. Note that sharing synchronization outcomes induces very similar thread schedules in the two executions. However, path
differences may lead to synchronization differences which may in turn lead to deadlocks in
L DX if not handled properly. We taint locks that have encountered differences and avoid
sharing synchronization outcomes for those locks. Moreover, low-level data races that are
not protected by any locks may induce non-deterministic state differences, leading to false
positives in strong CC inference. In Section 4.6, our experiment shows that false positives rarely happen (for the programs we consider). Intuitively, non-determinism during
computation may not lead to non-determinism at the sinks.
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Light-weight Resource Tainting. In our current implementation, a fle/directory is considered a resource. Taint metadata is associated with each resource. When an operation
for a resource is misaligned, the resource is tainted to indicate state differences so that any
future syscalls on the resource cannot be coupled. When a tainted resource is accessed by
the other execution, L DX will create a copy of the related resource(s) so that the master
and the slave operate on their own copies, without causing interference. For example, if the
master creates a directory while the slave does not, the directory is tainted. When the slave
tries to access the directory later, it gets into the de-coupled mode. The slave’s syscall will
be performed on a clone of the parent directory without the created directory. Similarly, if
a fle is renamed or removed from a directory in one execution but not the other, the fle is
tainted. Any following acceses to the fle lead to de-coupled execution.
Handling Library Calls. Regarding local fle outputs, the slave does not perform any
outputs to the disk if they are aligned. Instead, it skips the calls or buffer the output values
for causality inference if local fle outputs are considered sinks. The slave ignores its own
signals and receives its signals from the master. Upon a signal, L DX allows the slave to
execute the signal handler. Handler invocations are handled similar to indirect calls. Note
that the slave may invoke system calls to cause different signals or events such as creating
threads or processes different from the master. L DX buffers such different system calls and
all the system calls caused by such signals and events for causality inference. The threads
and processes unique to either execution run in the de-coupled mode.
Handling UI Library Calls. L DX is intended to be transparent to the user. Hence, it is undesirable to have two (almost identical) user interfaces. Therefore, L DX allows the master
to handle all the UI library calls as usual. The slave does not have its own interface. It tries
to reuse the UI library call outcomes from the master as much as possible. Misaligned UI
library calls, if they are input related, return random values to the slave. Misaligned output
UI calls are ignored, or buffered for causality inference if the outputs are considered sinks.
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Table 2.1.: Benchmarks and Instrumentation
Program

LOC

Instrumented instances
Inst. / Loop / Recur. / FPTR

Syscalls
Sinks/Total

Max
Cnt.

Dyn. Cnt.
Value
Stack∗

Mutated
inputs

400.perlbench
401.bzip2
403.gcc
429.mcf
445.gobmk
456.hmmer
458.sjeng
462.libquantum
464.h264ref
471.omnetpp
473.astar
483.xalancbmk

128K
5739
385K
1579
157K
20K
10K
2611
36K
26K
4285
266K

5540 (1.56%) / 10233 / 634 / 852
43 (0.24%) / 360 / 0 / 57
791 (0.07%) / 45702 / 2928 / 463
27 (1.32%) / 44 / 1 / 0
235 (0.22%) / 7910 / 74 / 47
1762 (3.59%) / 1611 / 11 / 13
26 (0.13%) / 978 / 10 / 1
52 (1.08%) / 153 / 11 / 0
102 (0.09%) / 1994 / 38 / 362
121 (0.09%) / 6102 / 46 / 838
56 (0.47%) / 224 / 0 / 1
116 (0.01%) / 28381 / 312 / 10265

4 / 62
4 / 10
3 / 31
3 / 11
3 / 15
4 / 25
4 / 12
3 / 17
4 / 20
2 / 22
1 / 18
5 / 25

72K
7
424
8
37
281
6
8
101
20
51
5

3392
4.5
96.1
4.3
1.7
83.2
2.7
1
26.4
4.5
32.8
1.5

2.91/7
0/1
0.11/5
0/0
1.68/4
0/1
0.07/1
0/0
0.26/2
2.3/6
0.12/1
1.34/9

Perl source
Input data
C source
Input data
Input data
Input/args.
Input data
Arguments
Confguration
Confguration
Confguration
Input XML

Firefox
lynx
nginx
tnftp
sysstat

14M
204K
287K
152K
29K

83 (0.01%) / 21 / 0 / 9
13157 (6.92%) / 6799 / 109 / 1179
4672 (4.27%) / 1541 / 21 / 850
2452 (6.31%) / 1093 / 17 / 210
811 (6.94%) / 271 / 0 / 1

3 / 26
6 / 132
6 / 110
8 / 125
3 / 47

71
15M
518
5878
365

41.2
578K
17.9
2623
70.7

0.09/1
0.3/6
3.8/7
0.01/1
0.01/1

nsIURI objects
Cookie/packets
Confguration
Arguments
Func. returns

gif2png
mp3info
prozilla
yopsweb
ngircd
gocr

16K
9252
13K
1961
66K
54K

246 (7.76%) / 62 / 0 / 0
205 (8.34%) / 91 / 0 / 0
1116 (8.19%) / 285 / 0 / 14
282 (5.93%) / 97 / 0 / 1
1052 (6.70%) / 417 / 24 / 1031
2801 (5.48%) / 2581 / 4 / 2

7 / 36
3 / 31
5 / 67
4 / 44
4 / 62
3 / 24

76
88
5680
24
2863
23K

18.2
6.4
713
3.7
1524
2182

0/0
0/0
0/0
0/1
0/1
0/1

Input image
Input mp3
Packet
Packet
Packet
Input image

Apache
pbzip2
pigz
axel
x264
* It shows avg/max

208K
4527
5766
2583
98K

640 (0.61%) / 2700 / 23 / 183
735 (6.74%) / 226 / 0 / 3
996 (5.85%) / 434 / 2 / 15
342 (8.24%) / 162 / 1 / 3
2071 (1.30%) / 2218 / 1 / 2295

6 / 126
4 / 49
6 / 54
6 / 35
8 / 49

89
1997
9288
271
881

43.7
578.83
432.82
73.66
76.58

1.56/4
0/0
0.99/1
0/0
15K/18K

Input HTML
Input data
Input data
Packet
Input video
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2.8

Evaluation
L DX is implemented in LLVM 3.4. We evaluate its runtime performance, the capability

of handling misaligned syscalls, and the effectiveness of causality inference with two applications: information leak detection and attack detection. Experiments are on a machine
with Intel i7-4770 3.4GHz CPU (4 cores), 8GB RAM, and 32-bit LinuxMint 17.
Benchmark Programs. We used 28 programs as shown in Table 2.1. They include four
different subsets: SPECINT2006 (the frst 12); the network and system related set for
information leak detection (the next 5), the vulnerable program set for attack detection (the
next 6), and the concurrency set (the last 5) for evaluation of concurrency control. The
detailed introduction of these programs can be found in [24].
Instrumentation Details. Table 2.1 shows the instrumentation details. Columns 3-6 describe the numbers of instrumented instructions (and their percentage), instrumented loops,
instrumented recursive functions, and instrumented indirect calls. The next two columns
show the number of sinks and syscalls instrumented. For programs that have network connections, we use the outgoing networking syscalls as sinks. For other programs, we treat
the local fle outputs as sinks. The “max cnt.” column shows the maximum counter value
in a program. It denotes the largest number of syscalls along some static program path. For
firefox, we were not able to instrument the whole program as LLVM failed to generate
the whole program bitcode (supposedly larger than 600MB). We identifed the source fles
for event processing and the JS engine and only instrumented those. The resulted object
fles are then linked with the rest.
We have a few observations. (1) We have some large and complex programs such
as lynx, 403.gcc, and apache. (2) The percentage of instrumented instructions is low
(3.44% on average). (3) Some programs (e.g., 403.gcc and 400.perlbench) have a large
number of recursive functions and indirect calls. L DX handles all of them.
The last column of Table 2.1 shows the source mutations. For the SPEC and network/system programs, we mutate the data fles and the confguration fles. For the vulnerable program set, we mutate the inputs from untrusted sources and detect whether dif-
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Without mutation (Perfectly align)
With mutation (Diff. syscalls)

5.70% / 6.08%
4.45% / 4.70%

15%
6.21% / 6.73%
4.4%/4.7%

10%

5%

400.perlbench
401.bzip2
403.gcc
429.mcf
445.gobmk
456.hmmer
458.sjeng
462.libquantum
464.h264ref
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473.astar
483.xalancbmk
pbzip2
nginx
tnftp
gif2png
prozilla
yopsweb
ngircd
gocr
apache
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axel
x264
Geo. mean (SPEC)
Mean (SPEC)
Geo. mean (All)
Mean (All)

0%

Figure 2.6.: Normalized overhead of L DX

ferences are observed at function return addresses (for buffer overfow attacks) and at parameters of memory management functions (for integer overfow attacks). We perform
off-by-one mutations. In order to avoid invalid mutations, we only mutate data felds, not
magic values or structure related values.

2.8.1

Performance

We study the performance of L DX using SPECINT2006 and programs that are not
interactive and have non-trivial execution time. For server programs such as nginx and
apache, we run the server and send 10,000 requests, and then measure the throughtput. For
web servers such as apache, we use ApacheBench to provide the requests. Firefox and
lynx are omitted because they are interactive. Sysstat and mp3info are also excluded as
their running time is trivial (<0.01sec). We use the reference inputs for SPEC. We run each
program twice. In the frst run, we do not mutate the input so that the master and the slave
perfectly align. The overhead is thus for counter maintenance and syscall outcome sharing.
In the second run, the master and the slave execute with different inputs. Since they can take
different paths and have different syscalls, the overhead includes that for synchronization
and realignment. The results are shown in Fig. 2.6. The baseline is the native execution
time for the uninstrumented programs with the original inputs. The geometric means of the
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overhead are 4.45% and 4.7%, while the arithmetic means are 5.7% and 6.08%. Observe
that the overhead of L DX is very low. We have also measured the overhead of LIBDFT [8],
one of the state-of-the-art dynamic tainting implementations that works by instruction level
monitoring. Its slow-down over native executions is roughly 6X on average. L DX is also
three orders of magnitude faster than dual execution [16].
Another observation is that the input differences and hence the syscall differences do
not cause much additional overhead. As we will show later, the syscall differences are not
trivial. This is because our alignment scheme allows the misaligned syscalls to execute
separately and concurrently.

The “dyn. cnt.” columns in Table 2.1 show the runtime

characteristics of the counter values. Observe that the average counter values are much
smaller than the maximum values (column 9). The maximum depth of the stack is also
small, meaning that we rarely encounter nesting indirect calls.
Table 2.2.: Dual Execution Effectiveness
Program
lynx
nginx
tnftp
sysstat
gcc
xalancbmk
gobmk
perlbench
bzip2
mcf
sjeng
h264ref
hmmer
libquantum
omnetpp
astar

Input 1 / Input 2
L DX TightLip
O/X
O/O
O/X
O/O
O/X
O/O
O/X
O/O
O/X
O/O
O/X
O/O
O/X
O/O
O/X
O/O
O/X
O/O
O/X
O/O
O/X
O/O
O/X
O/O
O/O/O/O/O/O/O/O/-

# of syscall diffs
Input 1
Input 2
1801 (4.13%)
1272 (3.0%)
202 (13.92%)
181 (13.02%)
2443 (19.19%) 381 (15.74%)
53 (7.42%)
58 (19.21%)
38161 (24.99%) 3590 (3.11%)
102 (2.60%)
91 (2.32%)
345 (1.68%)
114 (0.55%)
17 (7.08%)
11 (4.58%)
53 (54.63%)
49 (50.51%)
20 (0.01%)
17 (0.01%)
729 (45.45%)
132 (8.22%)
141 (31.68%)
12 (2.69%)
2 (0.03%)
1 (12.5%)
0
11 (73.33%)
-
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2.8.2

Effectiveness of Dual Execution

In this experiment, we answer the question why we need to align the master and the
slave. The experiment is in the context of detecting information leak. For each program,
we construct two input mutations with the following goal: one input mutation leads to
sink differences (and hence leakage) and the other does not. Both mutations may trigger
syscall differences. We also compare L DX with T IGHT L IP, which does not align executions and often has to terminate at syscall differences, reporting leakage. Table 2.2 presents
the results. Symbol ‘O’ denotes that leakage is reported and ‘X’ denotes normal termination without any warning. The last two columns show the syscall differences before the
sink difference and their percentage over the total number of dynamic syscalls. We have
the following observations. (1) L DX correctly identifes that one input mutation causes
leakage while the other one does not (except for the last four cases), whereas T IGHT L IP
reports leakage for both input mutations. Note that a lot of syscall differences are not output related. (2) The syscall differences caused by input mutations are not trivial and are
sometimes substantial. L DX can properly handle all such differences. (3) For numerical
computation oriented programs (i.e., the last four in the table), we were not able to construct the input mutation that does not cause leakage as any input mutation always leads to
sink differences.

2.8.3

Effectiveness of Causality Inference

Comparison with Dynamic Tainting. We frst compare L DX with TAINTGRIND [17]
and L IBDFT [8] 1 . We compare the number of tainted sinks for all the benchmarks. For
the set of programs with vulnerabilities, their sinks include function returns and memory
management library calls. The results are shown in Table 2.3. The three columns in the
middle report the number of tainted sinks. The last column shows the total number of sinks
encountered during execution.
1 We

have tried DECAF (formerly TEMU), but encountered build problems.
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Table 2.3.: Comparison with Dynamic Tainting
Program
gcc
perlbench
bzip2
mcf
gobmk
hmmer
sjeng
libquantum
h264ref
omnetpp
astar
xalancbmk
lynx
nginx
tnftp
sysstat
gif2png
mp3info
prozilla
yopsweb
ngircd
gocr
total

L DX
3
1
7
12
68
17
83
4
28
24
16
45
5
10
5
6
1
1
1
1
1
1
340

# of tainted sinks
TAINTGRIND LIBDFT
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
3
39
39
4
4
8
6
2
2
3
3
4
2
3
3
21
0
3
1
5
0
2
0
3
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
107
68

Total #
of sinks
146
5
20
36
84
29
112
7
37
52
53
419
8
22
32
12
7
8
100799
41
597
5
-

We have the following observations. (1) The tainted sinks reported by TAINTGRIND
and L IBDFT and are only 31.47% and 20% of those reported by L DX. This is because
the other two are based on tracking data dependences. As we discussed in Section 2.2,
data dependences are essentially strong causalities. Hence, L DX can detect what the other
two detect. In addition, L DX can detect strong causalities induced by control dependences.
We have validated that all the sinks reported by L DX have one-to-one mappings with the
tainted inputs (i.e., no false positives). (2) The tainted sinks reported by TAINTGRIND are
a superset of those reported by L IBDFT. Further inspection shows that L IBDFT does not
correctly model taint propagation for some library calls. This indeed illustrates a practical
challenge for instruction tracking based causality inference, which is to correctly model
taint behavior for the large number of instructions and libraries. The last six rows show the
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results for the vulnerable program set. Observe that L DX can detect the attacks by correctly
inferring the causality between the untrusted inputs and the critical execution points.
Effectiveness for Concurrent Programs. L DX supports real concurrency by sharing the
thread schedule as much as possible between the two executions (Section 2.7). However,
low level races may introduce non-deterministic state differences, leading to false positives
in causality inference. In this experiment, we collect 5 concurrent programs. For each
program, we mutate the input and dual execute it 100 times. We used the standard inputs
provided with the programs. As shown in column 3 of Table 2.4, the number of tainted
sinks rarely changes, whereas syscall differences do change (column 2) due to low level
races. However, the syscall difference changes are not substantial because L DX was able
to enforce the same schedule for most cases. This supports the effectiveness of the concurrency control of L DX (for the programs we consider). The tainted sink changes for x264 are
caused by the execution statistics report (e.g., the bits processed per sec.). Although L DX
forces the master and the slave to share the same schedule and the same timestamps, the
number of bits processed per unit time is non-deterministic across tests and beyond control.
The tainted sink changes for axel are because the program makes Internet connections in
each run, which are non-deterministic.
Table 2.4.: Effectiveness for Concurrent Programs
Program
Apache
pbzip2
pigz
axel
x264

# of syscall diffs
(Min/Max/Std. Dev.)
114 / 123 / 1.66
288 / 332 / 11.59
490 / 546 / 18.50
1173 / 1252 / 25.39
854 / 1211 / 89.38

# of tainted sinks
(Min/Max/Std. Dev.)
39 / 39 / 0
8/8/0
14/ 14 / 0
813 / 834 / 6.5
350 / 353 / 0.3

Input Mutation. L DX performs off-by-one mutation on sources, which must detect any
strong CCs as proved in [24]. However in some rare cases it may also detect weak causalities. We conduct an experiment to study different mutation strategies. We observe that
other strategies do not supercede off-by-one. Details can be found in [24].
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LDX executions

Input files to gcc
File 1: ngx_auto_config.h

Cnt

1 #ifndef NGX_HAVE_POLL
2 #define NGX_HAVE_POLL 1
3 #endif

4
5
6
7
8

#if (NGX_HAVE_POLL)
#include <poll.h>
#endif
#if (__FreeBSD__) &&
#include <sys/param.h>
...

✁

Layout of output file
Common parts
Parts depend on poll.h and
NGX_HAVE_POLL
Common parts

gcc preprocessor source
Slave

File 3: cpplib.c
465

71

fd1 = open( file1 );

71

fd1 = open( file1 );

81

fxstat( fd1,

81

fxstat( fd1,

101
File 2: ngx_auto_config.h

Cnt

Master

✁ );
read( fd , ✁ );
1

72

fd2 = open( file2 );

82

fxstat( fd2,

102
2161
2171
216i
217i
2181
2311

✁ );
read( fd , ✁ );
fprintf( ✁ );
_IO_putc( ✁ );
✁
fprintf( ✁ );
_IO_putc( ✁ );
fputs( ✁ );
fprintf( ✁ );
✁

101

✁ );
read( fd , ✁ );

Data flow
detected 1323

✁ );
✁ );
✁
fprintf( ✁ );
_IO_putc( ✁ );
fputs( ✁ );
fprintf( ✁ );
✁

2161 fprintf(

1326

2171 _IO_putc(

1329
1331
1332

216j
217j
2181
2311

✁

472

pfile node.value = (
...

1

476

2

do_define (pfile) {

Data flow
detected

); // define a value

}

✁

do_if (pfile) {
...
int skip = 1;
...
skip = ( pfile node.value == 0 );
pfile state.skipping = skip;
}
Data flow

✂ Input
✂ (node.value == 0);
state.skipping ✂ skip;

472

node.value

Explicit

1329

skip

Implicit

1331

Explicit

Figure 2.7.: Case study on 403.gcc. Input fles on the left; relevant gcc code on the right;
dual execution in the middle.

2.8.4

Case Studies

403.gcc. In this study, we use the source code of nginx as input. Fig. 2.7 shows part of
input code on the left. We specify the confguration NGX HAVE POLL as the source. The
master has NGX HAVE POLL defned but the slave does not. As such, the master includes
poll.h while the slave does not. This corresponds to 72 , 82 , and 102 (Fig. 2.7) occurring
in the master but not in the slave. Later on, both executions re-align at 2161 and run in the
coupled mode. In fact, 216 and 217 are in an output loop that emits the preprocessed code.
Due to the earlier differences, the preprocessed code is different. The differences manifest
as parameter differences during executions of 216i , 217i in the master and 216 j , 217 j in
the slave. The leak is reported. Note that the causality is strong as one can infer from the
preprocessed code the value of NGX HAVE POLL.
Other tools such as L IBDFT and TAINTGRIND are not able to detect the causality as it
is induced by control dependences, Fig. 2.7 shows the relevant gcc code on the right. At
line 472, gcc reads the value of NGX HAVE POLL and stores it. Later, when the preprocessor reaches the “#if NGX HAVE POLL” statement inside do if(), it reads the stored value
and compares it with 0. The outcome is stored to skip at line 1329. Then, the variable is
copied to pfile->state.skipping (line 1331), which later determines if the code block
guarded by the if statement should be skipped or not. Note that although there are data de-
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pendences 472 → 1329 and 1329 → 1331, the connection between pfile->node->value
and skip at line 1329 is control dependence, which breaks the taint propagation in LIBDFT
and TAINTGRIND.
Firefox. In this case, we detect information leak in a firefox extension ShowIP 1.2rc5
that displays the IP of current page. It sends the current url to a remote server. L DX instruments the event handling component and part of the JS engine in firefox to align JS
code block executions that correspond to page loading and user event handling. It successfully detects the leak whereas TAINTGRIND and L IBDFT fail because the leak goes through
control dependences. Details can be found in [24].

2.9

Related Work

Dual Execution. L DX is closely related to dual execution [16]. The main differences
are the following. (1) L DX is very lightweight (6.08% overhead) whereas [16] relies
on the expensive execution indexing [15], causing 3 orders of magnitude slowdown. (2)
L DX allows threads to execute concurrently whereas [16] does not. (3) The applications
are different. The low overhead of L DX makes it a plausible causality inference engine
in practice. (4) Their dual execution models are different as explained in Section 2.4.2.
T IGHTLIP [18] also uses the master-and-slave execution model to detect inforamtion leak.
It uses a window to tolerate syscall differences. The simple approach can hardly handle
nontrivial differences.
Execution Replication and Replay. Execution replication has been widely studied [25–
33]. The premise is similar to n-version programming [34], which runs different implementations of the same service specifcation in parallel. Then, voting is used to produce a common result tolerating occasional faults. There are many security applications [18,35–38] of
execution replication by detecting differences among replicas. There are also works in execution replay [39–47]. In contrast, L DX align different paths during execution. RAIL [48]
re-runs applications with previous inputs to identify information disclosure after a vulnerability is fxed. To handle state divergence between the original and replay executions, it
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requires developers to annotate the program. DORA [49] is a replay system that records
execution beforehand to replay with a modifed version of the application. Instead, L DX
runs two executions of an application with input perturbation to infer causality at real-time.
L DX focuses on aligning two executions accurately using a counter algorithm, while [49]
relies on heuristics to tolerate non-determinism.
Dynamic Taint Tracking. Most dynamic tainting techniques [6–10, 50] work by tracking
instruction execution and hence are expensive. They have diffculty handling control dependences [11]. Some have limited support by detecting patterns [12] or handling special
dependences [23]. In particular, [50] identifes and handles a subset of important control
dependencies using several heuristics. L DX provides a solution to such problems by detecting strong CC based on the defnition of causality instead of program dependencies. Approaches for quantifying information fow [11,51–53] aim to precisely ascertain fgures like
the number of sensitive bits of information that an attacker may infer, the number of attack
attempts required, or strategies for identifying secrets. Hardware based solutions [54–57]
have been proposed to speed up or improve accuracy of taint analysis.
Secure Multiple Execution (SME). SME [58–60] splits an execution into multiple ones
for different security levels: the low execution does the public outputs and the high execution does the confdential outputs. SME can enforce the non-interference policy. It blocks
or terminates when the two executions diverge, which is intended for non-interference. In
comparison, L DX focuses on causality inference and tolerates execution divergence.
Statistical Fault Localization (SFL). Recent approaches in SFL [61–63] use causal inference methodology in order to mitigate biases such as confoundings. In particular, suspiciousness scores that guide to locate faults can be distorted by such biases, producing
inaccurate results. They run a program over a set of inputs repeatedly to identify the causal
effect of a statement on program failures. Such causal effect is then used to improve the performance and accuracy of SFL by reducing confounding bias. Instead, L DX infers causality
by running multiple executions concurrently while tolerating execution divergence caused
by the input purturbation.
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3

M CI : MODELING-BASED CAUSALITY INFERENCE IN AUDIT LOGGING
FOR ATTACK INVESTIGATION

In this chapter, we develop a model-based causality inference technique for audit logging
that does not require any application instrumentation or kernel modifcation. It leverages
a recent dynamic analysis, dual execution (L DX), that can infer precise causality between
system calls but unfortunately requires doubling the resource consumption such as CPU
time and memory consumption. For each application, we use L DX to acquire precise causal
models for a set of primitive operations. Each model is a sequence of system calls that
have inter-dependences, some of them caused by memory operations and hence implicit
at the system call level. These models are described by a language that supports various
complexity such as regular, context-free, and even context-sensitive. In production run, a
novel parser is deployed to parse audit logs (without any enhancement) to model instances
and hence derive causality. Our evaluation on a set of real-world programs shows that the
technique is highly effective. The generated models can recover causality with 0% falsepositives (FP) and false-negatives (FN) for most programs and only 8.3% FP and 5.2%
FN in the worst cases. The models also feature excellent composibility, meaning that the
models derived from primitive operations can be composed together to describe causality
for large and complex real world missions. Applying our technique to attack investigation
shows that the system-wide attack causal graphs are highly precise and concise, having
better quality than the state-of-the-art.

3.1

Introduction
Cyber-attacks are becoming increasingly targeted and sophisticated [64]. A special

kind of these attacks, called Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), can infltrate into target
systems in stages and reside inert for a long time to remain undetected. It is important
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to trace back attack steps and understand how an attack unfolds [65]. In the mean time,
identifying the entry point of the attack and understanding the damage to the victim can
be critical to recovering the victim system from the intrusion and also preventing future
compromises.
Causality analysis techniques [46, 47, 66–68] are widely used in attack investigation.
They analyze audit logs generated by operating system level audit logging tools (e.g., Linux
Audit [69], Event Tracing for Windows [70], and DTrace [71]) and correlate system events,
e.g., system calls (syscalls) to identify causal relations between system subjects (e.g., processes) and system objects (e.g., fles, network sockets). Such capability is particularly
important in cyber-attack investigation where causality of malicious events reveals attack
provenance. For example, when an attacker exploits vulnerabilities and executes malicious
payloads, causality analysis can identify such vulnerable interfaces including input channels that accept malicious inputs from the user or the network. Moreover, given a set of
malicious or suspicious events, it can identify all the events that are causally related to
the given set of events. Essentially, these events depict the source of the attack and/or the
damage induced by the attacker. However, syscall based analysis has a major limitation:
dependence explosion [4]. For a long-running process, an output event (e.g., creating a
malicious fle) is assumed to be causally related to all the preceding input events (e.g., fle
read and network receive). This conservative assumption causes signifcant false causal
relations.
Some recent works [4, 72–74] focus on collecting enhanced information at run-time
to avoid dependence explosion and enable accurate attack investigation. For instance,
BEEP [4] and ProTracer [72] train and instrument long-running applications to capture
information of fne-grained execution units in addition to syscalls. MPI [74] asks the user
to annotate important data structures in applications’ source code to enable semantic aware
execution partitioning. Additionally, Bates at el. [75] propose a general provenance-aware
framework called Linux Provenance Module (LPM) that allows users to defne custom
provenance rules. The major hindrance of these techniques in practice is their require-
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ments of changing end-user systems, such as instrumenting user applications, installing
new runtime support, kernel modules, and even changing the kernel itself.
Taint analysis [8, 17, 76] is another approach that can track causal relations (e.g., information fow) between system components (e.g., memory objects, fles, and network
sockets). However, whole system tainting is too computationally expensive (over 3x slow
down [77, 78]) to be deployed on production systems. Additionally most taint analysis
techniques cannot handle implicit fow, resulting in false-negatives.
In this chapter, we propose M CI, a novel causality inference technique on audit logs.
Our technique does not require any changes on the end-user system, nor any special operations during system execution. The end-user only needs to turn on the audit logger shipped
with the operating system (e.g., Linux Audit, Event Tracing for Windows, and DTrace). If
the user detects a security incident, she only needs to provide the syscall log and program
binaries from the victim system (or a disk image) to a forensic expert.
In off-line attack investigation, which is often done by the forensic expert, M CI precisely infers causality from a given system call log by constructing causal models and
parsing the log with the models. Fig. 3.1 shows a high level overview of how M CI works.
M CI consists of two phases: (1) causality annotated model generation, and (2) model parsing. First, M CI generates causal models by leveraging L DX [1] which is a dual-execution
based system that can infer causality by mutating input syscalls and then observing output changes. In this phase, M CI takes two inputs: a program binary and typical workloads.
M CI’s model constructor automatically runs L DX and analyzes its results to construct models. Models are expressive and capable of representing fne-grained dependencies including
invisible at the syscall level (e.g., dependencies induced by memory operations). The models can be pre-generated (for widely used applications) or generated on demand after an
incident. Second, during investigation M CI identifes causal relations between events in a
given syscall log collected from a victim system by parsing the log with the models. The
derived precise dependencies are critical for attack investigation.
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In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We propose a novel technique for precise causality inference that directly works on
audit logs without requiring any changes or setup on end-user systems. We only
require program binaries and the audit log from the victim system after the incident.
• We perform a comparative study using a real-world example to illustrate the merits
and limitations of existing approaches.
• We propose to leverage L DX [1] to identify fne-grained causality from program
execution. Using the generated causality information, we construct causal models
annotated with fne-grained dependencies. We study the model complexity needed
to describe causalities in audit logging.
• We develop a novel model parsing algorithm that can handle multiple model complexity levels and substantially mitigate the ambiguity problem inherent in modelbased parsing.
• We perform thorough evaluation of M CI on a set of real-world applications. The
results show that the generated models can recover causality with close to 0% FP and
FN for most applications and the worst FP rate 8.3% and the worst FN rate 5.2%.
Model construction and model parsing have reasonable overhead and scale to weeklong and even month-long workloads. Applying M CI to attack investigation shows
that our models have very nice composibility such that small models can be composed together to describe complex system-wide attack behaviors. Our attack causal
graphs are even more precise than those generated by a state-of-the-art system [4].

3.2

Background and Motivation
In this section, we use an insider information leak attack case to illustrate the limitations

of existing attack provenance analysis techniques, and then to motivate our work.
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Figure 3.1.: Overview of M CI’s off-line causality inference. Audit Logs and Program
Binaries are provided from the end-user, workloads and input specifcations are generated
by an attack investigator (e.g., a forensic expert), and other components are automatically
generated by M CI.

3.2.1

Motivating Example

We use a data exfltration of confdential company data by an employee. Insider attacks
are the dominant reason for data breach incidents in 2016 [79, 80].
Assume John is a project manager who has access to confdential data. John was
bribed by a competitor company and attempts to breach some confdential data. However,
John’s company forbids copying data to removable media such as USB stick. Furthermore,
the company inspects all incoming/outgoing network traffc via deep packet inspection
(DPI) [81–83] to prevent exfltration of confdential data and to block malicious network
traffc from outside. To bypass the packet inspection, John decides to use the GPG encryption algorithm [84] to encrypt data before sending it.
GnuPG Vim plug-in. To use GPG encryption, John installed a Vim plug-in GnuPG [85],
which enables transparent editing of gpg encrypted fles. When he opens a fle encrypted by
gpg [84] which is an encryption utility supported by most operating systems with the GNU
library (e.g., Linux, FreeBSD, and MacOS), the GnuPG plug-in automatically decrypts and
passes the decrypted data to Vim so that the user can edit the contents of the encrypted fle.
The plug-in automatically encrypts the contents when the user saves the gpg fle.
Attack Scenario. John uses Vim equipped with the GnuPG plug-in to open three confdential fles, data1, data2, and data3. He also opens out.gpg in order to store confdential data
in an encrypted format. Then he copies a few lines from data2 using the Vim command
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‘v’ to select characters and ‘y’ to copy them to the clipboard buffer (i.e., Vim’s default
register). Then he fnds out the information in data3 is more up-to-date. He thus copies
lines from data3 that overwrite the contents from data2. Later, he pastes the copied lines to
out.gpg, saves the fle in an encrypted format and terminates Vim. Note that, when he saves
out.gpg, the GnuPG plug-in actually creates a new fle (inode:8) and renames it to out.gpg
so that the original out.gpg fle (inode:4) is replaced by a new fle (inode:8). Observe that
the inode numbers of the original out.gpg fle and the new fle are different. Finally, he
sends the encrypted out.gpg to a server outside the enterprise network.
This data breach incident is later detected, and a forensic analysis team starts to investigate the incident. Now, we introduce existing causal analysis based forensic techniques
and discuss how they work on this attack.
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(b) BEEP: Fine-grained Analysis
(c) TaintGrind: Taint Analysis

(a) Linux Audit: System Call Analysis

(d) LDX: Causality Inference

Figure 3.2.: Motivating example: Insider theft breaches confdential data using Vim and
GPG
.

3.2.2

Existing Approaches and Limitations

System Call based Analysis. Most causal analysis techniques use syscall logging tools
to record important system events at runtime and then analyze recorded events to identify
causal relations between system subjects (e.g., process) and system objects (e.g., fle or network socket). Syscall logging tools are shipped with most operating systems. For example,
Linux Audit [69] is a default package in Linux and MacOS distributions, DTrace [71] is
available in FreeBSD, and Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) [70] comes with Windows.
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Syscall based analysis has been studied in a number of works [46, 47, 66–68]. For instance, BackTracker [66] and Taser [46] propose backward and forward analysis techniques
in order to analyze syscall logs and construct causal graphs for effective attack investigation. The constructed causal graphs show system subjects and objects that involved in
attacks, and their causal relations.
Fig. 3.2-(a) shows a provenance graph generated from the syscall log collected during
the data breach incident discussed in the previous section. To understand the incident in
detail, a security analyst frst identifes the out.gpg fle (inode:8) which contains confdential
data. Then the analyst fnds the system components that are causally related to the fle from
the graph in the backward direction (time-wise). Observe that it was Vim that wrote the fle
( 11 ). Before that, Vim read /tmp/tmpfle ( 10 ) which was written by “gpg” ( 9 ). The “gpg”
process (pid:2) was forked by Vim ( 8 ). Before the fork, the Vim process reads /tmp/tmpfle
( 7 ) which was written by another “gpg” process (pid:1) ( 6 ). “gpg” previously read the
original out.gpg fle with a different inode number (inode:4) ( 5 ) and the “gpg” process
(pid:1) was forked by Vim ( 4 ) as well. There are also other fles that Vim read, including
data3 ( 3 ), data2 ( 2 ), and data1 ( 1 ).
Note that Fig. 3.2-(a) contains many false dependencies such as dependencies between
the Vim process and fles data1, data2, and /tmp/.X11-unix which is a socket for XWindow.
The coarse-granularity of processes leads to this false dependency problem as it simply
considers an output event is dependent on all the preceding input events in the process.
Execution Unit based Analysis. False dependencies in syscall based analysis are a major
obstacle for attack investigation as it often causes the dependency explosion problem [4],
which is a problem of having an excessive number of dependencies, with most of them
being bogus. It makes investigation challenging, often leading to wrong conclusions. To
address the problem, BEEP [4] and ProTracer [72] propose to divide a long-running process to autonomous execution units. In this way, an output event is only dependent on the
preceding input events within the same execution unit. BEEP and ProTracer also detect
inter-unit dependencies introduced via memory objects. ProTracer is a variant of BEEP
that can signifcantly reduce runtime and space overhead while the effectiveness of attack
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analysis remains the same because they share the same mechanism to partition a long process.
Unfortunately, BEEP and ProTracer require complex binary program analysis in order
to instrument a target application for execution partitioning at runtime. To detect the interunit dependencies, they need to identify memory dependencies across units by analyzing
training runs, and instrument the target program to monitor the relevant memory accesses
in production runs. Note that identifying all relevant memory accesses that induce dependencies across execution units in complex binary programs via training is challenging.
Missing memory accesses in training leads to false-negatives in attack investigation. They
also generate a large number of additional syscalls to denote unit boundaries and memory
accesses, increasing the storage pressure.
In addition, while BEEP can prune out some false dependencies as shown in Fig. 3.2(b) (e.g., between data1 and Vim) by leveraging fne-grained execution units, there are
still false dependencies such as those involving data2 and /tmp/.X11-unit. This is because,
in this example, BEEP considers each fle read/write event as a separate unit and detects
dependencies between units through memory objects. For example, BEEP considers units
that read data2 ( 2 ) and data3 ( 3 ) are causally related to a unit that writes out.gpg ( 11 ) as
texts from data2 and data3 are copied into a buffer for copy-and-paste in Vim. However,
the cross-unit dependency between the unit with data2 ( 2 ) and another unit with out.gpg
( 11 ) is bogus because the contents copied from data2 are not pasted to out.gpg. The
bogus dependency is introduced because BEEP simply detects memory read and memory
write events with a same memory address without checking if there is true information
fow between the two. In short, while BEEP can narrow down the scope of investigation,
there are still unnecessary fles and events in the graph.
Taint Analysis. Taint analysis techniques [8, 17, 76] track information fow between a set
of system components (e.g., fle, memory, and network), called taint sources, to another set
of system components, called taint sinks. Given a set of input related system components to
track, taint analysis keeps track of how data from the specifed input components are consumed and propagated by individual instructions that operate on the data, in order to iden-
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tify how they impact other system components. However, most taint tracking approaches
including the state-of-the-art tools such as TaintGrind [17] and libdft [8] are expensive as
they monitor each instruction to track information fow. Furthermore, they are often not
able to track implicit fows caused by control dependencies, introducing false-negatives.
To illustrate the merits and limitation of taint analysis techniques, we use a state-of-theart open source tool, TaintGrind, to analyze the aforementioned incident. Fig. 3.2-(c) shows
the result from TaintGrind. In this example, TaintGrind fails to identify the dependency
between the data3 and /tmp/tmpfle. Note that the most important part of the attack (i.e.,
the leaked confdential data) is not revealed in the attack investigation due to the missing
dependency.
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7
8
9

int tripledes_ecb_crypt(..., const byte* from, ...) {
...
work = from ^ *subkey++;
to ^= sbox8[ work
& 0x3f ];
to ^= sbox6[ (work>>8) & 0x3f ];
to ^= sbox4[ (work>>16) & 0x3f ];
to ^= sbox2[ (work>>24) & 0x3f ];
...
}

Figure 3.3.: Information fow through a table look-up in GPG

We investigate the case in depth, and fnd that GPG decrypts values through a table
lookup operation. Unfortunately, TaintGrind is not able to handle information fow through
the table lookup, resulting in missing dependencies. Fig. 3.3 shows a code snippet extracted
from GPG. Specifcally, the function argument from contains an piece of encrypted text. At
line 3, the encrypted text is used to calculate the value of work, and TaintGrind successfully propagates taint information to the variable. However, at lines 4-7, work is used to
look-up a table sbox2-8, and TaintGrind loses track of taint information at this point because it does not handle information fow via array indexing. Note that most taint analysis
techniques do not track information fow through array indexing to avoid the over-tainting
problem. Specifcally, the over-tainting problem often leads to an excessive number of taint
tags, resulting in false-positives. Hence, most taint analysis tools decide not to track such
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information fow. In addition to table look-up, explicit data fows through computations
(e.g., bitwise and arithmetic) and implicit data fows caused by control dependency are often disregarded to avoid the over-tainting problem. Moreover, the signifcant overhead of
taint analysis prohibits its application in practical forensic analysis that requires always-on
monitoring to capture attacks in-the-wild.
Causality Inference. Recently, Kwon et al. propose a light-weight causality inference
technique L DX [1] using a dynamic analysis called dual execution. For a given original execution, L DX derives a slave execution in which it mutates values of input source(s). It then
compares the corresponding outputs from the original execution and the slave execution to
determine whether the outputs are causally dependent on the source(s). Specifcally, if the
two executions have different values for an output, L DX considers that the output is causally
dependent on the mutated input source(s). To address execution path divergence caused by
input perturbation, L DX leverages its novel on-the-fy execution alignment scheme. Unlike
dynamic taint analysis techniques (e.g., TaintGrind [17] and libdft [8]), L DX can detect
explicit and implicit information fow and has much lower runtime overhead (about 6%).
Fig. 3.2-(d) shows the graph generated by L DX. Note that it contains only the objects
and events related to the attack, without any false dependences. While L DX produces
concise and accurate graphs, it requires the dual-execution framework available on the
end-user system which doubles the consumption of computational resources (e.g., CPU
and memory).
Table 3.1.: Comparison of Causality Analysis Approaches

Space overhead
Runtime overhead
Resource overhead
False-positive
False-negative
Granularity
End-user requirements

Syscall Analysis
[46, 66, 67]
Low
Low
Low
High
Low
Coarse
None

Fine-grained Analysis
BEEP [4]/ProTracer [72]
MPI [74]
Mid
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Mid
Low
Low
Low
Mid
Fine
Training/instrumentation Code annotation

WinLog [73]
Low
Low
Low
Mid
Low
Mid
None

Taint Analysis
[8, 17, 76]
High
High
High
Low
Low-Mid
Fine
Tainting framework

Causality
Inference: L DX [1]
Low
Low
Mid
Low
Low
Fine
Dual-execution framework

M CI
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Fine
None
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3.2.3

Goals and Our Approach

Table 3.1 presents merits and limitations of existing causality analysis approaches. In
summary, syscall analysis techniques suffer from high false-positive rates due to dependence explosion. While BEEP and ProTracer mitigate the dependence explosion problem,
they require complex static, dynamic binary analysis and instrumentation and incur nontrivial space overhead. MPI is effcient and effective, but requires access to source code
and domain knowledge for annotation. Taint analysis techniques generally incur signifcant runtime and space overhead and suffer from the over-/under-tainting problems. L DX
requires the dual-execution framework in production run that doubles computational resource consumption.
Our Goal. The goal of this chapter is to provide a causality analysis technique with the
same accuracy as L DX, but does not require any changes of end-user systems, such as instrumenting user applications, modifying the kernel or installing special runtime. Specifcally, the end-user only needs to turn on the default audit logging tool that comes with their
system, such as Linux Audit, Event Tracing for Windows, and DTrace to collect syscall
logs. Upon a security incident, M CI can generate precise causal graphs from the raw log
to explain attack causality and assess system damages. We believe such a design would
substantially improve applicability.
Our Approach. As shown in Fig. 3.1, the key idea of M CI is to use causal models to
parse raw logs to derive precise causality information. Specifcally, in the offine phase,
we use L DX [1] as the causality inference engine to construct models for the applications
that will be deployed on an end-user system. A causal model is essentially a sequence
of inter-dependent syscalls and their causal relations. Such causalities/dependencies can
be induced by system objects, called explicit dependencies, as they can be determined by
analyzing syscalls alone, or induced by memory operations and control dependences, called
implicit dependences, which are not visible by analyzing syscall events. Note that L DX can
detect both explicit and implicit dependencies.
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During deployment, given a syscall log collected from the incident, M CI can precisely
infer causality between events in the log by parsing the log using the pre-generated models.

3.2.4

M CI on Motivating Example

We demonstrate the effectiveness of M CI on investigating the incident. Assume the
causal models of applications have been derived offine. Note that generating models does
not require any particular expert knowledge on target programs, but rather the typical user
level workloads. Model generation is a one-time effort such that models generated for a
program can be used for all installations of the program.
Fig. 3.4-(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) show the graphical representations of some models
from Vim. A node is denoted by a letter which represents a syscall, with a superscript (∗ )
representing a sequence of syscalls. A subscript represents the (symbolic) system object
(e.g., fle or socket) operated by the syscall. For example, model (a) is for the behavior
of opening and decrypting a gpg fle. Specifcally, as shown in the legend in Fig. 3.4, the
frst node of (a) rα indicates a read syscall on α which is stdin. Note that each model
has its own legend for the subscript. The frst node is a syscall that causes the entire
behavior. Intuitively, the model represents reading from a command line that loads a gpg
fle. The second node, sβ , represents a stat syscall on a fle β (output fle). The GnuPG
plug-in uses a temporary fle to store decrypted contents and then informs Vim to open.
Subscript β symbolizes the temporary fle which contains decrypted contents. The second
node essentially checks whether the fle exists. After that it loads a key fle to prepare
decryption which is represented as a third node (rγ∗ ). Then, it checks (stat) the output fle
again (s∗β ). Finally, the ffth node (rδ∗ ) represents reading a gpg fle which is an encrypted
fle. The sixth node (wβ ) indicates that the decrypted contents are written onto the output
fle (β ). Then, the GnuPG plug-in sends a notifcation to Vim via a pipe which is shown in
the last node (wε ). Note that symbols in subscript (e.g. α, β ) can be instantiated to any
concrete fle handler during parsing. The same subscript β in sβ and the later nodes s∗β
and wβ dictate that these syscalls must operate on the same fle. The third and ffth nodes
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are denoted by a superscript ∗ , representing a sequence of read system calls (read∗ ) on
different fles γ and δ .
The directed edges between nodes represent the causality/dependency between syscalls,
with the solid and dotted edges representing the explicit and implicit dependencies, respectively. For example, in (a), there are explicit dependences from sβ to wβ and implicit
dependencies from rγ∗ and rδ∗ . The implicit dependencies are caused by memory operations
that copy values from a crypto key fle (γ) to encrypted contents δ that are detected and
modeled by M CI.
Fig. 3.4-(f) illustrates a syscall log collected during the incident by the default Linux
Audit tool [69]. Given the syscall log and the models, M CI automatically parses the log and
hence derives the corresponding dependencies. Each box in (f) denotes a model instance
with the letter annotated on the box representing the model id. Note that we use different
background colors for boxes to represent nodes belong to different models. We omit the
dependences in the model instances for readability. For readability, we use superscripts to
denote event timestamps.
The model instances essentially tell us that the user frst opened a gpg fle (i.e., out.gpg)
by model (a), opened and copied a fle (i.e., data2) without pasting by model (b), and
opened, copied, and pasted another fle (i.e., data3) by model (c). Observe that there are
events that belong to multiple models, which allow us to determine causality across models
and hence compose the whole attack path. For instance, event s11
5 belongs to both models
(c) and (d) (i.e., the node in the two boxes in blue and green), suggesting that the contents
from data3 are copied to the previous gpg fle. The subscript 5 corresponds to fle viminfo
that is used to indicates the state of editing. Note that model (c) does not have explicit dependencies with other models. Hence, without model (d), causality between model (c) and
other models is diffcult to reveal. After a few editing operations by model (d), the user
fnally saved the contents to a new gpg fle by model (e). The event s11
5 belonging to models (c) and (d) indicates that the new gpg fle contains information from data3 (confdential
data). Note that the matched instance of model (b) does not have any overlapping nodes
with other model instances nor explicit dependencies, and hence no causal relations with
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others. This indicates that data2 is not involved in the incident. The fnal causal graph is
shown Fig. 3.2-(d), which is accurate and concise, without any missing or bogus dependencies.
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δ: temp swap file, ε: viminfo file, ζ: config file

sβ

sγ

wγ

s*δ

rα

sβ

r*γ

s*β

rδ*

wβ

Ma Mb Mc Md Me

α: stdin, β: output (encrypted) file,
γ: key file, δ: input file, ε: pipe to Vim

Ma
Mb
... r23 w41 ... ... r05 s63 ... ...

r07

Mc
s84

...

r09

...

w105 ...

sε

Legend
sσ: stat(σ), wσ: write(σ), rσ: read(σ),
uσ: unlink(σ), rσ*: read(σ)*, s*σ: stat(σ)*
Model boundaries
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(e) Me: Save a gpg file

(d) Md: Edit
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γ: swap file, δ: current file
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(f) System call trace
0: stdin, 1: temp file (containing decrypted contents), 2: org. gpg file (gpg.out), 3: data2 file, 4: data3 file, 5: viminfo file, 6: swap file for the temp (1), 7: new gpg file

Figure 3.4.: M CI on the motivating example

3.3

Problem Defnition
In this section, we introduce a number of formal defnitions and the problem statement

for M CI.

3.3.1

Defnitions

Causal Model. Fig. 3.5 shows defnitions for a causal model. Specifcally, SysName represents syscall names such as open and read. Repetition indicates how many times a term or
node repeats. It could be a constant number, a variable such as n or m, or ∗ representing any
number of repetition. Variables are needed to to denote repetition constraints across syscall
events. ResourceSymbol represents a symbol for a resource handler that a system call operates on (e.g., fle handler). A Term is a sequence of Nodes that could be annotated with the
number of repetitions. A node N is a syscall annotated with a set of parameters denoted by
SymbolicResource. A symbolic resource can be instantiated to different concrete resources
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during parsing. Two nodes with the same symbolic resource indicates that they have explicit dependency. An Edge denotes dependency/causality between two nodes Nfrom and
Nto . Finally, a causal model is defned as a 3-tuple < T, P(E)implicit , P(E)explicit > where T
is a sequence of terms, P(E)implicit is the set of implicit dependency edges and P(E)explicit
is the set of explicit dependency edges. The defnitions of two kinds of edges can be found
in Sec. 3.2.
SyscallName
Repetition
SymbolicResource
Term
Node
Edge
Model

SysName ::= open | read | write | ...
R ::= 1 | 2 | 3 | ... | n | m | ∗
S ::= {α, β , γ, ...}
T ::=
N ::=
E ::=
M ::=

N | NT | (T)R
SysNameP(S)
< Nfrom , Nto >
< T, P(E)implicit , P(E)explicit >

Figure 3.5.: Defnition of causal model

For example, the model in Fig. 3.4 (a) can be represented as follows. First, T can be represented by a sequence: readα , statβ , read∗γ , stat∗β , read∗δ , writeβ , writeε . Implicit dependencies (dotted edges below nodes) are denoted as follows: {hread∗γ , read∗δ i, hread∗δ , writeβ i,
hread∗δ , writeε i}. Explicit dependencies (solid edges above nodes) are the following: {
hstatβ , stat∗β i, hstatβ , writeβ i }. Observe the nodes in an explicit edge have the same resource symbol, indicating that they operate on the same resource. In this chapter, we will
use the more concise graphical representations when possible.
Syscall Trace. As shown in Fig. 3.6, a system call trace T is a sequence of trace entries
TE where a trace entry is a system call name annotated with a set of ConcreteResource that
represents concrete resource handlers, and a number N that represent an index of TE in T.
Note that it does not contain any dependency information. The frst 6 entries in Fig. 3.4 (f)
are represented as TE = (read10 , stat21 , ..., read32 , write41 , ...). Note that the subscripts represent concrete resource handlers and the superscripts represents indexes.
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ConcreteResource
TraceEntry
SyscallTrace

C ::= N
TE ::= SysNameN
P(C)
T ::= TE

Figure 3.6.: Defnition of syscall trace

3.3.2

Problem Statement

We aim to infer fne-grained causality from a syscall trace by parsing it with models.
This procedure can be formally defned as a function of T and P(M):
T × P(M) 7→ (TE 7→ P(N × M))
Specifcally, given a syscall trace T and a set of models P(M), the function generates

a mapping, in which a trace entry is mapped to a set of nodes N in model M. It is a set
because a trace entry can be present in multiple models as shown in the motivation example
in Sec. 3.2. With the mapping, the dependencies between trace entries can be derived from
the dependencies between the matched nodes in the models. For example, parsing the
trace in Fig. 3.4 (f) using the models in (a)-(d) generates the following mapping. The
frst 4 events are mapped to model (a): (read10 7→< readα , Ma >), (stat21 7→< statβ , Ma >
), (read32 7→< read∗δ , Ma >), (write41 7→< writeβ , Ma >). Moreover, stat11
5 belongs to two
11
models, resulting in two mappings: (stat11
5 7→< statε , Mc >), (stat5 7→< statβ , Md >). It

entails the following concrete dependency edges < read32 , write41 > (from model edge <
∗
14
read∗δ , writeβ > in (a) ) and < stat12
5 , stat1 > (from model edge < statβ , statδ > in (d)).

The frst edge indicates implicit dependency between the original gpg fle (out.gpg) and a
temp fle containing its decrypted contents, and the second edge implies that the copy and
paste action is related to the temp fle containing the decrypted contents of the original gpg
fle (out.gpg). Such dependency edges lead to a causal graph as that in Fig. 3.2-(d).
The mapping may not be total, depending on the comprehensiveness of the models. An
important feature of M CI is model composibility, meaning that a complex behavior can be
composed by multiple models sharing some common nodes. For instance, a complex user
behavior in Vim such as “open fle, edit, copy, edit, paste, save, reopen” can be decomposed
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to multiple primitive models. As such, the number of models needed for regular workload
is limited as shown in Sec. 4.6.
The key challenge of M CI lies in parsing the trace that does not contain any dependencies with models that contain dependency information, which entails solving two prominent
technical problems discussed next.

3.3.3

Technical Challenges: Complexity and Ambiguity

Language Complexity
According to our defnition, a trace is a string in the trace language that does not contain
dependency information, our problem is essentially to parse the string to various model instances. In the following, we use the classic language theory to understand the complexity
of our problem. Note that although it seems that we could consider models as graphs and
leverage the sub-graph isomorphism theory to understand our problem, there are places that
can hardly be formulated in the graph theory. For instance, our trace is not a graph because
it does not have implicit dependency information. Furthermore, our model may have constraints among the numbers of event repetitions (e.g., the number of close matches with
the number of open while the number of repetitions may vary). Such constraints can hardly
be represented in graphs.
The classical Chomsky hierarchy [86, 87] defnes four classes of languages characterized by the expressive power of their defning grammars: regular, context-free, contextsensitive, and recursively enumerable. More expressive grammar can describe more complex language but requires higher cost in parsing. We study some of representative causal
model types observed in real-world programs. For each type, we show a sample grammar and discuss the complexity of the grammar as well as scalability of the corresponding
parser.
Regular Model. Fig. 3.7 shows a model from ping [88], representing a behavior “resolving a network address, sending a packet, and receiving a response.”
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Legend
gσ: gethostbyname(σ)
soσ: socket(σ), slσ: select(σ),
swσ: sendto(σ), srσ: read(σ),
α: stdin, β: network socket,
∅: empty set

Explicit

rα

soβ

g∅

swβ

slβ

srβ

Implicit

Figure 3.7.: Regular model from ping [88]

Observe that the explicit dependencies (solid edges) are caused by the socket (β ). The
implicit dependencies (dotted edges) are introduced because gethostbyname() decides
whether to execute socket() and sendto() meaning that they have control dependences.
In particular, if gethostbyname() returns an error, the program immediately terminates.
Also, sendto() is dependent on the return value of gethostname() (e.g., IP address) as
the ping program composes and sends Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) packets
that contain the returned IP address. Such dependencies are not visible at the syscall level.
Note that in any model, the frst node, which is always an input syscall, has dependencies
leading to all other nodes. Recall that a model is acquired from L DX that mutates an input
syscall and observes changes at output syscalls (e.g., the frst node in Fig. 3.7 is a syscall
that reads an option from the command line that leads to all the other syscalls in the model).
The model in Fig. 3.7 can be simplifed by a regular grammar (e.g., regular expression)
which is the simplest one in Chomsky hierarchy. A regular language parser has very good
scalability. From our experience, most models (53 out of 56 models in our evaluation) fall
into this type.

Explicit Dep.

rα

m

oβ

rβ

cβ

wγn

oδ

rδ

cδ

Implicit Dep.

wnγ

Legend
oσ: open(σ), rσ: read(σ),
wσ: write(σ), cσ: close(σ),
α: stdin, β: /proc/mounts,
γ: stdout, δ: /proc/*

n

Figure 3.8.: Context-free model from procps [89]

Context-free Model.

There are cases that the models need to be context-free. Fig. 3.8

shows such a model extracted from procps [89]. The model represents “retrieving fle
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system information.” It frst reads a fle that contains information about the list of fle
systems. It then uses an outer loop to emit the information for individual fle systems. For
each fle system, an inner loop is used to collect information about the fle system from
multiple places (e.g., different disks).
As shown in Fig. 3.8, three symbols from the 2nd to the 4th (oβ , rβ , cβ ) have explicit
dependencies due to the fle containing the list of fle systems (β ). The 5th symbol wnγ is to
emit the header information for each fle system, causing the implicit dependency between
the 3rd symbol rβ and the 5th . The superscript n denotes that there are n fle systems. The
6th , 7th , and 8th symbols (oδ , rδ and cδ ) form a term, corresponding to the inner loop that
reads m places to collect information for the n fle systems. Note that m may not equal
to n as multiple fles may be accessed in order to collect information for a fle system.
After that, the 9th symbol wnγ emits the collected information for the n fle systems. Note
that the number of writes in the 5th and the 9th symbols need to be identical (n times).
The constraints on the numbers render the model cannot be transformed to an automaton
that handles a regular language. It is essentially context-free. The parser for a contextfree language requires some push-down mechanism, incurring higher complexity. We have
encountered 2 context-free models in our evaluation.

Legend

rα

srβn

swγm

n

cβn

cγm

rσ: read(σ), srσ: recv(σ),
swσ: write(σ), cσ: close(σ),
α: socket for comm.,
β: socket for read,
γ: socket for write

m

Figure 3.9.: Context-sensitive model from raft [90]

Context-sensitive Model.

In some rare cases, even context-free models are not suff-

ciently expressive. Fig. 3.9 shows a model from [91] which is a distributed voting application that implements the Raft consensus protocol [90]. The program can exchange network
messages between different number of users to get a consensus. The model describes a
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voting procedure. Specifcally, it receives network messages from n users (n iterations
of read()), and sends network messages to m users (m iterations of write()). Later, it
closes the sockets for n users and then m users. The crossing-constraints between m and n
( r2 n ,

cn )

and ( wm ,

cm )

require a context-sensitive language. However, a parser for a context-

sensitive language is prohibitively expensive in general (PSPACE complexity [92]). We
have not encountered any models more complex than context-sensitive languages. The various language complexities pose a prominent challenge: since syscall events belonging to
multiple models interleave and are often distant from each other, we cannot know which
model an event belongs to until reaching the end of the model. As such, we do not know
which complexity class shall be used to parse individual events. As we will show later,
we develop a uniform parsing algorithm for multiple complexity classes that leverages the
special characteristics of causal models.

Ambiguity
The strings (of syscalls) parsed by multiple models may share common parts (e.g.,
common prefxes). In the worst case, multiple models may accept the same string, although
we have not encountered such cases for models within the same application. As a result
during trace parsing, given a syscall, there may be multiple models that it can be attributed
to and M CI does not know which model(s) are the right ones. We call it the ambiguity
problem.
..., r1, w2, w3, r4, r5, w6, w3, r7, w8, ...
(a) Trace
..., r1, w2, w3, r4, r5, w6, w3, r7, w8, ...
(b) Ground-truth
rα

wβ

Explicit Dep.

(c) Model

Legend
rσ: read(σ),
wσ: write(σ)

M1: r1, w2, w3, r4, r5, w6, w3, r7, w8, ...
M2: r1, w2, w3, r4, r5, w6, w3, r7, w8, ...
M3: r1, w2, w3, r4, r5, w6, w3, r7, w8, ...
M4: r1, w2, w3, r4, r5, w6, w3, r7, w8, ...
M5: r1, w2, w3, r4, r5, w6, w3, r7, w8, ...
...
(d) Possible Matchings

Figure 3.10.: Ambiguity problem
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For instance, consider a trace, the ground-truth causality of the trace, and a model
shown in Fig. 3.10-(a), (b), and (c), respectively. Observe that the model has a socket read
followed by a fle write. The two have implicit dependency but not explicit dependency
visible at the syscall level. The three boxes in Fig. 3.10-(b) denote the three real model
instances.
When the model is used to parse the trace, due to the lack of dependencies between
the two syscalls in the model, there are many possible matchings as shown in Fig. 3.10(d). Note that except M1 , the other matchings are incorrect even though they all appear
possible at the syscall level. In practice, such incorrect matchings introduce false causalities
which hinder attack investigation. Moreover, ambiguity may cause excessive performance
overhead because M CI has to maintain numerous model instances at runtime. The root
cause of the problem is that the trace does not have suffcient information. Hence, we
develop a method that leverages explicit dependences to mitigate the problem. Details can
be found in Sec. 3.4.2.

3.4

System Design
M CI consists of two phases: model construction and model parsing. The former is

offine and the latter is meant to be deployed for production run.

3.4.1

Model Construction

Given an application, the forensic analyst provides a set of regular workloads. The
application is executed on the L DX system with the workloads. The dependences detected
by L DX, including explicit and implicit dependences, are annotated on the syscall events
in the audit logs. The annotated logs are analyzed to extract inter-dependent subsequences,
which are further symbolized (i.e., replacing concrete resource handlers with symbolic
ones). The sequences of symbolic syscalls with dependences constitute our causal models.
In the following, we use a program snippet in Fig. 3.11 to illustrate how M CI constructs
causal models. It frst reads a network message (line 1) and encrypts the received message
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(line 2). Later, it stores the encrypted message to a local fle (line 3) and sends a notifcation
to a GUI component (line 5).

1
2
3
4
5

while( (len = read(socket, buf, 1024)) != -1 ) {
ebuf = encrypt(buf);
write( file, ebuf, 4096 );
}
sendmsg( wnd, “Update: ” + ebuf ... );

Figure 3.11.: Example program

Dependencies Identifcation by L DX
The program is executed with a typical workload on L DX [1] to collect a system call
log T . To identify dependencies, L DX mutates the value of input syscall read() in the
slave execution. By contrasting the values of the following syscalls (e.g., the write() and
sendmsg()) in the two executions, L DX identifes all the dependencies between syscalls.

1
2
3
4
5
6

Figure 3.12.: Causally dependent system calls from L DX

Fig. 3.12 shows the output generated by L DX. It includes two read()s (lines 3 and
5), one write() (line 4) and one sendmsg() (line 6) which are causally dependent on the
source (i.e., read() at line 2). More specifcally, the write() at line 4 and sendmsg() at
line 6 are (implicitly) dependent on the source by variables buf and ebuf, and the read()s
at lines 2 and 4 are explicitly dependent on the source due to the socket handler 0x11.
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The generated sequence of syscalls includes all the syscalls causally dependent on the
source (line 3). We hence leverage them as a sample of the model. Note that L DX also
returns dependences between syscalls inside the sequence such as the dependence between
lines 3 and 4.

Symbolization
The collected sequence of syscalls cannot be directly used as a model due to the concrete arguments. For instance, in Fig. 3.12, syscalls have concrete values (e.g., handlers
0x11 and 0x12) which may differ across executions. Hence, we symbolize concretes values in syscalls by replacing with symbols (e.g., α and β ). For instance, if two syscalls
share the same argument, they are assigned the same symbol.
If the application supports repeated workload, there must be repetitions in the syscalls
that need to be modeled (such as n and m in Fig. 3.5). To do so, M CI duplicates the
workload a few times and feeds the new workloads to L DX again. Subsequences that have
a constant number of repetitions across workloads are annotated with the constant. Those
that have varying numbers of repetitions across workloads are annotated with ‘*’. If there
are correlations between the repetition numbers of multiple subsequences (inside the same
model), variables n/m are used to model the number of repetition, such as the previous
example Fig. 3.8 in Sec. 3.3.3.

1
2
3
4

SUCCESS
SUCCESS
FAILURE
SUCCESS

=
=
=
=

read( fd1 /* file handle*/, *, * );
write( fd2 /* file handle*/, *, * );
read( fd1 /* file handle*/, *, * );
sendmsg( *, *, * );

Figure 3.13.: Symbolized system calls

Fig. 3.13 shows a symbolized log. For example, 0x11 in read() in Fig. 3.12 is replaced
by a new symbol fd1 and 0x12 in write() in Fig. 3.12 is generalized to another symbol
fd2 . 0x11 in the second read() is replaced by the previously assigned symbol fd1 as it
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already appeared before. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 3.13, all concrete return values are
symbolized as either

SUCCESS

or

FAILURE .

They are part of the models in our system

although our formal defnitions did not describe them for brevity. The constructed model
is shown in Fig. 3.14. The formal model construction algorithm is elided due to the space
limitations.
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*

rα

wβ

Implicit Dep.

rα

sγ

Legend
rσ: read(σ), wσ: write(σ),
sσ: sendmsg(σ),
α: socket(fd1),
β: file (fd2), γ: window

Figure 3.14.: Constructed model from the example

3.4.2

Trace Parsing with Models

In this section, we describe how M CI parses an audit log with models. As we described
in Sec. 3.3.3, if we simply consider an audit log as a string of the trace language, we need
to consider three language classes in the Chomsky hierarchy, namely, regular, context-free,
and context-sensitive languages. Recursively enumerable languages are never encountered
in our experience. A more expressive language requires more expensive parser. For instance, context-free language can describe almost all causal models we have encountered
but context free parsers have a time complexity of n3 where n is the length of a string
(the number of events in audit log in our case), thus they are too expensive to handle realworld logs that can grow in the pace of gigabytes per day [93] (corresponding to millions
of events). Context-sensitive parsers have even higher computational complexity. Furthermore, our parser needs to be able to substantially mitigate the ambiguity problem in which
M CI does not know which models an event should be attributed to.
Segmented Parsing. Our proposal is not to consider a trace as a simple string, but rather a
sequence of symbols with explicit inter-dependences. Note that explicit dependences can be
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directly derived from the trace. The basic idea is hence to leverage explicit dependences to
partition the sequence of terms/nodes in a model into segments, delimited by terms/nodes
that are involved in some explicit dependences. Therefore, all the terms/nodes inside each
segment are a string in some regular language. The essence is to leverage explicit dependences to reduce language complexity. During parsing, we frst recognize (from the trace)
the explicit dependences that match those of the model. These dependences partition the
trace into sub-traces. Then automata are used to recognize model segment instances from
the sub-traces. Since string parsing is only carried out within small sub-traces instead of
the lengthy whole trace, ambiguity can be substantially suppressed. We call the technique
segmented parsing.

rα

sβ

rγ

sδ

wε

wα

rζ

oδ

Legend
rσ: read(σ), sσ: stat(σ), wσ: write(σ), oσ: open(σ), α, β, γ, δ, ε, ζ: different files

Figure 3.15.: Example for segmented parsing

Next, we use an example to illustrate the basic idea and then explain the algorithm.
Fig. 3.15 shows a sample model. Observe that there are explicit dependences between the
1st and the 6th nodes ( rα and wα ), and between the 4th and the 8th nodes ( sδ and oδ ).
The sequence of terms/nodes involved in explicit dependences form the model skeleton.
In our example, it is rα - sδ - wα - oδ . The skeleton partitions the model into sub-models.
A sub-model is a sub-sequence of nodes/terms of the model that are delimited by explicit
dependences but themselves do not have any explicit dependences. In Fig. 3.15, three submodels are obtained as follows: sβ - rγ delimited by rα and sδ , wε delimited by sδ and
wα , and rζ delimited by wα and oδ .
During parsing, we frst fnd instances of the model skeleton. For each skeleton instance, we try to identify instances of sub-models within the trace ranges determined by
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the skeleton instance. Any mismatch in any sub-model indicates this is not a correct model
instance and the corresponding data structures are discarded. In our example, we frst locate
the possible positions of rα , sδ , wα , oδ in the trace, and then look for the instances of
sβ - rγ in between the positions of rα and sδ , and so on. Partitioning a model to a skeleton and a set of sub-models is straightforward. Details are hence elided. Given a trace, to
facilitate segmented parsing, we extract a number of trace indexes, each containing all the
nodes related to the same system object (e.g., a fle) and the position of the nodes in the
raw trace. These indexes allow our parser to quickly locate skeleton instances in the trace.
Fig. 3.16 shows an example of index extraction from a trace. Observe that all the nodes in
an index have explicit dependences.

oα

rβ

wα

rβ

rα

wβ

cα

(a) Trace Annotated with Explicit Dependencies

oα

wα

rα

cα

rβ

Index 1

rβ

wβ

Index 2

(b) Indexes for each resource

Legend
oσ: open(σ), rσ: read(σ), wσ: write(σ), cσ: close(σ),
α: File 1, β: File 2

Figure 3.16.: Trace preprocessing

Algorithms. The parsing procedure consists of three major steps. The frst one is to preprocess trace to extract indexes, which has been intuitively explained before. The second
step is to locate skeleton instances in the trace and the third is to parse sub-models. In the
following, we explain the algorithmic details of steps two and three.
The algorithm of locating skeleton instances is shown in Alg. 4. It takes the trace T , the
indexes I that can be accessed by the concrete resource id (e.g., fle handler), and a model
skeleton S, and identifes all the possible instances of the skeleton. The result is stored in
P. Each instance is a pair hmap, seqi with map projecting each symbolic resource (e.g., α
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Algorithm 4 Locating Skeletons
Input: trace T , indexes I, model skeleton S
Output: a set of skeleton instances P, each consisting of a mapping that maps a symbolic resource to a concrete one, and a sequence
of positions
1: procedure L OCATE S KELETON(T , I, S)
2:
for all node Nα ∈ S do
3:
if P ≡ {} then
4:
P ← {h{α → h}, ii | for all T [i] = Nh }
5:
else
6:
for all hmap, seqi ∈ P do
7:
Let the last position in seq be i
8:
if map[α] =
6 nil then
9:
pos ← fndbeyond(N,i,I[map[α]])
10:
if pos =
6 −1 then
11:
seq ← seq · pos
12:
else
13:
P.remove(hmap, seqi)
14:
end if
15:
else // scan all indexes to fnd Nh syscalls that are beyond i
16:
... // and instantiate α to h.
17:
end if
18:
end for
19:
end if
20:
end for
21:
return P
22: end procedure

Algorithm 5 Model Parsing
Input: trace T , skeleton instances P, sub-models S
Output: the concrete syscall entries that correspond to the sub-models in the temporal order
1: procedure PARSE S UB M ODELS(T , P, S)
2:
for all hmap, seqi ∈ P do
3:
for i from 0 to |S| − 1 do
4:
instance[i] ← parse(T [seq[i], seq[i + 1]], S[i])
5:
end for
6:
if all instance[0 − (|S| − 1)] are not nil then
7:
if none of the concrete syscalls in instance[0(−|S| − 1)] share the same resource id then
8:
output instance[0 − (|S| − 1)]
9:
end if
10:
end if
11:
end for
12: end procedure
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and β ) in the skeleton to some concrete handler and seq storing the trace positions of the
individual nodes in the skeleton. To simplify our discussion, we assume the skeleton does
not have repetitive nodes or terms. The algorithm can be easily extended to handle such
cases.
The main procedure iterates over each node Nα in the skeleton (line 2) with N the
syscall and α the symbolic resource. For the frst node (indicated by an empty result set
P), the algorithm considers each syscall of the same type N, in the form of Nh at location i
in the trace, may start an instance of the skeleton, and hence instantiates α to the concrete
handler h and records its position i (lines 3 and 4). If Nα is not the frst node, the algorithm
iterates over all the skeleton candidates in P in the inner loop (lines 6-18) to check if it can
fnd a matching of the node for these candidates. If not, the skeleton candidate is invalid
and hence discarded. Specifcally, for each skeleton candidate denoted as hmap, seqi, line
7 identifes the trace position of latest node i. This is needed as the algorithm looks for
the match of Nα in trace entries beyond position i. The condition at line 8 separates the
processing to two cases with the true branch denoting the case that α has been instantiated
before, that is, a node of the same symbolic resource was matched before (e.g., wα in
Fig. 3.15), the else branch otherwise (e.g., sδ in Fig. 3.15). In the frst case (lines 9-11), the
algorithm looks up the index of the concrete handler associated with α, i.e., I[map[α]], to
fnd a concrete syscall N beyond position i (line 9). If such a syscall is found, we consider
the algorithm has found a match and the new position pos is appended to seq (line 11).
Otherwise, the skeleton candidate is not valid and removed (line 13). Here, we have another
simplifcation for ease of explanation. Line 9 may return multiple positions in practice
while in the algorithm we assume it only returns one. The extension is straightforward.
In the else branch, the node has a new symbolic resource, the algorithm has to go
through all indexes to fnd all instances of N and instantiate the symbolic resource accordingly. This may lead to the expansion of the candidate set P. Details are elided. To reduce
search space, we use time window and other syscall arguments to limit scopes.
Given a set of skeleton instances for a model M, Alg. 5 parses the sub-models of M.
In particular, the outer loop (lines 2-11) iterates over all the skeleton candidates identifed
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in the previous step. If matches can be found for all sub-models regarding a skeleton
instance, the matches are emitted. Otherwise, it is not a legitimate instance and discarded.
Specifcally, the inner loop in lines 3 and 4 iterates over individual sub-models in order.
In the ith iteration, it uses automata to parse sub-model S[i] in the trace range identifed
by the ith segment identifed by the skeleton candidate, which is from seq[i] to seq[i + 1]
(line 4). Automata based parsing is standard and elided. After such parsing, line 6 checks
if we have found matches for all sub-models. If so, line 7 further checks that none of the
concrete syscall entries that are matched with some node in a sub-model do not share the
same resource (and hence have explicit dependences). This is because the model specifes
that there are not explicit dependences between the corresponding nodes. Line 8 outputs
the parsing results.
Handling Threaded Programs. Threading does not pose additional challenges to M CI
in most cases because syscalls from different threads have different process ids so that
models can be constructed independently for separate threads. Explicit dependences across
threads can be easily captured by analyzing audit logs. Some programs such as Apache and
Firefox use in-memory data structures (e.g., work queues) to communicate across threads,
causing implicit dependences. However, it is highly complex to model and parse behaviors
across threads due to non-deterministic thread interleavings. We observe that these data
structures are usually protected by synchronizations, which are visible at the syscall level,
and the synchronizations should follow the nature of the data structures, such as frst-infrst-out for queues. Hence, M CI constructs models for individual threads including the
dispatching thread and worker threads. The models include the synchronization behaviors.
It then leverages the FIFO pattern to match nodes across threads. It works nicely for most
of the programs we consider except transmission, whose synchronization is not visible
at the system level (Sec. 4.6).
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3.5

Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate M CI with a set of real-world programs in order to answer

the following research questions.
RQ 1. How many models are required to infer causality for these programs in production
runs (Sec. 3.5.1), and how much efforts are required to construct models? (Sec. 3.5.1)
RQ 2. How effective is M CI for system wide causality inference including multiple longrunning programs and various activities? (Sec. 3.5.2)
RQ 3. How effective is M CI for realistic attack investigation? (Sec. 3.5.3)
RQ 4. Is M CI scalable on large workloads for long-running programs? (Sec. 3.5.3)

Table 3.2.: Details on Model Construction
Program

Model Description

Size1

Dexp 2

Dimp 3

Lang.4

Tab Open/Switch/Close

7/9/5

2/2/1

3/4/3

Reg.

Load a URI

12

2

4

Reg.

Download (Save)

15

3

5

Reg.

Click a link

9

2

3

Reg.

HTTP(S) resp.

17 (21)5

3 (4)5

8 (11)5

Reg.

CGI resp.

26 (33)5

4 (5)5

11 (14)5

Reg.

HTTP(S) resp.

8 (11)5

2 (3)5

4 (6)5

Reg.

CGI resp.

16 (19)5

3 (4)5

7 (9)5

Reg.

HTTP(S) resp.

14 (17)5

3 (4)5

6 (9)5

Reg.

CGI resp.

21 (24)5

4 (5)5

8 (11)5

Reg.

Firefox

Apache

Lighttpd

nginx

Continued on next page
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Table 3.2: Details on Model Construction (cont.)
Program

Size1

Dexp 2

Dimp 3

Lang.4

Add printers

6

1

3

Reg.

Remove printers

5

1

3

Reg.

Modify printers

6

1

3

Reg.

Print a doc.

7

2

4

Reg.

Open

8

1

5

Reg.

Edit

10

1

4

Reg.

Save

13

2

4

Reg.

Save As

15

3

6

Reg.

Copy and Paste

14

3

6

Reg.

Copy

11

1

5

Reg.

Plug-in (gpg)

21

2

6

Reg.

Browse

11

3

6

Reg.

Save

6

2

5

Reg.

Upload

7

2

5

Reg.

Send emails

10

2

6

Reg.

Send fles

13

3

7

Reg.

Download emails

9

2

6

Reg.

Download fles

11

2

5

Reg.

Open a link

8

2

4

Reg.

Compress fle(s)

16

8

5

C.F.

Use encryption

6

4

3

Reg.

Model Description

CUPS

vim

elinks

alpine

zip
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2: Details on Model Construction (cont.)
Size1

Dexp 2

Dimp 3

Lang.4

Download

17

4

8

Reg.

Add a torrent fle

6

3

3

Reg.

Add a magnet

12

3

7

Reg.

Login

5/4/6

1/1/2

4/3/4

Reg.

Create directory

4/4/4

2/2/2

3/3/3

Reg.

proftpd/

Delete directory

3/4/4

1/2/2

3/3/3

Reg.

lftp/yafc

List directory

3/3/3

1/1/1

3/3/3

Reg.

Upload

7/8/18

2/2/3

5/5/9

Reg.

Download

6/7/16

2/2/4

5/6/9

Reg.

Download (HTTP(S))

7 (15)5

2 (4)5

5 (8)5

Reg.

Option -f

6

2

5

Reg.

Option -r

5

2

5

Reg.

Get fle system info.

6

3

4

C.F.

Voting

5

2

6

C.S.

Leader Election

7

2

7

Reg.

10.2

2.4

5.4

-

Program

transmission

wget

Model Description

ping
procps
raft [91]
Average

-

1:

# of nodes in a model. 2 : # of explicit dependencies (edges) in a model.

3:

# of implicit dependencies (edges) in a model. 4 : Language Class of a model.

5:

for HTTPS.

Experiment Setup. We evaluate our approach on 17 real-world programs. Table 3.2 shows
the programs and models we constructed. Note that 15 out of the 17 programs (except
zip and Vim) are network related which is a popular channel for cyber-attacks. For each
program, we construct models offine. We use typical workloads briefy described in the
second column of Table 3.2. Specifcally, if there are available test inputs for a program, we
use them as the typical workloads. Otherwise, we construct inputs by inspecting program
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manuals and identifying options and commands that can trigger different functionalities,
such as for proftpd, CUPS, and zip.

3.5.1

Model Construction

Table 3.2 shows the constructed models for each program. Columns 1 and 2 show
programs and model description. Column Size shows the number of nodes in each model.
The numbers in/out parentheses are for the same behaviors with/without HTTPS. The next
two columns show the number of explicit and implicit dependencies in each model. The
last column (Lang.) shows the language class of each model (Regular (Reg.), Context-free
(C.F.), or Context-Sensitive (C.S.)).
We have the following observations from the results. First, the size of model is relatively small (on average 10.2 nodes) and there are on average 2.4 explicit dependencies
(more than 4 nodes) for each model. The strong presence of explicit dependencies allows
M CI to perform segmented parsing effectively. Second, we observe three language complexity classes and most models fall into the regular class. It supports our design choice of
integrating regular parsers (i.e., automata) with explicit dependency tracking.

# of Models Required
The constructed models listed in Table 3.2 are suffcient to infer causality for logs from
realistic scenarios described in Sec. 3.5.3 including the motivation example in Sec. 3.2.
The number of models for each program ranges from 3 to 12 which is fairly small and not
diffcult to obtain in practice. We observe that the primary reason why M CI is effective with
a small number of models is model composibility, namely, primitive models can be used to
compose complex behaviors. For instance, models for “Edit” and “Save” can compose a
new model “Edit and Save”.
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Efforts on Model Construction
To construct models, a program is executed repeatedly on L DX. The number of runs
required to construct a model depends on the number of events in the model. Specifcally,
we frst run a program with a workload on L DX to identify all the events causally dependent
on the workload. Note that the detected events constitute the bulk of the model. Assume
there are n such events (nodes). For each node in the model, M CI mutates the value of
the corresponding syscall to determine dependencies on the node inside the model. To
fgure out the repetition factors of the node (Sec. 4.4), M CI runs k times for the node, each
execution repeats the workload for different times. In total, we run a program (k ∗ n) + 1
times to construct a model. In our experiments, k = 10. On average, the machine time
to construct a model, including L DX execution time and model extraction time, takes 4
minutes (253 seconds).
Table 3.3.: Results for System-wide Causality Inference
Program
Firefox
Apache
Lighttpd
nginx
proftpd
CUPS
vim
elinks
alpine
zip
transmission
lftp
yafc
wget
ping
procps

# of
events
2,313 M
296 M
125 M
187 M
49 M
25 M
43 M
38 M
116 M
5M
250 M
11 M
9M
627 K
2.4 k
4M

# of
causality
11 M
6.6 M
3.3 M
3.8 M
2.1 M
918 K
4M
3.6 M
4.7 M
634 K
6.9 M
438 K
616 K
71 K
1.3 K
1M

# of matched
models
549 K
435 K
275 K
246 K
179 K
88 K
219 K
145 K
231 K
36 K
479 K
54 K
43 K
5.4 K
241
176 K

FP

FN

8.3%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
3.8%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

3.2%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0.8%
0%
0%
0.3%
0%
5.2%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
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3.5.2

System-wide Causality Inference

In this experiment, we apply M CI to infer causality on a system wide syscall trace
collected for the system execution of a week, to demonstrate the effectiveness of causality
inference for realistic programs with production runs. The trace includes syscall logs from
multiple programs including those in Table 3.2. Specifcally, we enable Linux Audit and
use the programs in Table 3.2 with typical workloads for a week. Given the collected trace,
we identify all the inputs that appear in the trace (e.g., fle reads, command line arguments,
user interactions). Then, we build a forward causal graph from each input, i.e., identifying
all other syscalls depending on the input, using M CI and compare it with the ground truth
by L DX. During the experiment, we record all inputs used for the programs. Then, we reexecute the program with the recorded inputs to reproduce the same execution. To do so,
we develop a lightweight record and replay system similar to ODR [94]. L DX is run on top
of the replay system to derive the ground truth. Note that due to the limitation of the replay
system, the replayed execution may differ from the original execution. Such differences
are counted as false-positives/negatives for conservativeness.
The collected log consists of syscalls from multiple programs and the size of the log is
around 732 GB (without compression) containing 3707 million events. We frst separate
the log into smaller logs per process.
Table 3.3 shows results of the experiment. The second column shows # of events
(syscalls) in the log for each program. The third and forth columns represent # of dependencies detected and # of models matched by M CI. For the # of dependencies, we
count all those inferred by M CI via matched models and those explicit dependencies across
matched models. The last column shows false-positive and false-negative rates.
For most programs, M CI precisely identifes causality with not measurable false positives and negatives. There are a few exceptions: Firefox, CUPS, alpine, and transmiss
ions. We manually inspect a subset of these false-positives/negatives and have the following observations. Our Firefox models are intended to describe browser behaviors such as
following a hyperlink and opening a tab. However, logs contain a lot of syscalls generated
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by the page content. Some of them are not much distinguishable from browser-intrinsic
behaviors, leading to mismatches. For CUPS, we identify new behaviors during the experiment which are variations of the existing models. Transmission is a threaded program
with memory based synchronizations that are invisible to M CI. Hence, M CI misses some
thread interdependences via memory.
Table 3.4.: Comparison with BEEP
BEEP
M CI

System subjects
9.23
9.18

System objects
33.71
25.38

Edges
74.21
62.87

FP / FN
12.8% / 0.3%
0.1% / 0.1%

Comparison with BEEP. To evaluate the effectiveness of M CI when compared with
BEEP, we randomly select 100 system objects (e.g., fles or network connections) accessed
in the week-long experiment. For each selected system object, we construct a causal graph
by BEEP and by M CI, and compare the two. Table 3.4 shows the results. First of all, we
observe that M CI has fewer false-positives and false-negatives. Again, we use L DX as the
ground truth. Especially, M CI reduces the false-positive rate signifcantly. We investigate
some of the cases that BEEP introduces false-positives, and fnd that many system objects
accessed in a unit are included in the causal graphs while they are not causally related.
Also, BEEP causes slightly more false-negatives due to missing inter-unit dependencies.
We analyze the cases and fnd that the missing inter-unit dependencies were due to incomplete instrumentation caused by the diffculty of binary analysis in BEEP. We also manually
investigate false-positive and false-negative cases from M CI. It turns out they are mostly
caused by concurrent executions in transmission.
Runtime/memory Overhead. We also measure runtime overhead and memory overhead
of M CI. Specifcally, we report how long M CI takes to parse the audit log collected from the
one week experiment which contains 3707 millions events. As we discussed in Sec. 3.4.2,
we preprocess an audit log to extract indexes so that the parser can quickly locate skeleton
instances. We measure the runtime performance and memory consumption of the trace
preprocessor. It takes 4 hours 47 minutes to preprocess (index) the entire log. The prepro-
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cessor occupies around 2.8 GB of memory on average. The parser frst locates segments of
the traces and launches automata within the identifed segments. We fnd that the parser
spend more time on parsing within the segments. In particular, the parser takes more time
when it parses a wrong segment and eventually fails. Note that we parallelize the parsing
within a segment to exploit multi-core processors. To parse the log, it takes around 4 days
(95 hours 43 minutes), and the parser consumes around 6.2 GB of memory on average. We
consider such one-time efforts reasonable given the huge log size. We leave performance
optimization to our future work.

3.5.3

Case Studies

In this section, we present a few case studies to demonstrate the effectiveness of our
approach in attack investigation.

Phishing email and camoufaged FTP server case
In this case, we use a scenario adapted from attack cases that were created by security
professionals in a DARPA program [95], to demonstrate how M CI can effectively infer
causality in a real-world security incident that happens across multiple programs including
PINE and Firefox.
Attack Scenario. The user regularly uses PINE to send and receive emails. At some point,
the user receives a phishing email, and she opens it, fnds a hyperlink that looks interesting,
and hence clicks the hyperlink. PINE automatically spawns the Firefox browser and
the browser navigates to the given hyperlink. The hyperlink leads her to a web-page that
contains an FTP server program. As she thinks the program is useful, she downloads the
program. Before she closes the Firefox browser, she navigates a few more websites and
downloads other fles as well. Specifcally, she opened 2 more tabs and downloaded 3
more programs.
After she closed the browser, she checked a few more emails and then opened a terminal to
execute the downloaded FTP server program. The FTP server is a camoufaged trojan [96].
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It normally behaves as a benign FTP server, serving remote FTP requests properly. However, it contains a backdoor which allows a remote attacker to connect and execute malicious commands on the victim computer. After she ran the trojan FTP server program, it
served tens of benign FTP user requests with hundreds of FTP commands. A few hours
later, the attacker connects to the machine through the backdoor, and modifes an important
fle (e.g., fnancial report). Later, the company identifes that the contents of the important
fle is changed and then hires a forensic expert to investigate the case to identify the origin
of the incident.
Investigation. Given the causal models listed in Table 3.2 and a system-wide trace collected from the user’s system, the forensic expert uses M CI to infer causal relations from
the changed fle. By matching models over the trace, M CI successfully identifes causality
from the initial phishing email to the attacker’s connection in the camoufaged trojan. The
investigator further identifes that the important fle is touched by the FTP server process.
However, the fle operation does not belong to any model instance. Interestingly, this indicates that the fle is not part of regular behaviors, indicating that the FTP server may be
trojaned. The investigator then tries to identify how the FTP server is downloaded and
executed in the system. M CI reveals that a Firefox process downloaded the FTP server
binary via y.y.y.y:80 through “LoadURI” and “Download a fle” models. M CI further identifes that the Firefox process was launched by a PINE process when the user clicked a
link from an email stored at /var/mail/.../94368.5222 downloaded from x.x.x.x.
We also investigate the same incident with BEEP, and fnd out that a causal graph generated by BEEP has a number of false-positives. Specifcally, as shown in Fig. 3.17, the
causal graph includes n.n.n.n:53 which is resolving the domain name, several other IP addresses from the Firefox process, which are from different tabs. Moreover, the causal
graph contains other fles downloaded from other tabs (../fle1 and ../fle2), two more sockets for internal messaging system (unix socket) and XWindow system (/tmp/.X11-unix), as
well as some database fles for storing browsing history (/.../places.sqlite).
In contrast, as M CI leverages accurate models generated by L DX, the graph generated
by M CI is more accurate and precise without bogus dependencies. We also note that BEEP
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requires training and binary instrumentation on the end-user site while M CI has no requirements on the end-user site.
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Figure 3.17.: Causal graphs generated from BEEP and M CI for the camoufaged FTP server
case

Information Theft via InfoZip (zipsplit)
In this case, we use another insider attack to demonstrate the effectiveness of M CI.
Specifcally, an attacker in this case intentionally uses zipsplit to obstruct the investigation of the case as it reads and writes multiple input and output fles where dependences
between them are diffcult to capture by existing approaches. We show how M CI can accurately identify the information fow through the program.
Attack Scenario. In this case, an insider tries to leak a secret document to a competitor
company. However, the attacker’s company forces all computer systems to enable audit
logging system to monitor any attempts to exfltrate important information. To avoid being exposed, he decides to use zipsplit before sending out the secret. Specifcally, he
understands that the zipsplit program can compress n fles into m compressed fles, and
traditional audit logs are able to accurately identify causal relations if an input fle is compressed to a single output fle. Hence, the attacker used zipsplit to compress a secret
document, secret.pdf, as well as two non-secret fles, 1.pdf and 2.pdf, and generates four
output fles, c1.zip−c4.zip. In this example, the secret fle is compressed and distributed
into c1.zip and c2.zip, whereas c3.zip and c4.zip only contain non-secrets. Then he attached
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all output fles to an email, but before he sent it to the competitor company, he removed
c3.zip and c4.zip from the email and only sent the other two that contain the secret. After
that, he deleted all emails histories and compressed fles.
A few days later, the company found suspicious behaviors from the attacker’s computer. They identifed that the secret document was accessed by zipsplit, and some fles
that may contain the secret were sent out. However, the attacker claimed that the secret
document was mistakenly included in zipsplit and he only sent the zip fles that contain non-secrets. At this point, the company started to investigate the attacker’s machine
to identify the source of outgoing fles. Note that the investigator is not able to inspect the
compressed fles or email history as the attacker already deleted them.
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sσ: stat(σ), tσ: time(σ), wσ: write(σ), rσ: read(σ), nσ: rename(σ),
α: stdin, β: current dir, γ: output (compressed) files, ε: input files, θ: temp file

Figure 3.18.: Context-free model from zipsplit

Investigation. A forensic expert utilizes M CI to construct causal models for zipsplit and
PINE. A related model for zipsplit is presented in Fig. 3.18, corresponding to the “read
n fles and compress to an output fle” behavior. Note that it is context-free as there are two
groups of nodes (from the 4th to the 6th and from the 12th to the 16th ) that have the same
number of repetition. The frst group is for reading the meta information of the n input fles
and the second group is for reading the contents of the fles and write to an output fle.
M CI matches the models over the audit log collected from the attacker’s machine, and
it accurately reveals the causality between the secret document and the outgoing message.
Fig. 3.19-(b) presents a causal graph generated by M CI. It shows that the c1.zip and c2.zip
are derived from secret.pdf, and they are sent out via PINE. In contrast, Fig. 3.19-(a) shows a
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causal graph generated by BEEP but it contains many false-positives as BEEP was not able
to identify such removed attachments nor causal relations between inputs and outputs of
zipsplit. We manually inspect the program to identify the root cause of false-positives.
It turns out that zipsplit frst compresses input fles into a temporary fle, then splits
it into multiple output fles. Hence, BEEP considers the temporary fle is dependent on
all input fles, and the output fles are dependent on the temporary fle. In other words,
BEEP considers all output fles are dependent on all input fles. Instead, M CI infers precise
causality between each input and output fle via implicit dependencies annotated in the
model.
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Figure 3.19.: Causal graphs for the zipsplit case

Table 3.5.: Evaluation on Long Running Executions
Access Log
NASA-HTTP [97]
Our institution

# of req. (unique)
3.4M (36K)
5.6M (4.2M)

Elapsed Time
19 hrs 41mins
40 hrs 13mins

FP / FN
3.9% / 0.2%
1.1% / 0.1%
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Long running real world applications
In the last experiment, we evaluate M CI on large scale real world workloads. In particular, we use 2 months of NASA HTTP server access logs obtained from [97] as well as 3
months of our institution’s HTTP server access logs (from Nov. 2015 to Jan. 2016).
To obtain audit logs from the HTTP access logs, we frst emulate the web server environment by crawling all the contents of the original servers. Then, we create a script which
connects and accesses the web server according to the access log so that the audit logging
system on our server can regenerate logs for our analysis.
Table 3.5 shows the result. First, our parser takes 19 hours and 40 hours to parse the
logs from [97] and our institution, respectively. Considering the size of the logs, we argue
that our parser is reasonably scalable. For the accuracy test, we have 3.9% and 1.2% falsepositives for the two respective logs. We analyze such cases and fnd that the NASA-HTTP
log includes much more CGI requests than our institution’s log. We fnd that most of the
false-positive cases are from those CGI requests (e.g., PHP) that introduce noises. That is,
some of the CGI behaviors are similar to the server behaviors and hence confuse our parser.
We also have 0.2% and 0.1% false-negative rates. We manually analyze such cases and fnd
out that they are mainly caused by CGI requests and suspicious requests embedding binary
payloads, which crash the web-server during the experiment. Overall, the result shows that
M CI is scalable to identify causality over large scale logs.

3.6

Related Work

Causality Tracking. There exists a line of work in tracking causal dependences for systemlevel attack analysis [46,47,66–68,98]. BackTracker [66] and Taser [46] propose backward
and forward analysis techniques to identify the entry point of an attack and to understand
the damage happened to the target system. Recently, a series of works [4, 72, 74] have
proposed to provide accurate and fne-grained attack analysis. Dynamic taint analysis techniques [8, 76, 99] track information fow between taint sources and taint sinks. SME [100]
detects information fows between different security levels by running a program multiple
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times. L DX [1] proposes a dual execution based causality inference technique. When a user
executes a process, L DX automatically starts a slave execution by mutating input sources. It
identifes causal dependences between input source and outputs by comparing the outputs
from the original and slave executions.
These approaches have limitations, for instance, syscall-based techniques suffer from
imprecisions that cause false-positives and false-negatives, unit-based techniques require
training or instrumentation on the end-user site, and dynamic taint analysis techniques
cause too much runtime overhead. We discussed details of strengths and limitations of
those techniques in Section 3.2 and compare them with M CI.
Program Behavior Modeling. Constructing program models that represent program’s internal structures (e.g., control fow) or behaviors (e.g., system call invocations) have been
extensively studied, especially in anomaly detection techniques [101–106]. Specifcally,
they train benign program executions to get models which are abstraction of the program
behavior. Then, they use various ways such as DFA [102], FSA [101, 103], push-down
automaton (PDA) [104], hidden Markov models [105], and machine learning [106, 107].
However, their models are mostly control fow models that do not have dependency information. Having dependences (acquired from L DX) in our models on one hand allows us to
use models in attack provenance investigation, on the other hand poses a number of new
technical challenges. Due to the diffculty of static binary dependency analysis, generating
precise models using static analysis is highly challenging.

3.7

Discussion

Kernel-level Attack. We trust audit logs collected at the victim system. Most audit logging
systems including Linux Audit and Windows ETW collect and store audit logs at the kernel
level, and a kernel-level attack could disable the logging system or tamper with the log.
One possible solution is to integrate with LPM-Hif [75] that provides stronger security
guarantees.
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Limitations by L DX [1]. In our off-line analysis, we leverage L DX to construct causal
models, hence, the limitations in L DX are also inherited by M CI. L DX doubles the resource
consumption such as memory, processor and disk storage in order to run a slave execution
along with original execution. However, we argue that the limitations only apply to the
off-line analysis and do not apply the end-user.
Model Coverage. M CI relies on causal models generated by training with typical workloads. If an audit log includes behaviors that cannot be composed by the models in the
provided workloads, M CI may not be able to infer causality precisely and could cause
false-positives/negatives. Also, the FPs and FNs caused by missing models may cascade
throughout the remaining M CI’s parsing process. However, the cascading effect is mostly
limited within a unit (e.g., each request in a server program) because M CI nonetheless starts
a new model instance when it encounters an input syscall that matches with the model.
Moreover, we can detect matching failures due to the incomplete models while M CI is
parsing the audit log. For instance, missing models often lead to causal graphs lacking
important I/O related system-objects (e.g., fles/sockets), hence they are a strong indicator.
Then we can enhance the model to resolve the situation by training with more workloads.
Furthermore, we can fall back to a conservative strategy to assume unmatched events have
inter-dependencies.
Although we mitigate the ambiguity problem (Sec. 3.3.3), as some models may not
have enough dependencies to segment traces, ambiguity is still a challenge. We plan to
investigate using irrelevant events as delimiters to further partition the trace and suppress
ambiguity.
Signal and Exception Handler. Signals and exceptions can be delivered to a predefned
handler at anytime, interrupting a normal execution fow. Unfortunately, it is possible that
system calls in the handler may affect our parser. However, we observe that in practice our
models are robust enough to handle the additional system calls caused by such handlers.
This is because system calls invoked in a signal or exception handler are generally distinctive from the system calls in our causal models, hence our parser is able to flter them out.
Moreover, in many programs such as Lighttpd, handlers functions often do not invoke
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any system call. In the future, we plan to extend M CI to construct proper models for signal
and exception handlers. As such, we can identify handler models from the audit log and
extract them before we apply M CI’s model parsing process.
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4

A2C : SELF DESTRUCTING EXPLOIT EXECUTIONS VIA INPUT
PERTURBATION

Malicious payload injection attacks have been a serious threat to software for decades. Unfortunately, protection against these attacks remains challenging due to the ever increasing
diversity and sophistication of payload injection and triggering mechanisms used by adversaries. In this chapter, we develop A2C, a system that provides general protection against
payload injection attacks. A2C is based on the observation that payloads are highly fragile
and thus any mutation would likely break their functionalities. Therefore, A2C mutates
inputs from untrusted sources. Malicious payloads that reside in these inputs are hence
mutated and broken. To assure that the program continues to function correctly when benign inputs are provided, A2C divides the state space into exploitable and post-exploitable
sub-spaces, where the latter is much larger than the former, and decodes the mutated values
only when they are transmitted from the former to the latter. A2C does not rely on any
knowledge of malicious payloads or their injection and triggering mechanisms. Hence, its
protection is general. We evaluate A2C with 30 real-world applications, including apache
on a real-world work-load, and our results show that A2C effectively prevents a variety of
payload injection attacks on these programs with reasonably low overhead (6.94%).

4.1

Introduction
Attacks which exploit software vulnerabilities are among the most prevalent cyber-

security threats to date. This is due, in part, to many complex combinations of potential
attack vectors: Buffer overfow attacks, Return-to-libc attacks [108], ROP [109], Jumporiented programming (JOP) [110], and Heap spraying [111, 112] to name just a few. Unfortunately, this ever expanding variety of exploit attack vectors has led to a constant “cat
and mouse game” of building defenses as each new attack is released.
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In light of this, many existing protection mechanisms focus on specifc attack vectors
and become less effective (or even completely ineffective) for others. For example, nonexecutable stack and heap have diffculty preventing code reuse (e.g., ROP) attacks because
the executable payload is constructed from the original code of the application. Shellcode detection techniques are only effective against injection of binary executable code
and are often bypassable [113–116]. Control Flow Integrity [117–120] prevents attacks
which exhibit certain abnormal control fows within a victim program. Further, some defense techniques may entail non-trivial overhead (e.g., [121]) or require hardware support
(e.g., [122]), which affects their application in practice. Based on this trend of attackspecifc defense, we are motivated to look for an entirely new, more fundamental weakness
of software exploits to provide an attack vector independent protection mechanism.
It turns out that all software exploit attacks invariably have two common characteristics:
First, they all need to inject an exploit payload into the target application. This payload
could be a piece of executable code (shellcode) or information that allows constructing
the malicious instruction sequence at runtime (e.g., a ROP chain that contains the entry
addresses of gadgets). Second, these payloads are famously brittle. Specifcally, exploit
payloads are designed with very strict semantic assumptions about the environment (e.g.,
memory layout, libraries, or known binary instructions) which require each byte of the
payload to be carefully tailored to a victim.
In this chapter, we will show that these invariant characteristics of exploit attacks make
it possible to protect applications from exploit injections independent of the attack vector
they use. Specifcally, we leverage the observation that exploit payloads (regardless of their
attack vector) are so brittle that any mutation would break their execution — i.e., cause the
execution to crash. For example, even simple mutation of x86 shellcode results in invalid
instructions. Similarly, most sequences of ROP addresses no longer form an executable
gadget chain if even a single byte is changed. Secondly, since these exploit payloads must
be injected into a victim application, their behavior eventually diverges from that of the
application’s legitimate inputs. Therefore, we propose that exploit payloads may be easily
disabled via a “shoot frst and ask questions later” policy, whereby all input to a victim
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program is immediately mutated and only those that are beyond the control of the adversary
are decoded.
Based on the above observations, we have developed the A2C (or “Attack to Crash”)
technique. A2C naturally exploits the brittleness of attack payloads by setting these attacks on track to crash before malicious logic is executed. First, any buffer inputs from
untrusted sources are securely encoded using A2C’s One-Time Dictionary, which varies
for each input buffer to prevent memory disclosure/value guessing based attacks. Since all
the untrusted inputs are mutated, malicious payloads that reside in these inputs are also mutated, resulting in broken payloads which will induce crashes when executed. Later, A2C
must undo the mutation in the buffer inputs, when the program begins using these inputs
to compute new values, so that our mutation does not cause any exceptions for legitimate
input.
Our evaluation shows that A2C is able to protect a variety of applications against a
wide spectrum of exploit attacks regardless of their injection methods, without affecting
the normal functionalities of the program. Further, because A2C requires no knowledge
of the specifc attacks (only leveraging the two invariant characteristics mentioned above)
it may even prevent currently unknown injection attack types in the future. The detailed
threat model considered in this chapter is presented in Section 4.5.
Our contributions are summarized in the following:
• We propose the novel idea of partitioning program state space into the exploitable and
post-exploitable sub-spaces so that we only need to protect the smaller exploitable
sub-space, which is critical to A2C’s effciency and effectiveness.
• We develop a novel constraint solving based approach that can determine the boundary of the two sub-spaces. This serves as the basis to compute the execution points
where the mutation can be safely undone.
• We develop a fow-, context-, and feld-sensitive static analysis to identify the places
at which A2C needs to undo the mutation so that execution on legitimate inputs is
not affected.
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• We develop an effcient runtime that leverages a One-Time Dictionary, which projects
a value to another unique value. The dictionary varies for each input buffer to prevent memory disclosure based attacks. A2C also features effcient calling context
encoding to support undoing input mutation.
• We develop a prototype A2C. The evaluation results show that A2C effectively
prevents a number of known payload injection attacks with low overhead (6.94%).

4.2 System Overview
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Figure 4.1.: Overall procedure of A2C

In this section, we present an overview of A2C, which is based on the following two
observations. (1) Most malicious payloads reside in buffers and they only go through copy
operations or simple transformations before the attack is launched. It is very rare for these
payloads to undergo complex transformations in the victim program before being executed.
This is due to the diffculty in controlling the transformations (in the victim program) to
generate meaningful payloads. (2) Malicious payloads are very fragile. Any mutation often
leads to an unsuccessful attack. For example, changing a few bits at the beginning of a
shellcode can easily throw off the sequence of executed instructions, leading to a crash.
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Terminal
write(Input, ✁); ...

Controllable
Transformative
(Copy operations)*
char Input[...];
Input = read(...);

memcpy(..., Input);
strcpy(✁, Input);
toupper(Input);
iconv(..., Input, ...);
mbtowc(..., Input, ...);
x = Input[...] + 3;
x = Input[...] * 2; ...

Exploitable space

Comparative
Input[...] == 'C'; ...

...

exit

Uncontrollable
Transformative
x = (int) Input[...];
x = Input[...] & 1;
x = Input[...] * y / ... ;
...

Decoding
Frontiers

Post-exploitable space

Figure 4.2.: Decoding frontiers

The overarching idea of A2C is to protect a program from malicious injection attacks
by perturbing or encoding inputs from untrusted sources. However, inputs from untrusted
sources (e.g., packets from remote IPs) are not necessarily malicious. We need to ensure
that our perturbation does not fail executions based on non-exploit inputs. According to
observation (1), we aim to undo the perturbation when the buffer data goes beyond copy
operations/simple transformations and starts being used in benign computation.
In the following, we use the diagram in Fig. 4.2 to illustrate the life cycle of buffer
data and hence the intuition behind A2C. After the buffer data are loaded through input
functions, they may undergo a number of transformations, including copy operations (e.g.,
memcpy() and strcpy()) that copy a buffer to another target buffer, constant table lookup
(e.g., in iconv(), toupper(), mbtowc(), and wctomb()), and simple transformative operations (e.g., additions with a constant). Then, the buffer data will eventually encounter one
of the following three kinds of operations: (1) Comparative operations, in which elements
in the buffer are used in comparisons; (2) Terminal operations, in which the buffer data are
passed to output library functions (e.g., write(), send(), and printf()); (3) Uncontrollable
transformative operations, in which elements in the buffer undergo transformations that
disallow the attacker to control the values beyond these transformations to construct meaningful payloads. For instance, type widening copies a value of smaller type (e.g., char) to
an array element of larger type (e.g., integer) so that each element in the array is padded
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with leading 0’s. As such, the resulting byte sequence denoted by the array cannot serve as
a meaningful payload.
We call these three kinds of operations the decoding frontier (DF) because A2C should
undo the perturbation for the buffer elements involved before executing the operations.
Intuitively, we consider the space before the frontier the exploitable space where the malicious payloads are supposed to take effect and without perturbation would successfully
exploit the program. Therefore, we use perturbation to achieve protection in this space.
The space after the frontier is referred to as the post-exploitable space. This is because
controlling the payload becomes infeasible if it has gone through these benign transformations conducted by the victim program. Therefore, it is safe to undo our perturbation before
the decoding frontier so that benign inputs can be used in computation as usual1 . The core
technical challenge for A2C is hence to identify the DF of a subject program and perform
instrumentation accordingly. More discussion about the decoding frontier can be found in
Section 4.4.1.
Another interesting observation that makes our solution feasible is that the exploitable
space is usually much smaller than the post-exploitable space as most computation happens
in the post-exploitable space. As such, the frontier tends to be small and shallow and as
explained above, operations beyond the frontier do not need our attention.
Overall Procedure. Fig. 4.1 shows the complete procedure of A2C. There are four phases:
constraint solving based decoding frontier computation, static analysis for determining encoding and decoding places which are a superset of the decoding frontier, instrumentation,
and runtime.
First, we leverage constraint solving to determine the uncontrollable operations. These
operations, together with the comparative and terminal operations, form the decoding frontier. This phase simply marks all the operations on the frontier.
Second, a fow-, context-, and feld-sensitive analysis is applied to determine the places
to instrument. It takes three inputs: the LLVM IR of the program, the decoding frontier
from the frst phase, and the untrusted input specifcation that identifes a set of library
1 Here

we assume that output library functions are hardened and thus cannot be exploited by the decoded
buffers.
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functions that read inputs, such as recv() for network inputs and read() for fle streams.
In this phase, A2C produces two outputs. Specifcally, the decoding set is a superset of
the decoding frontier and the encoding set contains the statements to encode (input) values,
such as recv() in network programs. Interestingly, the encoding set may also contain instructions that load constant values. Explanations about why we need to encode constants
can be found in Section 4.4.3. The computation of decoding and encoding sets (DE sets
for short) is iterative as new elements on encoding sets may introduce additional decoding
operations.
Third, the instrumentation phase statically instruments the program according to the DE
sets. An important observation is that the decoding frontier is context sensitive. Different
inputs may lead to different calling contexts of a function invocation. The membership of
a statement in the DE set may change with those contexts. As such, upon the execution
of a statement in the DE set, we need to know the current calling context to determine
if the instrumented version or the original version of the statement should be executed.
Therefore, part of the instrumentation phase handles the problem of effciently tracking the
current calling context.
Lastly, the runtime supports execution of the instrumented program. It features encoding based on a One-Time Dictionary, which projects a plaintext value to a unique encoded
value. Different input buffers use different dictionaries to prevent memory exposure based
exploits.

4.3

Illustrative Example
In this section, we use a real-world example to illustrate A2C’s operation. We use the

nginx 1.4.0 web-server as the subject program. It has two known heap buffer overfow
and integer overfow vulnerabilities, which can be triggered by providing crafted HTTP
requests containing malicious payloads. Fig. 4.3 shows two code snippets with part of the
original nginx program on the left and the corresponding instrumented version on the right.
The column in the middle shows how the two code snippets process the request differently.
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Original Program
File: ngx_recv.c
ssize_t ngx_unix_recv( … ) {
…
136: n = recv( c->fd, buf, size, 0);

Encoding/Decoding a request
1. Encoding a request
POST /index.php HTTP/1.1\r\nHost:...
ONRS..hmcdw-ogo.GSSO.0-0 . .Gnrs9...

File: ngx_http_parse.c
139: for (p = b->pos; p < b->last; p++) {
140: ch = *p;
…
160: if ( ch == ' ' ) {
...
179:
case 4:
...
182:
if ( ngx_str30_cmp( m, 'P','O','S','T' ) ) {
183:
r->method = NGX_HTTP_POST;

ssize_t ngx_unix_recv( … ) {
…
136:
n = recv(c->fd, buf, size, 0); Encode(buf, n);
File: ngx_http_parse.c

2. Comparing the first byte ('P')
POST /index.php HTTP/1.1\r\nHost:...
PNRS..hmcdw-ogo.GSSO.0-0 . .Gnrs9...

3. Comparing the first 4 bytes ("POST")
POST /index.php HTTP/1.1\r\nHost:...
POST..hmcdw-ogo.GSSO.0-0 . .Gnrs9...

File: ngx_http_request_body.c
int ngx_http_do_read_client_request_body( … ) {
…
302: n = c->recv(c, rb->buf->last, size);

Instrumented Program
File: ngx_recv.c

139: for (p = b->pos; p < b->last; p++) {
140: ch = *p;
…
160: if ( Decode(ch, 1) == ' ' ) {
...
179
case 4:
...
182:
if ( ngx_str30_cmp( Decode(m, 4) , 'P','O','S','T') ) {
183:
r->method = NGX_HTTP_GET;
File: ngx_http_request_body.c

4. Injected Code by Heap overflow/spraying
\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90...

302:

\x89\x89\x89\x89\x89\x89\x89\x89\x89...

File: ngx_http_request.c
int ngx_http_request_handler( … ) {
…
2133:
r->read_event_handler(r);

int ngx_http_do_read_client_request_body( … ) {
…
n = c->recv(c, rb->buf->last, size); Encode(rb->buf->last, n);
…

File: ngx_http_request.c
5. Jump to the injected code
call r->read_event_handler (= 0x00b7c010)
call r->read_event_handler (= 0xffb6bf0f)

int ngx_http_request_handler( … ) {
…
r->read_event_handler(r);

2133:

Figure 4.3.: Original and instrumented programs of demonstrative example

First, both programs receive a POST request at Line 136 in ngx recv.c. Since the
request is from an untrusted source, the instrumented program encodes the buffer. For
simplicity of discussion, the encoding here is to subtract 1 from every byte. Encode()
denotes this modifcation. The HTTP request “POST /index.php HTTP/1.1\r\nHost:
...” is hence encoded as “ONRS..hmcdw-ogo.GSSO.0-0..Gnrs9...”. The request is
parsed at Lines 160 and 182 in ngx http parse.c, which contain comparative operations
on some buffer data and are hence part of the decoding frontier. Therefore, the instrumented
program calls Decode() to undo the perturbation so that the program can parse and process
the request correctly. Note that it only decodes a few bytes (of fxed length) at a time so that
the decoded data cannot be run as any meaningful payload. Also observe that the original
buffer remains encoded. This is achieved by only decoding the values after they are loaded
into variables of primitive types (e.g., bytes and words).
Next, the ngx http do read client request body() function stores the contents
of the request into a different heap buffer. Notice that without A2C this becomes vulnerable to heap spraying attacks which can be further leveraged to launch attacks such as ROP.
Also, the same function has a heap buffer overfow vulnerability that allows overwriting a
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function pointer, read event handler, which will be called inside ngx http request
handler(). However, since the instrumented program encodes all external requests, the
payload at Line 302 and the address accessed at Line 2133 are mutated. Assume the malicious shellcode contains a sequence of nop instructions (0x90*n) for the nop-sled portion
of a heap spray attack and the malicious address injected is 0x00b7c010. In the instrumented program, the nop instructions (0x90*n) are encoded to “0x89*n”, which denotes
a sequence of mov instructions that write to invalid memory locations (e.g. mov ecx,
ecx(-76767677h)). At this point, even though the shellcode is successfully injected, due
to the mutation, it crashes upon execution. Similarly, the injected function pointer at Line
2133 is also broken. Note that if the request is valid, despite it being encoded by the instrumented program, it will be decoded at the frontier and will not affect normal execution.

4.4

Design

4.4.1

Decoding Frontier Computation via Constraint Solving.

The frst phase of A2C is to determine the decoding frontier that will be used to identify
the encoding and decoding sets in the next analysis phase. As we will see in the next
section, A2C needs to decode at more places than input related buffers.
According to the defnition in Section 4.2, the decoding frontier consists of three kinds
of operations: comparative, terminal, and uncontrollable. While the identifcation of the
frst two is straightforward, we focus on the third in this section.
We frst defne controllable operations as follows: if valid payloads can be generated
in a memory region (e.g., a buffer) right after a set of operations by manipulating program
inputs, these operations are controllable. An example of a controllable operation is the
toupper() transformation that turns a lower case character into its upper case. Assume an
application transforms a text input buffer A into another buffer B using toupper(). The
attacker can carefully prepare the input so that after the transformation, buffer B contains
the intended payload. It was indeed reported that existing operations in a program could be
leveraged to compute/decode payloads [123].
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We further formulate the determination of controllable operations as a constraint solving problem. We consider program inputs as symbolic variables. We further model the
operations that compute the values for a memory region (at a given program point) from
the program inputs as a set of constraints. We then assert the values (of the memory region)
to be some valid payload and query a solver if there is a satisfying (SAT) solution. If so,
one may be able to manipulate the input (e.g., using the SAT solution generated by the
solver) to induce the given payload. While it is diffcult to precisely defne what constitutes
a valid payload, we use the following procedure to determine if operations are controllable.
Procedure to Determine Decoding Frontier. Given a program to protect, A2C identifes
all memory regions larger than or equal to 16 bytes that can be affected by inputs (through a
standard static taint analysis). These regions include buffers, consecutive local variables (on
stack), consecutive global variables (in data section), as well as structures. For example,
four consecutive local integer variables related to inputs constitute a region for testing.
For these regions, A2C creates constraints according to the operations that compute the
values in the regions from program inputs. Other variables that are not related to inputs are
considered as free variables. This makes our analysis a conservative one as free variables
can take any values during constraint solving, whereas in practice these variables may have
various restrictions. After we generate the constraints, we use the Z3 solver [124] to test
whether payloads can be generated through these operations. In particular, we collected
1.4GB binary codes, 200MB shellcode, and 200MB ROP gadgets from Internet [125–129].
We also generate 1.0G random numbers. We further break the data sets down to sequences
based on the size of the region under testing. If the size is unknown, we use 16-byte
sequences. We then assert the values of the region equal to each of these sequences one
by one. If the constraint solver yields SAT, TIMEOUT, or UNKNOWN for any of the
sequences, which implies that an attacker may be able to construct some malicious payload
through the operations, then the operations are considered controllable. If the constraints
are UNSAT for all these sequences, the operations that defne the values of the memory
region are considered uncontrollable.
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Essence. Intuitively, we use the large pool of binary code and shell code snippets to model
the distribution of executable payloads and the large pool of ROP gadget subsequences
to model the distribution of address-based payloads (for code reuse attacks). We further
use a large set of random number sequences to model the distribution of other arbitrary
payloads. Since we only consider operations uncontrollable when all these sequences yield
UNSAT results, A2C provides strong probabilistic guarantees that the values beyond these
operations are not exploitable.
Note that for complex programs, it may be diffcult to model the entire data fow from
program inputs to the memory region of interest due to various reasons such as unmodeled
library calls and uncertainty of data fow caused by aliasing. A2C leverages backward
slicing, starting from the memory region of interest and traverses backward along data
dependencies until the traversal becomes infeasible (e.g., due to unmodeled library calls).
If program inputs cannot be reached by the traversal, A2C treats the farthest variables that
it can reach as free variables. Note that this yields an over-approximation, which is safe.
The decoding frontier analysis marks all the operations on the decoding frontier. Since the
algorithms in this phase are standard, details are omitted.
In the following, we use a number of examples to facilitate understanding of decoding
frontier.
Uncontrollable Operation Example One. Fig. 4.4 shows a code snippet from 464.h264ref
(i.e., a video decoding program) in SPEC 2006.

(a) Code snippet from 464.h264ref
// Declarations (Data Types)
m7[...][...];
1. unsigned int
2. unsigned short img[...][...];
3. unsigned short mpr[...][...];
...
// Transformative Operations
4. for (int x = 0; ...; x++ )
5. for (int y = 0; ...; y++ )
6. m7[x][y] = img[...][...] - mpr[...][...];

(b) Constraints from the code snippet
; Constraints for Operations (img - mpr)
7. m7[0,1,2,3] = img[0,1,2,3] - mpr[0,1,2,3]

/\

; Constraints for the range of unsigned short
8. 0 <= img[0,1,2,3] /\ 0 <= mpr[0,1,2,3]
/\
9. img[0,1,2,3] <= 65535 /\ mpr[0,1,2,3] <= 65535 /\
; Constraints for Payloads (i will select a payload)
10. m7[0,1,2,3] = payload[i, i+1, i+2, i+3]

Figure 4.4.: Uncontrollable operations due to type widening in 464.h264ref
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Fig. 4.4 (a) shows three arrays m7, img, and mpr with m7 a temporary array that stores
intermediate values during encoding, img holding raw input values and mpr calculated by
the program and not related to inputs. Observe that m7 is an int array whereas the other two
are arrays of short int. Fig. 4.4 (b) shows the constraints generated. Lines 7-9 denote the
constraints representing the operations. Line 7 denotes the subtraction at Line 6. Line 9
denotes the range constraints of img and mpr. We use “0,1,2,3” to represent that the same
constraint applies to four respective elements. Line 9 denotes the payload assertion. We
iterate this test with i from 0 to the number of sequences in our test data set.
The test result shows that the constraints are always UNSAT. This is mainly because the
assignment of short to int (called type widening) requires payloads to have two zero bytes
in every four bytes. As such, Line 6 is on the decoding frontier. Type widening is one of
the major reasons for uncontrollability. Another popular form of type widening is through
bit operations, namely, only a few bits of a word are set. Examples are omitted.
Uncontrollable Operation Example Two. Another common kind of uncontrollable operation is one that induces intensive correlations between values. For example, Fig. 4.5 (a)
shows a code snippet from 429.mcf in SPEC.

(a) Code snippet from 429.mcf
// Declaration (Data Types)
1. typedef struct network{
2. long n, n_trips, max_m, m;
...
3. } network_t;
...
4. network_t* net;
5. in[2] = read( InputFile );
// Transformative Operations
6. net->n_trips = in[0];
...
7. net->n = (in[0]+in[0]+1);
8. net->m = (in[0]+in[0]+in[0]+in[1]);
9. if ( ... ) net->max_m = net-> m;
10. else
net->max_m = 0xA10001;

(b) Constraints from the code snippet
; Constraints for Operations
11. net[0] = (2 * in[0] + 1)
12. net[1] = in[0]
13. ( (net[2] = (3 * in[0] + in[1])) \/
14. (net[2] = 0xA10001))
15. net[3] = (3 * in[0] + in[1])
; Constraints for Payloads
; (i will select a payload to test)
16. net[0] = payload[i]
/\
17. net[1] = payload[i+1] /\
18. net[2] = payload[i+2] /\
19. net[3] = payload[i+3]

Figure 4.5.: Uncontrollable operations in 429.mcf program

/\
/\
/\
/\
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Fields n, n trips, max m, and m are consecutive in the structure network and they are
all related to inputs (in[0] and in[1]). As such, A2C needs to test if the operations on
these felds are controllable. The constraints are shown in Fig. 4.5 (b). Observe that the
net→max m (i.e., net[3] in the constraint) and net→m (i.e., net[4]) are identical except
when net→max m has a constant value 0xA10001. The other 8 bytes are also closely
correlated through in[0] and in[1]. Consequently, the solver returns UNSAT for all the
payload tests.
Controllable Operation Examples. Most controllable operations are straightforward,
such as copy operations. Method toupper() is another example of a controllable operation. The solver returns SAT for many payload sequences, such as consecutive 0x90’s,
which represent the NOP instructions (nop-sled) in exploits. A2C also determines unicode
conversion functions (e.g., mbtowc()) as controllable. This is because while unicode conversion translates an ASCII character to two bytes with an additional byte (0x00), it also
translates two byte characters such as Chinese, Japanese, and Korean characters to two
bytes [130], making payload construction feasible. Our results echo the message conveyed
in [123] that Unicode conversion function can be leveraged to construct payloads. In fact,
all the data conversion/encryption/decryption/encoding via table lookup (e.g., iconv(),
mbtowc(), wctomb(), and Infate (Huffman Coding) Algorithm) are recognized as controllable by A2C.
Interestingly, we also observe that some operations of complex types and performing complex computations are determined as controllable by our analysis. Consider the
following example that leverages existing foating point operations to construct malicious
payloads. According to the IEEE-754 foating point representation standard, even a very
small foating point value can affect all the 4 bytes of its presentation. For example, a foating point variable 0.0001 is encoded as 0x38d1b717 in memory. Fig. 4.6 shows FNorm()
in 456.hmmer from SPEC. It frst adds all elements in v into sum using FSum(), and then
each element is divided by the sum if the sum is not 0.0. If the sum is 0.0, all the elements
in v have 1.0 / n where n is the size of v. Note that when there are multiple defnitions
of a variable (e.g., v[x]), A2C disjoins the constraints for these defnitions, which are rep-

97

(a) Code snippet from 456.hmmer

(b) Constraints from the code snippet

// Declarations (Data Types)
1. float v[...], sum;
2. int x, n;
// Transformative Operations
3. sum = FSum(v, n);
// FSum returns a sum of all elements.
4. if (sum != 0.0)
5. for (x = 0; x < n; x++)
6.
v[x] /= sum;
7. else
8. for (x = 0; x < n; x++)
9.
v[x] = 1. / n;

; Constraints for Operations
10. sum = vold[0] + vold[1] + vold[2] + vold[3] /\
11. (vnew[0] = (vold[0] / sum) or (1.0 / n)) /\
12. (vnew[1] = (vold[1] / sum) or (1.0 / n)) /\
13. (vnew[2] = (vold[2] / sum) or (1.0 / n)) /\
14. (vnew[3] = (vold[3] / sum) or (1.0 / n)) /\
; Constraints for Payloads
; (i will select a payload to test)
15. vnew[0] = payload[i]
/\
16. vnew[1] = payload[i+1] /\
17. vnew[2] = payload[i+2] /\
18. vnew[3] = payload[i+3]

Figure 4.6.: Controllable operations in 456.hmmer program

resented in the SSA form. The solver returns SAT for the constraints. The exploit input is
a sequence of values (e.g., −12068, −18966, −14108, −13991, ...) whose binary representations do not denote any meaningful payload. But they are transformed to a meaningful
payload by the operations in Fig. 4.6. The payload issues a system call through int 0x80
with arguments.

4.4.2

Static Analysis to Compute Decoding and Encoding Sets

In this section, we discuss the second phase, i.e., the computation of decoding and
encoding sets.
Language. A2C works on the Single Static Assignment (SSA) LLVM IR, which is generated from program source code. To facilitate precise discussion, we introduce a simplifed
language which models the LLVM IR in Fig. 4.7.
Memory loads and stores are denoted by LOAD(xa ) and STORE(xa , xv ), respectively,
with xa holding the address and xv the value. The address of a feld access is explicitly
computed by x := xbase → f with xbase the base pointer and f the feld. Array accesses can
be considered as a special kind of feld accesses. F(xa ) models a call to function F with xa
the actual argument and x f the formal argument. Function return is modeled by ret.
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Program
Stmt

Operator
Expr
Var
Const
Label

P ::= s
s ::= s1 ; s2 | skip | x :=` e | x :=` LOAD(ra ) |
STORE` (xa , xv ) | F` (xa ) | ret` | goto` (`) |
if (x` ) then goto(`1 ) | strcat` (xa1 , xa2 ) |
x := lib` (x1 , x2 , ...) | x := malloc` (xs ) |
x := φ ` (y, x1 , x2 ) | input` (xbu f , xsize )
op ::= + | − | ∗ | / | < | > | == | ...
e ::= x | c | x op c | x1 op x2 | x → f
x ::= {x1 , x2 , x3 , ...}
c ::= {true, f alse, 0, 1, 2, ...}
` ::= {`1 , `2 , `3 , ...}

Figure 4.7.: Language

Conditional or loop statements are not directly modeled. Instead we defne jumps using
goto and guarded goto. Conditional and loop statements can be constructed by combining jumps and guarded jumps. strcat(xa1 , xa2 ) denotes a function that concatenates two
strings. It appends the second string denoted by pointer xa2 to the frst string xa1 . We defne
lib(x1 , x2 , ...) to model library calls. It takes several xn ’s as arguments and returns a value
in another variable. Function input(xbu f , xsize ) models library calls that read inputs such as
read() and recv(). The x := φ (y, x1 , x2 ) denotes the φ function in SSA that determines
the value of a variable at the joint point of two branches. In particular, if y is true, x := x1
otherwise x := x2 . We also explicitly model heap allocation through the malloc() function.
Operator denotes uncontrollable (computed by the previous phase) or comparative operations. Each statement is annotated with a label, which can be intuitively considered as
the line number of the statement in the program.

4.4.3

Static Analysis Phase

We formulate the static analysis as an abstract interpretation process. Intuitively, abstract interpretation can be considered as “executing” the program on the abstract domain
instead of the concrete domain. The abstract domain is specifc to an analysis. In abstract
interpretation, it is often the case that branch outcomes cannot be statically determined.
Therefore, it assumes all branches are possible. In the presence of loops, the interpretation
may go through the loop bodies multiple times until a fx point is reached. If the abstract
domain is well designed, the interpretation procedure is guaranteed to terminate.
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Addr
a
PointsTo
σ
Source
SRC
TaintStore τ
Context
C
DecodeSet DEC
EncodeSet ENC

::= ` | x | a. f
::= (Addr | Var) ×Context → P(Addr)
::= CONST(`, x) | MARKED(`, x)
::= (Addr | Var) ×Context → P(Source)
::= `
::= P(< Context, Label,Var >)
::= P(< Label,Var | Const >)

ChkSrc(`, x) ::=
if MARKED(`m , xm ) ∈ τ ` (x,C) then
DEC := DEC ∪ {< C, `, x >}
if ({C, `, x} ∈ DEC) then
foreach CONST(`c , c) ∈ τ ` (x,C) then
ENC := ENC ∪ {< `c , c >}
ChkStrcat(`, xa1 , xa2 ) ::=
if ∃a ∈ σ ` (xa1 ,C), MARKED(`m , xm ) ∈ τ ` (a,C) then
if ∃b ∈ σ ` (xa2 ,C), CONST(`c , c) ∈ τ ` (b,C) then
ENC := ENC ∪ {< `c , c >}
if ∃a ∈ σ ` (xa2,C ), MARKED(`m , xm ) ∈ τ ` (a,C) then
if ∃b ∈ σ ` (xa1 ,C), CONST(`c , c) ∈ τ ` (b,C) then
ENC := ENC ∪ {< `c , c >}
TaintConst(`, x, c) ::=
if {< `, c >∈ ENC} then
τ ` (x,C) := {MARKED(`, c)}
else
τ ` (x,C) := {CONST(`, c)}

Figure 4.8.: Defnitions for abstract interpretation rules

Before the abstract interpretation, constants are propagated during preprocessing using
an existing LLVM pass (e.g., x1 ∗ x2 is rewritten to x1 ∗ c if x2 is determined to hold a constant c). During the analysis, A2C iteratively goes through program statements following
the control fow and updating the corresponding abstract states (e.g., the decoding set) until
a fx point is reached. Specifcally, A2C taints input buffers from untrusted sources. The
taints are propagated through controllable operations, which may be conducted through library functions (e.g., memcpy(), toupper(), and iconv()), linear operations (e.g., y = x
and y = 3 ∗ x), and so on. If a tainted value reaches an operation on the decoding frontier
computed in the previous phase, which includes comparative, uncontrollable, and terminal
operations, taint propagation is terminated and the operation is added to the decoding set.
However, the decoding set may be context-sensitive and path-sensitive. To handle such
cases, statements that load constant values may need to be considered as sources and hence
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encoded. As a result, more statements may be added to the encoding set and the decoding
set.
Defnitions. To facilitate discussion, we introduce a few defnitions in Fig. 4.8. Our analysis computes four kinds of abstract information: the points-to set, the taint set, and the
encoding and decoding sets. The points-to set σ is a mapping from an abstract address a
(representing some memory location) or a variable x, together with the calling context, to
a set of abstract addresses denoting the memory locations that may be pointed-to by a or
x. Abstract address Addr is denoted by some variable representing an abstract global/stack
array/buffer or a label denoting an abstract heap buffer, followed by a sequence of felds.
Intuitively, one can consider it as the reference path to some abstract memory location. The
role of abstract addresses in our static analysis is similar to that of concrete addresses in
dynamic analysis (e.g., to look up taint values). Since our analysis is context-sensitive and
feld-sensitive, context is part of the mapping and felds are explicitly modeled in abstract
addresses.
Source represents the (taint) source of a value. There are two types of Source: CONST
and MARKED, meaning a constant value and an untrusted input source, respectively. We
use the term MARKED to indicate that a value originates from some input buffer and
has only gone through controllable operations. Hence it is in the exploitable space (Section 4.2). Such values shall be in their encoded form at runtime. We track the MARKED
value propagation through our analysis. TaintStore τ stores the (taint) source information
for abstract addresses and variables. Both σ and τ are fow-sensitive, meaning that A2C
computes separate σ and τ for different program locations (i.e., labels). For example, we
use τ ` to denote the abstract taint mapping computed at `. It is implicit in the rest of the
chapter for simplicity in discussion.
If MARKED values reach an operation on the decoding frontier, the operation is inserted to the DecodeSet DEC. The EncodeSet ENC contains the set of statements at which
the (input) values ought to be encoded. Context C is denoted by a sequence of labels (`’s)
that models a call stack. Each element in the DEC set includes a Context, suggesting that
we decode input buffers depending on the calling context. For example, hC, `, xi ∈ DEC
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Table 4.1.: Abstract Interpretation Rules
Statement
`

input (xb , xs )

x :=` x1
(x =` x1 op c)
x :=` LOAD(xa )
STORE(xa , xv )
x :=` x1 op x2
x :=` x1 → f
x :=
lib` (x1 , x2 , ..)
x :=` c
strcat` (xa1 , xa2 )
F` (xa )

ret
x := φ ` (y, x1 , x2 )
x := malloc` (xs )

Interpretation Rule
σ ` (x

foreach a ∈
b ,C)
`
τ (a,C) := MARKED(`, xb );
ENC := ENC ∪ {h`, xb i};
σ ` (x,C) := σ ` (x1 ,C);
τ ` (x,C) := τ ` (x1 ,C);
S
σ ` (x,C) := ∀a∈σ ` (xa ,C) σ ` (a,C)
S
τ ` (x,C) := ∀a∈σ ` (xa ,C) τ ` (a,C)
∀a ∈ σ ` (xa ,C) : σ ` (a,C) ∪ := σ ` (xv ,C)
∀a ∈ σ ` (xa ,C) : τ ` (a,C) ∪ := τ ` (xv ,C)
σ ` (x,C) := ⊥;
ChkSrc(`, x1 ); ChkSrc(`, x2 );
σ ` (x,C) := {a · f | ∀a ∈ σ ` (x1 ,C)}
for each xi ∈ {x1 , x2 , ...}
ChkSrc(`, xi );
TaintConst(`, x, c);
ChkStrCat(`, xa1 , xa2 );
C0 := C; C := C · `;
// x f formal arg
σ ` (x f ,C) := σ ` (xa ,C0 );
τ ` (x f ,C) := τ ` (xa ,C0 );
foreach buffer var y ∈ F :
σ ` (y,C) = {y};
C := C − last(C);
σ ` (x,C) := σ ` (x1 ,C) ∪ σ ` (x2 ,C);
τ ` (x,C) := τ ` (x1 ,C) ∪ τ ` (x2 ,C);
σ ` (x,C) := `;

Name
I NPUT

N ON DF-O P
L OAD
S TORE
D F - OP
F IELD
D F - TERM
C ONST
S TRCAT
C ALL

R ET
P HI
H EAP

suggests that when the statement denoted by ` is encountered under context C at runtime,
A2C will decode the variable x.
Decoding Set is Context-Sensitive and Path-Sensitive. The membership of a statement
in the decoding set may change with the context. Fig. 4.9 shows an example in ngircd, an
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) daemon program. In this example, we treat all network functions
as untrusted input sources. Thus, the input data from these functions are encoded while
data from fles are not. ngt TrimStr() is a utility function for trimming a string. It is
invoked at different places. For instance, Read Config() calls it with a string from the
confguration fle, which is not encoded. On the other hand, Parse Request() also calls
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conf.c

tool/tool.c

VOID Read_Config(VOID){
...
386: fd = fopen( NGIRCd_ConfFile, "r" );
...
441: if( !fgets( str, ..., fd )) break;
442: ngt_TrimStr( str );

VOID
ngt_TrimStr(CHAR *String) {
...
// String can be either from
// a configuration file or
// a network message
40: start = String;
...
46: ptr = strchr( start, '\0' ) ✁ 1;
47: while(((*ptr == ' ') || (*ptr == 9) ||
(*ptr == 10) || (*ptr == 13) ||
...

parse.c
Parse_Request(..., CHAR *Request){
...
/* Request is a user request
through network. */
140: ngt_TrimStr( Request );

Figure 4.9.: An example of context sensitive code

it, but with a string from the network. The string is encoded this time. Hence, A2C may
or may not decode the value in *ptr at Line 47, depending on the context. Therefore, each
statement in the DEC set is annotated with a context such that decoding is only performed
when the same context is encountered at runtime.
The decoding set is also path-sensitive. Consider the example in Fig. 4.10 (a), which
contains code snippets from unrtf, a program for converting documents in Rich Text Format (RTF) to other formats such as HTML and LaTeX. At 2 and 3 , str may hold a
constant value or a tainted value ch. At 4 and 5 , str is inserted to a hash map. Strings in
the hash map are loaded and used at 6 . Depending on whether 2 or 3 is executed, Line
336 may or may not belong to the decoding set. In other words, if tmp holds a constant
string at 336, it does not need to be decoded. Note that in this case, the context of Line 336
cannot be used to distinguish the different behaviors of the line. We cannot afford to track
paths at runtime either. Hence, our solution is to identify the related constant strings, such
as that at Line 326, and treat them as input sources so that they will be encoded as well. As
a result, the behavior at Line 336 becomes path insensitive, always requiring decoding. 
Abstract Interpretation Rules. The interpretation procedure is formulated by the rules
in Table 4.1, which specify how the abstract information is updated upon each statement. Specifcally, when the program reads data from untrusted input sources through
input(xb , xs ) with xb the buffer address and xs the size, the TaintStore of all the abstract
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(a) unrtf program source (each circled number represents a block index)

(c) Abstraction interpretation state

parse.c

Ref.

Abstract Addr/Var

Taint

ENC

DEC

Description

1-2461
1-2661
2-3261
2-3271
5-1081
...
3-3321
5-1081
6-3351
6-3361

ch
ch
str
str[1]
hash[ ] str
...
str
hash[ ] str
tmp (=hash[...] str)
tmp

{M}
{M}
{C}
{C}
{C}
...
{M}
{C,M}
{C,M}
{C,M}

{ch246}
{ch246}
{ch246}
{ch246}
{ch246}
...
{ch246}
{ch246}
{ch246}
{ch246, "\\tab"326 }

{}
{ch266}
{ch266}
{ch266}
{ch266}
...
{ch266}
{ch266}
{ch266}
{ch266, tmp336}

1st iteration.
DF-OP

...
2-3262
2-3272
5-1082
...
3-3322
5-1082
6-3352
6-3362

...

...
{M}
{M}
{C,M}
...
{M}
{C,M}
{C,M}
{C,M}

...
{ch246, "\\tab"326 }
{ch246, "\\tab"326 }
{ch246, "\\tab"326 }
...
{ch246, "\\tab"326 }
{ch246, "\\tab"326 }
{ch246, "\\tab"326 }
{ch246, "\\tab"326 }

2nd iteration
{ch266, tmp336}
CONST
{ch266, tmp336, str[1]327} DF-TERM
{ch266, tmp336, str[1]327}
...
{ch266, tmp336, str[1]327}
{ch266, tmp336, str[1]327}
{ch266, tmp336, str[1]327}
{ch266, tmp336, str[1]327}

...

...

convert.c

static int read_word (FILE *f) {
...
246: ch = getchar(f);

✁
switch( ch ) {
✁

266:
323:
326:
327:

case '\t':
strcpy(str, "\\tab");
fprintf ( , str[1]);
...
case ';':
str[0] = ch;
...

331:
332:

void process_font_table (Word *w) {

1

2

// word_string(w) returns
// hash[...] str stored by word_new
335: tmp = word_string( w2 );
336: if( !strncmp("\\f", tmp, 2) ) { 6
...
}

✂

word.c

✁

✁
t_str = hash[✁]✂str;
✁

84:
86:

word_new (str);

4

return t_str;
}

word.c
Word* word_new(char *t){

✁

✁✂

hash[ ] str = my_strdup(t); 5

108:
}

✂

✂

char* word_string (Word* w) {

3

}
454:

✂

(b) Abstract interpretation path
1

2

4

5

1

3

4

5

str
str[1]
hash[ ] str
...
str
hash[ ] str
tmp (=hash[0] str)
tmp

✂
✂

✂

STORE
DF-OP

...

6
...

...

...

3rd iteration

Figure 4.10.: An example of the iterative interpretation procedure on unrtf

memory locations pointed to by xb are set to MARKED (Rule I NPUT). Note that using
the context C makes our analysis context sensitive. The encoding set is also updated. Rule
N ON -DF-O P describes the interpretation of an operation that is not on the decoding frontier, i.e., controllable operation such as copy. In this case, A2C copies the points-to set
and the abstract taint set. Rule L OAD describes that for a load instruction, the resulting
points-to/taint set is the union of all the points-to/taint sets of all abstract memory locations
pointed-to by the address xa . Similarly, for a store statement, the points-to/taint set of the
value variable xv is added to the points-to/taint set of any abstract memory location pointed
to by xa . A2C only propagates taints for controllable operations. Rules D F - OP handles an
uncontrollable operation or a comparative operation. It frst resets the taint. It then calls
function ChkSrc(`, x) that checks if variable x is tainted as MARKED. If so, the statement
together with the current context and the variable are inserted to the decoding set DEC. The
context and variable information is needed to indicate which variable should be decoded
and under what context. The function further tests if the statement is already in DEC and
the variable is currently tainted as CONST, suggesting that the statement sometimes uses a
value from untrusted input and sometimes uses a constant. This corresponds to the case in
which the decoding set is path sensitive. To eliminate such path sensitivity, A2C adds the
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source of the constant to ENC, indicating that the source should be tainted as MARKED
in the next round of abstraction interpretation.
Rule D F - TERM handles the other kind of operations in the decoding frontier: the terminal operations.
Rule C ONST handles constant assignment, including constant string assignment. It tests
if the constant assignment has been inserted to the ENC set (by Rules D F - OP or D F - TERM),
indicating that the constant should be encoded so that we need to fgure out its decoding
places. In this case, it sets the taint as MARKED, otherwise CONST. Rule S TRCAT
handles string concatenations. When a string from an untrusted source is concatenated with
a constant string, we add the constant string to the ENC set to indicate that the string shall
be encoded. Such concatenation happens frequently when a program uses string formatting
functions such as sprintf(). Rule C ALL updates the current context. It further propagates
the points-to and taint sets from the actual argument to the formal argument. At the end,
it sets the points-to sets of all the local buffer variables to contain themselves. The R ET
rule pops the last entry in the context. The P HI rule specifes that since x takes the value of
either x1 or x2 , its abstract sets are the union of those of x1 and x2 . A2C does not model path
conditions so that it essentially considers all paths are feasible and computes merged results
along various paths. Rule H EAP describes that we use the label of the allocation statement
to denote the abstract heap region allocated. In addition, the σ and τ entries computed at
a location are also propagated to its control fow successors. The rules are omitted as they
are standard. The abstract interpretation is iterative until a fx point is reached. It is easy to
infer that our analysis must terminate as all the abstract domains are fnite.
Example. Fig. 4.10 shows how the analysis works for unrtf that reads an RTF fle and
transforms it to various formats. Fig. 4.10 (a) shows some code snippets of the program.
The description of them can be found at the beginning of Section 4.4.3. The program is
simplifed and slightly changed from its original version for illustration.
The abstract interpretation procedure is equivalent to traversing the path in Fig. 4.10
(b). The real interpretation order inside A2C is slightly different due to the φ functions
that are omitted for easy explanation, although the outcome is identical. In the path, the
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two branches of the switch are traversed in two sub-paths: 1 2 4 5 and 1 3 4 5 . They
insert strings to the hash table and the strings are later accessed at 6 .
Fig. 4.10 (c) shows the abstract states computed by A2C in multiple rounds. Each
round follows the path in (b) during interpretation and corresponds to a sub-table in (c).
The frst column shows the block, line and round numbers of each statement. For instance,
2-3261 means Line 326 inside 2 in the frst round of interpretation. Here, we only show
the statements related to our analysis. The next two columns present the abstract address
or variable that each statement accesses and its taint set. C means the CONST type and M
denotes the MARKED type. The next two columns show the contents of ENC and DEC.
The last column presents the rules applied.
First Round. ENC and DEC sets are empty at the beginning. At 1 − 2461 , since ch is
loaded from an input source, we add ch246 to ENC to indicate that we should encode ch
at Line 246. Then, ch is used in a comparison at 1 − 2661 , thus we add ch266 to DEC,
meaning that we should decode ch at Line 266. For simplicity, we ignore the contexts in
the DEC set. At 2 − 3261 , a constant string is copied to str, and part of it is printed at
2 − 3271 . Since str has a constant taint at this point, it does not need to be decoded. Later
it is stored into the hash table at 5 − 1081 . Then, a character from a fle is copied to str at
3 − 3321 , and is then stored in the hash table at 5 − 1081 . Since A2C cannot distinguish if
the hash table write and the previous write access different (abstract) memory locations, it
unions the two taints so that the hash table is tainted with both CONST and MARKED,
according to Rule S TORE.
Later, at 6−3351 and 6−3361 , the stored string is loaded and compared with a constant
string “\\f”. According to Rule D F -OP, since Line 336 is comparative and tmp is tainted
with MARKED, it shall be decoded. An entry is hence inserted to the DEC set. Also
according to the second if statement inside ChkSrc(), which is invoked by Rule D F -OP,
the constant string at Line 326 is added to ENC, meaning that the constant string shall be
encoded.
Second and Third Rounds. The second round traverses the same path. At 2 − 3262 , the
constant string is MARKED as it is in ENC, meaning that we should track its propagation
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to fgure out the decoding places (Rule C ONST). As a result, str[1] at Line 327 is added
to DEC according to Rule D F - TERM. The rest is similar to the frst round. In the third
round, none of the abstract sets are updated, a fx point is reached. The analysis terminates.
From the fnal ENC and DEC sets, we should encode at Lines 246 and 326, and decode
ch, str[1] and tmp at Lines 266, 327 and 336, respectively. 

4.4.4

Runtime

Supporting Context Sensitivity. Once the analysis phase is fnished, we have the DEC
and ENC sets. Since both DEC and ENC are context sensitive, meaning that decoding
and encoding should be performed only under certain calling contexts, the instrumentation
needs to compare at runtime if the current context matches with that in DEC/ENC in order
to perform decoding/encoding.
A straightforward way to obtain the current context is to perform stack walking. However, it incurs signifcant overhead. Furthermore, the resulting contexts are verbose and
diffcult to compare. To address the problem, we adopt a precise calling context encoding
algorithm [131]. The algorithm maintains an id which is a unique number for each context.
Given a program and its call graph, the algorithm automatically determines a unique id for
each context. It further instruments the program in such a way that the instrumentation
(at call sites) guarantees to produce the corresponding id when a context is reached. The
instrumentation only requires simple (and low-cost) additions and subtractions before and
after a subset of call sites. Context comparison becomes simple id comparison. Since the
encoding algorithm is not our contribution, details are elided.
Encoding Based on One-Time-Dictionary. Simple encodings such as subtract-by-one
are easy for the adversary to reverse engineer. He/she can prepare the exploit accordingly
so that the exploit inputs become the plain-text payloads after our encoding. To address the
problem, we use one-time-cipher. In particular, A2C has a large number of pre-generated
random one-to-one mappings that project a byte to another unique byte. Whenever the program reads inputs from an untrusted source, A2C selects a mapping to encode the buffer.
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Since the dictionary for each untrusted input buffer is different from others, knowing previous mappings (e.g., through memory disclosure) does not help in launching subsequent
attacks. More discussion can be found in Section 4.5. Another thing we want to point out is
that A2C mutates every byte from an untrusted sources. As such, none of the instructions
from the original payload can be properly executed.
Using different dictionaries for different buffers requires A2C to track the dictionaries
for individual buffers so that decoding can be properly performed. This is achieved by
adding runtime taint propagation logic for controllable operations in the exploitable space.
For controllable operations that are not simple copies (e.g., y = 3 ∗ x), A2C decodes the
source operand(s), performs the operation, and encodes the resulting operand using the
same mapping. Since the exploitable space is very small, the entailed runtime overhead is
low (see Section 4.6).

4.5

Threat Model
A2C assumes the subject program is benign but the inputs may be malicious. The

user specifes which part of the inputs cannot be trusted such as network inputs and/or
local fle reads. It trusts the kernel. It also trusts that the low level output libraries are
free of vulnerabilities, as it decodes the buffer values before calling these libraries. If
they cannot be trusted, we can mitigate the problem by postponing the decoding to before
output syscalls, which requires instrumenting libraries. Note that we do not trust all library
functions. For example, we do not decode inputs for functions that copy data such as
strcpy and memcpy. In practice, such functions are commonly exploited by attackers
whereas output library functions such as write and send are not.
A2C aims to protect against payload injection attacks. It cannot handle other attacks
that do not inject payload. It also requires the payload injection go through explicit input
channels, which is true for most attacks. A2C currently only supports C/C++ programs
and hence cannot deal with payload injections for programs in other languages such as
JavaScript, although the idea is general.
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Attacks In the Post-exploitable Space. A2C leverages constraint solving and a large
pool of payload test cases that models the distribution of valid payloads to determine the
decoding frontier with strong probabilistic guarantees. However, it may still be possible to
construct some payloads via the very limited controllability of those uncontrollable operations on the decoding frontier. We argue that such payloads will have very limited functionalities. Moreover, we only protect against payloads that are larger or equal to 16 bytes.
While it may be possible to construct payloads smaller than that, we again argue that such
payloads will have very limited functionalities. Note that if a primitive value of four bytes
is related to input, the attacker could inject a four byte payload to that primitive if there
existed one. Protecting against such small payloads is almost impossible and unnecessary.
In practice, we have not seen any examples of these payloads.
Memory Disclosure. Memory disclosure vulnerabilities can reveal memory contents of
a process. Attackers can access memory pages that contain the encoded values and thus
reverse engineer dictionaries. For example, he/she can manipulate the input by providing a
sequence of unique values and then search in the disclosed memory for regions that have a
sequence of unique values of the same length. By contrasting the two, the dictionary can
be revealed. However, since A2C uses different dictionaries for individual input buffers,
disclosing previous dictionaries does not help in subsequent attacks. Since A2C uses a
random dictionary each time, it is really diffcult to guess the next dictionary even knowing
the previous dictionaries (i.e., 1 out N with N the number of pre-generated dictionaries).
We use N = 106 in this chapter.

4.6

Evaluation
A2C is implemented on LLVM [132]. We evaluate A2C on 18 different real world

programs shown in Table 4.2. All the experiments were done on a machine with Intel Core
i7 3.4GHz, 8GB RAM, and 32-bit LinuxMint 17.
We searched exploit-db.com to choose target programs. We tried the listed programs
with reported exploits and selected those which we could reproduce. We have 6 network
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Table 4.2.: Evaluation Results for Analysis
Program

Size

|ENC|

|DEC|

CS1

CCE2

Analysis Time
SA4
DF Comp.3

mupdf
483K
598
2283
241
172
1h 5m
prozilla
54K
98
754
391
104
9m 49s
stftp
18K
42
144
42
37
6m 51s
yops
9,215
49
153
4
12
24s
nginx
335K
151
1005
37
72
34m 14s
ngircd
119K
123
391
113
249
7m 39s
unrar
99K
36
239
44
164
17m 21s
mcrypt
36K
83
278
40
35
12m 41s
gif2png
16K
32
129
28
22
8m 19s
mp3info
17K
33
91
23
19
6m 9s
fcrackzip
48K
18
37
23
11
8m 17s
chemtool 176K
100
388
27
39
20m 35s
vfu
180K
64
129
49
318
12m 51s
unrtf
25K
31
220
291
178
14m 5s
rarcrack
1,364
7
19
39
9
0s
make
124K
106
719
125
94
31m 14s
Xerces-C 415K
121
1137
102
213
1h 28m
apache
208K
364
1586
98
63
1h 56m
1 # of Context Sensitive Statements.
2 # of instrumentations for Calling Context Encoding.
3 Decoding Frontier Computation Phase. 4 Static Analysis Phase

12m 11s
2m 43s
1m 58s
13s
17m 22s
10m 1s
7m 11s
4m 20s
1m 38s
2m 17s
2m 58s
7m 41s
8m 21s
2m 43s
5s
1h 40m
6h 21m
5h 41m

Table 4.3.: Evaluation Results for Attack Prevention
Program

# of Inputs
(Mal./Benign)

# of
Vulnerabilities

# of Payloads
(Shellcode/ROP)

# of Crashes
(Mal./Benign)

# of ins. exec.
in Payloads

mupdf
10 / 20
1 (CVE-2014-2013)
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.62
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.62
mcrypt
10 / 20
21
sftp
10 / 20
1 (EDB-ID: 9264)
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.6
yops
10 / 20
1 (EDB-ID: 14976)
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.62
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.62
nginx
10 / 20
1 (CVE-2013-2028)*
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.62
ngircd
10 / 20
22
unrar
10 / 20
1 (EDB-ID: 17611)
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.62
prozilla
10 / 20
23
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.6
gif2png
10 / 20
1 (CVE-2009-5018)
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.62
mp3info
10 / 20
1 (CVE-2006-2465)
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.62
fcrackzip
10 / 20
1 (EDB-ID: 14904)
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.62
chemtool
10 / 20
1 (EDB-ID: 36024)
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.6
vfu
10 / 20
1 (EDB-ID: 35450)
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.61
unrtf
10 / 20
1 (CVE-2004-1297)
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.62
rarcrack
10 / 20
24
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.62
make
10 / 20
1 (EDB-ID: 34164)
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.62
Xerces-C
10 / 20
1 (CVE-2015-0252)
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.62
10 / 20
25
50 / 50
1000 / 0
3.6
apache#
1 (CVE: 2012-4409, 2012-4527) 2 (CVE: 2005-0226, 2005-0199) 3 (CVE: 2005-0523, 2004-1120)
4 (EDB-ID: 15062, 15054) 5 (CVE: 2004-0940, 2006-3747) * This CVE includes multiple vulnerabilities

# of ROP Gadgets
Exec. in Payloads

Precision/Recall

0.1
0.18
0.08
0.05
0.09
0.11
0.18
0.09
0.09
0.05
0.05
0.18
0.18
0.18
0.05
0.18
0.07
0.13

100% / 100%
100% / 100%
100% / 100%
100% / 100%
100% / 100%
100% / 100%
100% / 100%
100% / 100%
100% / 100%
100% / 100%
100% / 100%
100% / 100%
100% / 100%
100% / 100%
100% / 100%
100% / 100%
100% / 100%
100% / 100%

# Version

1.3.31

programs, with two client programs: prozilla and stftp, and four server programs:
apache, nginx, yops, and ngircd. We have 12 user applications. mupdf reads and displays pdf documents. unrar is a decompressor program. mcrypt encrypts and decrypts
fles. gif2png converts gif to png. unrtf converts RTF fles to other formats such as
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HTML. mp3info reads and modifes meta tags of MP3 fles. rarcrack and fcrackzip
recover passwords of compressed fles (e.g., zip and rar fles) using different strategies.
vfu is a text-mode fle manager. chemtool is a GUI program for drawing chemical structures. Xerces-C is an XML parser. Among these programs, we have two GUI programs
that require user interactions: mupdf, and chemtool. vfu requires text-based user interactions.
The frst two columns of Table 4.2 show the programs and their size in C source code
lines (CLOC). The third and fourth columns present the number of entries in DEC and
ENC computed by our analysis. They are essentially LLVM IR statements annotated with
contexts. The ffth column shows the number of statements in DEC that behave differently
depending on the context. One such statement has multiple entries in the DEC set (for different contexts). The sixth column represents the number of instrumented IR statements for
calling context encoding. The last two columns show the time spent on computing the decoding frontier, and the static analysis for DEC/ENC set computation and instrumentation,
respectively. The overhead of decoding frontier computation includes the running time of
Z3 constraint solver. We use one minute as the timeout threshold. We also avoid testing
identical payload sequences.
From the table, we have the following observations. A2C can handle large and complex
programs such as mupdf and apache. The number of entries in ENC/DEC is small with
respect to the program size. This supports our speculation that the exploitable space is
small. The data in the ffth column also supports that context sensitivity is needed. Finally,
the analysis overhead is acceptable. Some large programs take a few hours. However, we
argue that this is one-time cost.

4.6.1

Performance

Performance for Programs with Vulnerabilities (i.e., those in Table 4.2). To evaluate the
runtime overhead of A2C, we run both the original program and the instrumented version
10 times and take the average. We use large inputs. For example, we use document fles
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that are larger than 10MB to test fle processing programs unrtf, Xerces-C, and gif2png.
As such, the native executions usually last for more than a few seconds. For the programs
that require user interactions, we force them to quit after they load, process, and render the
inputs, and before they take any user interactions. We manually identify the locations in the
source fles that indicate such status (e.g., before calling a function to change the status bar
to show the input is successfully loaded and rendered) and insert exit() to these locations.
We then measure the overhead for these shortened executions. Note that, this usually leads
to over-approximation of the overhead as our instrumentation largely lies in the initial input
loading and parsing logic.

10%

6.11%

8%

6%

4%

2%

0%

Figure 4.11.: Normalized overhead on programs in Table 4.2

Fig. 4.11 shows the result. The average overhead is 6.11%. In most cases, the overhead
is less then 6%. There are a few exceptions. Programs dedicated to processing and parsing
input fles such as make, Xerces-C, unrtf, and gif2png have relatively higher overhead.
This is because the instrumented statements are being executed throughout the execution.
Also, the programs that require interactions, e.g., mupdf, chemtool, and vfu, have relatively higher overhead. This is because of the way we measure the overhead. apache
has the highest overhead (9.84%) due to the complex structure of input flters that leads to
many constant strings being encoded.
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14%

8.18%
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10%
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Figure 4.12.: Normalized overhead on SPEC CPU2006 programs

SPEC CPU2006. We also evaluate the performance of A2C on SPEC CPU2006. We run
both the original and instrumented programs 10 times using the reference inputs. Fig. 4.12
shows the result. The average overhead is 8.18%. 401.perlbench, 403.gcc, and 483.xa
lancbmk have relatively higher overhead because they process inputs intensively. 456.hmm
er has 9.94% overhead as it processes inputs even during the execution of its main algorithm. 429.mcf and 462.libquantum have extremely low overhead, less than 1.5%. This
is because they process inputs once at the very beginning. As such, A2C only needs to
decode at the beginning and the rest of the execution does not cause any overhead. The
average overhead for all 30 programs including programs in Table 4.2 and SPEC CPU2006
is 6.94% and the geometric mean is 5.94%.

4.6.2

Effectiveness

To evaluate the effectiveness of A2C in preventing attacks and allowing benign executions, for each program, we prepare 10 exploits and 20 other benign inputs. For each
exploit input, we prepare 100 different malicious payloads, including 50 shellcodes and 50
ROP payloads.
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The shellcodes are generated from [127], and we use ROP attack creators [128, 129]
to generate 50 different ROP payloads for each vulnerable application. Thus, we have
1,000 attack executions and 20 benign executions for each program. Note that, as shown
in Table 4.3 Column 3, some programs have more than one vulnerability, which require
unique exploit inputs. The table also shows the results. Observe in the ffth column, A2C
successfully crashes all the attacks and allows all the benign inputs to proceed to normal
termination and produce the expected outcomes. The next two columns show the average
number of payload/gadget instructions that got executed before crashing. They are all in
very small numbers. As such, they can hardly cause any damage to the system.
Decoding Frontier (DF) Operation Classifcation. We further analyze the DF operations
for all the subject programs and classify them into a few categories. Fig. 4.13 shows the
results, from which we have the following observations.

100%

80%

Comparative
(63%)

60%

Uncontrollable transformative
(18%)
40%

Terminal
(19%)
20%

Type
Widening
(5%)

Irreversible
Calculation
(5%)

Primitive Type
Conversion
(5%)

Indexing
(3%)

0%

Figure 4.13.: Different types of decoding frontiers

First, 63% operations on DFs are Comparative Operations. Note that comparative operations are mostly conducted on individual buffer elements (of primitive types), A2C only
decodes the element needed by the operation. The decoded value is dead (e.g., overwritten) right after the operation. Such DF operations cannot be exploited. Second, 19% DF
operations are Terminal Operations. For a terminal operation, A2C frst copies the original
buffer to a temporary buffer, and then decodes the temporary buffer. Also, after the terminal operation, A2C releases the temporary buffer to minimize the attack window. Third,
we also identify a few kinds of Uncontrollable Transformative Operations. In particular,
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Type Widening expands each element in a buffer by padding it with some specifc byte(s)
such as 0x00. Note that we use the constraint solver to determine whether each case of type
widening is controllable as not all type widening cases are uncontrollable. In fact, casting
a one-byte data type to a two-byte data type is solvable in many cases. Note that some
binary operations (e.g., multiplication) of values with smaller types yield a value of a large
type. These are not type-widening as the bits in the resulting value are often fully/largely
controllable. Irreversible Calculation means arithmetic transformations that cause intensive correlations among values so that the solver returns UNSAT for all tests. An example
can be found in Section 4.4.1. Primitive type conversion means that a buffer element is
converted to a value of primitive type (e.g., atof()) and this value is not stored to any
array/buffer. Since single primitive values can hardly be exploited to inject payloads due
to the size, decoding is safe. Note that A2C protects consecutive primitive values if they
can form a region larger than 16 bytes. Indexing means that an encoded value is used to
index a non-constant array. It is safe to decode the value because the decoded value is of a
primitive type and soon dies after the operation. The entire buffer is never decoded.
Decoding Frontier (DF) Computation. Table. 4.4 shows the evaluation results of decoding frontier computation. The frst column shows the programs. The next three columns
show the numbers of controllable operations, uncontrollable operations, and their sum, respectively. The last column shows the average number of constraints for each memory
region under test. Recall that if the solver returns SAT, TIMEOUT or UNKNOWN for a
constraint in any payload sequence test, the corresponding operations are considered controllable.
We make the following observations. First, in most cases, there are more UNSAT cases
than SAT cases. This means that most input related computations are not controllable.
There are a few exceptions. gif2png, apache, and chemtool have more SAT cases as our
modeling of the external library calls is not complete and the modeling of foating point
functions is conservative. For example, we assume exp() function can return any positive foating point values while the parameter of the exp() function may have constraints,
hence it may not be able to produce some foating point values. Note that such a conser-
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Table 4.4.: Results for Decoding Frontier Computation
Program
mupdf
Prozilla
stftp
yops
nginx
ngircd
unrar
mcrypt
gif2png
mp3info
fcrackzip
chemtool
vfu
unrtf
rarcrack
make
Xerces-C
apache
Average

# of Operations
Controllable Uncontrollable
9
141
4
20
2
8
0
1
4
41
2
12
6
33
4
24
13
10
4
9
4
4
29
22
3
25
2
22
0
0
9
53
14
75
145
129
14.1
34.9

Total
150
24
10
1
45
14
39
28
23
13
8
51
28
24
0
62
89
274
49

Avg. # of
Constraints
16.4
15.9
11.5
8
17.2
14.1
14.2
18.3
16.9
15.3
13.6
14.1
15.5
14.5
0
15.4
14.8
17.7
14.05

vative assumption only causes over-approximation. Second, the total number of operations
for testing is not large (apache has the largest number 274). This is because the controllability classifcation for most operations is straightforward (e.g., comparative operations
and copy operations) and hence does not require constraint solving. Third, the average
number of constraints in our tests is not large, suggesting that controllable operations are
often shallow in the data fow, meaning that they are close to program inputs. This supports
our assumption that most computation happens in the post-exploitable space. Note that we
do not need to test controllability of operations if their operands are not controllable.

4.6.3

Case Studies

Running Web Servers on Real-world Traffc. To further evaluate the robustness of A2C,
we run the instrumented web servers on a real-world traffc log. We obtained our institu-
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tion’s server access log from November 2015 to January 2016. The log contains 5.6 million
requests with 4.2 million unique requests, including some suspicious requests with binary
payloads (about 100 of them). We also randomly inject 300 exploit inputs to the access log.
We ran three servers (apache, nginx, and yops) with these requests. The results show that
the instrumented versions produce the same expected results as the original versions except
for the attacks. All attacks are prevented. The throughput is only reduced by 8.83%, 7.37%,
and 5.49%, respectively.
Code Injection Through Benign Functions and Payload Triggered Through Integer
Overfow. In this case study, we show how a payload can be injected through benign
and non-vulnerable program logic and later triggered by an integer overfow vulnerability.
Such a combination makes it diffcult for traditional defense techniques. Fig. 4.14 shows
code snippets of the victim program, mupdf. First, observe that the xps read dir pa
rt() function reads a fle. It opens a fle at Line 455, then gets the size of fle at Line
458. Later, it reads the fle and puts it into a heap buffer (part->data) at Line 462.
Note that the function xps read dir part() is not vulnerable. But still, the attacker can
provide a crafted xps fle that contains a malicious payload. The payload will be injected
through the normal fle read in the benign function. Thus, most existing protection schemes
including CFI, DFI, ASLR, and boundary checkers cannot prevent such injection. While
malicious payload detection methods can identify the injected shellcode by scanning the
input fle at the fread function, the attacker can use obfuscation techniques to circumvent
such detection.
To trigger the payload, the attacker exploits an integer overfow vulnerability. The integer overfow happens as follows. It reads input from a fle at Line 91 in lex number().
Then the input is propagated to Line 97 where the integer overfow occurs. The program
assumes the input c is between ‘0’ to ‘9’, and converts it into an index (i). At Line 106,
the converted index is stored into buf->i. Later, the index is used to write elements into
a structure (at Lines 176-178 in pdf repair obj stm()). Note that the earlier index is
propagated to variable n which is also used as an index. This integer overfow can be
leveraged to overwrite some critical data felds such as function pointers in order to change
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control fow of the program to the injected shellcode. Note that the exploit may not be detected by address sanitizers as the attacker can manipulate the offset n to directly overwrite
the target memory addresses that may fall into other legitimate memory regions, without
overwriting the canaries.
In contrast, A2C defeats the attack by breaking its weakest link, which is the injected
payload itself. In particular, A2C mutates the input including the shellcode at the fread in
Line 462. The original shellcode is shown in Fig. 4.14 (a), and the corresponding mutated
shellcode in Fig. 4.14 (b). Observe that the mutated shellcode is broken and not executable.

xps/xps_zip.c
static xps_part* xps_read_dir_part(...) {
455:

✁

file = fopen(buf, "rb");
...
458:
fseek(file, 0, SEEK_END);
459:
size = ftell(file);
...
462:
fread(part->data, 1, size, file); // Shellcode Injection

pdf/pdf_lex.c
static int lex_number (✁) {
...
91: int c = fz_read_byte(f);
...
case RANGE_0_9:
97:
i = 10*i + Decode( c )
- '0';

✁

106:

buf->i = i;

pdf/pdf_repair.c
static void
pdf_repair_obj_stm (...) {
...
172: n = buf.i;

✁

// Triggering the shellcode
176: xref->table[n].ofs = num;
177: xref->table[n].gen = i;
178: xref->table[n].stm_ofs = 0;

(a) Injected Shellcode

(b) Mutated Shellcode

push 0x2e2e2e62
mov edi, esp
xor eax, eax
...
Hex: 68 62 2e 2e 2e 89 e7 33 ...

ret
0x84c8
test
in
eax, dx
...
Hex: c2 c8 84 84 84 23 4d 99 ...

Figure 4.14.: Integer overfow in mupdf

Note that A2C does not prevent the integer overfow. Even through it encodes the input
value at Line 91, it decodes the value right before the overfow (at Line 97) because that is
an operation of primitive type. In other words, the attacker can still exploit integer overfow
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vulnerabilities. However, when the control fow of the program is redirected to the injected
shellcode, the execution crashes almost immediately as the frst instruction of the mutated
shellcode is “ret 0x84c8”, which does not have a valid return address.
One might think the attacker can exploit the integer overfow to direct the control fow
to some buffer in the post-exploitable space. However, as we pointed out in Section 4.5, the
transformations performed by the subject programs are complex enough that the attackers
cannot generate plain-text payloads in the post-exploitable space.
Preventing ROP attacks. As DEP (Data Execution Prevention) becomes more and more
popular, attackers now use ROP to bypass such protection. In this case study, we show how
A2C prevents ROP attacks using an example.

convert.c

(a) Injected ROP gadgets

void process_font_table (...) {
...
331: char name[255];

Address Instructions
0x804d820 mov ebx,0x0; ret
0x804ec7d mov eax,0x806275c; ret
...
...

341: while (w2) {
342: tmp = word_string(w2);
343: if ( tmp &&
Decode( tmp[0] ) != '\\' )
344: strcat( name, tmp );

(b) Mutated ROP gadgets

✁

Address Instructions
0xa2ae728a Invalid address
0xa2ae46d7 Invalid address
...
...

Figure 4.15.: Stack buffer overfow in unrtf

Fig. 4.15 shows unrtf which has a stack buffer overfow vulnerability. It can be leveraged to inject a malicious payload that allows constructing a ROP gadget chain. The program frst gets a user provided string at Line 342. Then, it compares the string with a
constant at Line 343. As it is a comparative operation, A2C decodes the value, allowing
proper comparison. The buffer overfow happens when the program copies the user provided buffer (tmp) to a local buffer name at Line 344 in process font table(). Observe
that the size of name is only 255. Thus, providing a long enough input to the tmp buffer
will result in a stack overfow.
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Fig. 4.15 (a) shows the injected ROP payload and the corresponding gadgets. The
address column shows the payload that contains the raw addresses of the ROP gadgets.
The instructions column shows the instructions from the ROP gadgets. Observe that they
all end with a ret instruction. These chains of instructions are essentially the ones that
get executed once the attack is launched. Fig. 4.15 (b) shows the mutated payload. For
demonstration purpose, we use a simple encoding/decoding scheme even though our implementation uses one-time-dictionary. In particular, the mutation is to xor a value with
0xAA. Observe that all the addresses in the original payload are encoded and point to invalid addresses. Hence, the attack fails. Note that since A2C prevents attacks by mutating
payloads, the injection methods do not affect our protection.
Preventing English Shellcode. As a counter attack to shellcode detection techniques, Mason et al. proposed an automatic way to generate shellcode which is similar to English
prose [115]. Such technique can be used to avoid existing shellcode identifcation techniques [133–136].

English Shellcode and Mutated English Shellcode
Assembly

Opcode

ASCII

push esp
push 0x20657265
...
inc
dl
iret
...

54
68 65 72 65 20
...
fe c2
cf
...

There is a
majorcenter of
economic activity, ...
No ASCII character
found

Figure 4.16.: English shellcode example

Fig. 4.16 shows an example of English Shellcode presented in [115]. As shown in the
ASCII column, the shellcode is an English statement. The corresponding assembly instructions are listed in the frst column. While we are just showing one example, in practice attackers also use other various shellcode obfuscation and compression techniques [137,138]
to avoid shellcode identifcation. A2C mutates all untrusted inputs including shellcodes
as they are part of the inputs. The mutated English Shellcode includes those shaded in

120
Fig. 4.16. For demonstration, we again apply the xor with 0xAA mutation. Observe that
the mutated shellcode is completely different from the original shellcode. While the frst
instruction is executable, it does not help attackers to achieve anything useful. More importantly, the second instruction is iret, which can only be executed in a kernel mode.
Executing iret results in a segmentation fault. One interesting observation is that the frst
a few instructions in the mutated shellcode are often executable. The ffth column of Table 4.3 shows the average number of instructions executed in the mutated payload is very
small (<4). It is also important to note that such a few (mutated) instructions do not have
the same semantics as the original malicious logic. They often immediately lead to crashes
and do not cause any damage to the system.
Buffer Overfow In Structure. AddressSanitizer [139] is an important technique to prevent various buffer overfow attacks including heap and stack overfows. It works by placing canaries before and after a buffer. One of the limitations of the technique is that it
cannot handle buffer overruns within a structure.

Program.c

Program.h

void process(RECORD* p) {
fread( p->name, ✁ );
printf("Name: %s\n",
Decode( p->name ));
3: p->handler( p->privilege );

typedef struct tag_RECORD {
char name[255];
void (*handler)(int);
int privilege;
} RECORD;

1:
2:

Figure 4.17.: Buffer overrun in structure

Fig. 4.17 shows a buffer overfow vulnerability in a structure. Specifcally, buffer
name in the structure RECORD can affect adjacent data felds including a function pointer
handler. At Line 1, it reads a fle to fll the name buffer. By providing an input string
longer than 255 bytes, it can overwrite handler. Note that A2C mutates the input in
fread at Line 1, the handler is overwritten with a mutated address. Then, the program
calls printf to display the name on the screen. As printf is an external call, A2C decodes the input buffer name. Specifcally, in our implementation of the decoding function,
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when A2C decodes a buffer for a library call, it allocates a new buffer, copies the original
encoded buffer, and then decodes it in the new buffer before passing it. Since A2C does
not decode the original buffer, the injected malicious payload remains mutated. At Line
3, the program calls handler. Although it is overwritten, the function pointer no longer
points to the injected shellcode. Note that the privilege feld can also be overwritten to
launch non-control data attacks [140]. A2C mitigates the attacks by encoding the inputs
from untrusted sources. As a result, the attacker cannot control the overwritten value.

4.7

Related Work

Control-fow Integrity (CFI). Recent advances in control-fow integrity have developed
very robust systems for preventing malicious/abnormal control fows within a victim program. These typically monitor execution to enforce pre-determined control fow paths [117–
120,141–146]. In contrast, A2C provides protection by corrupting input payloads, which is
a perspective orthogonal to the enforcement of a program’s legitimate control fow graph.
Therefore, A2C is complementary to and can be deployed alongside CFI, e.g., to prevent exploit injection attacks that may employ indirect calls or not violate control fow
integrity [146–153].
Malicious Payloads Detection. In [133] and [134], researchers proposed analyzing inputs to detect malicious payloads with little runtime overhead. However, Fogla at el. [154]
demonstrated that polymorphism techniques can defeat these approaches. Dynamic analysis using emulation [155, 156] have been proposed to uncover polymorphic payload injection attacks, but they cause non-negligible performance penalty. A2C mutates all input
buffers from untrusted sources and thus is resilient to polymorphism. It does not require
emulation and causes low overhead. Nozzle [157] proposed a novel technique to detect
heap spraying attacks at runtime. It uses runtime interpretation and static analysis to analyze suspicious objects in the heap. While Nozzle focuses on detecting heap spraying on
JavaScript, A2C takes a more general approach to prevent a wider range of input injection
attacks.
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Randomization Approaches. Address space layout randomization (ASLR) is one of the
most widely deployed defense mechanism to mitigate payload injection and triggering.
ASLR randomizes the memory layout of a program when the OS loads the binary and dynamic libraries. ASLR is already a default defense mechanism in most operating systems
including Linux, MacOS, BSD, and Windows. Address space layout perturbation [158] and
fne-grained randomization techniques [159–164] have been developed to provide higher
entropy. Instruction set randomization [122, 165, 166] aims to change the underlying instruction set to prevent executing injected code. However, it was shown recently that
randomization could be evaded by brute-force attacks [108, 167], memory disclosure attacks [168–170], and just-in-time code reuse attacks [171]. In [172], researchers presented
a novel defense technique to mitigate counterfeit object-oriented programming (COOP) attacks [151]. They randomize the layout of the code pointer table and plant booby-traps to
prevent brute-force attacks. Compared to these techniques, A2C provides protection by
working from the input perspective, which is complementary to randomization. Data randomization [121, 173] dynamically decrypts a buffer upon each buffer access and encrypts
it again after the access. It encrypts all buffers including those not related to inputs. It also
uses different keys for various buffers. A2C shares a similar idea of buffer encoding with
data randomization. The differences lie in that A2C focuses on input related buffers; it
encodes only once for each input and decodes only at the decoding frontier. As such, A2C
has relatively lower overhead. PointGuard [174] encrypts pointer values at runtime.
Bounds Checking. Stackguard [175] inserts a secret value (canary) before each return
address and frame pointer. However, it can be defeated through information leak attacks
that reveal a canary value [176, 177]. Compile-time code analysis [178, 179] have been
proposed to detect unsafe array and pointer accesses. However, they often generate many
false positives and focus on specifc kinds of vulnerabilities. Cling [180] and AddressSanitizer [139] provide pointer safety to prevent exploiting pointer related bugs such as
use-after-free. However, as shown in our case study, they can hardly handle advanced
attacks [181]. In contrast, A2C aims to break the weakest link of attacks, which is the
payload itself.
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5

CONCLUSION

As cyber-attacks are becoming more and more persistent and sophisticated, investigating
and preventing advanced cyber-attacks such as APTs is of the utmost importance. In this
dissertation, we present three fundamental primitives for the investigation and prevention
of advanced cyber-attacks. Specifcally, we adopt the original concept of counterfactual
causality in the context of program and program execution in order to precisely infer causality between system call events. Moreover, we proposed a model-based causality inference
technique that can precisely infer causality without any modifcation on end-user systems.
Finally, we develop a novel attack prevention technique which can prevent unknown zeroday exploits by perturbing inputs. In other words, we showed that accurate attack investigation and general protection against advanced and sophisticated attacks can be achieved
by leveraging causality inference and fundamental weaknesses of the attacks.
In particular, we present L DX, a causality inference engine by lightweight dual execution. It features a novel numbering scheme that allows L DX to align executions. L DX can
effectively detect information leak and security attacks. It has much better accuracy than
existing systems. Its overhead is only 6.08% when executing both the master and the slave
concurrently on separate CPUs. This is much lower than systems that work by instruction
level tracing although they do not require the additional CPU and memory.
Second, we propose M CI, a novel causality inference algorithm that directly works on
audit logs provided from commodity systems. M CI does not require any special efforts
(e.g., training, instrumentation, code annotation) or framework (e.g., enhanced logging,
taint tracking) on the end-user. Our off-line analysis precisely infers causality from a given
system call log by constructing causal models and identifying the models in a given audit
log. We implemented a prototype of M CI and our evaluation results show that M CI is
scalable to cope with large scale log from long-running applications. We also demonstrate
that M CI can precisely identify causal relations in realistic attack scenarios.
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Finally, we describe A2C that provides general protection against a wide spectrum of
payload injection attacks. It mutates all input buffers from untrusted sources to break malicious payloads. To assure the program functions correctly on legitimate inputs, it decodes
them right before they are used to produce new values. A2C automatically identifes such
places at which it needs to decode using a novel constraint solving based approach and a
sophisticated static analysis. Our experiments on a set of real-world programs show that
A2C effectively prevents known payload injection attacks on these programs with reasonably low overhead (6.94%).
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